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Preface 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A few years ago a professor told me that research activity is possible only if it 
has been desired, contemplated and built upon since youth. 
This path started eight years ago during a bioethics course at the University; during 
those lessons I heard about bioethics for the first time. After that course I began to study 
bioethics, in particular clinical ethics, in my opinion one of the most interesting and 
fascinating contemporary research fields. I decided to present my candidacy to a 
Doctoral Program after two degree theses in bioethics and pursuing a Master’s Degree 
in Bioethics and Education. During the entrance exam I presented a research project 
regarding method in clinical ethics: I wanted know how an ethical issue can be resolved 
in a clinical setting and learn what type of relationship can exist between daily clinical 
activity and ethics reasoning. 
This dissertation is a step in this research project, conducted as part of the doctoral 
program I started three years ago. 
During this period I attended the Center of Clinical Ethics at the Icahn School of 
Medicine at Mount Sinai Hospital in New York (January-April 2014), under the 
tutelage of professor Rosamond Rhodes in order to learn how a Clinical Ethics Service 
functions in a Hospital and how to conduct ethics consultations in different medical 
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settings. Furthermore, I attended the Hastings Center in Garrison, NY, directed by 
Professor Mildred Z. Solomon, during May and June of the same year. My research 
project was directed to improve a theoretical approach to face ethics consultation. 
I also worked as an intern, the Palliative Care Department at the Hospice in the 
Rehabilitation Center “Domus Salutis” in Brescia for eleven months, during the last 
year of my doctoral course. 
During these three years my research has focused on the figure of the ethics consultant, 
more specifically about what kind of method he/she should apply to conduct an ethics 
consultation in concert with patient, family members, medical staff and administrative 
organs of a medical center. 
The work which took place during these three years is described in the following pages. 
That professor who told me the secret to research activity now is my master. He has 
given me the possibility to improve my competencies in bioethics and clinical ethics. 
Many thanks, Professor, for all those times you encouraged me while I was learning. 
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Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Why is an ethics consultant called to resolve ethical controversies in a clinical 
context? What kind of core competences should an ethics consultant have? 
These two general questions open a myriad of philosophical and medical considerations 
to which only a strong relationship between medicine and philosophy can offer virtuous 
responses. 
Often researchers in Bioethics have conflicting ideas in particular about the field of the 
Clinical Ethics. Some safeguard the theoretical origin of the ethical reflection about 
daily clinic activity; others defend the medical field as the precise setting in which 
Clinical Ethics was born and is developing.1 
A proper attitude might be to recognize that Clinical Ethics arises in both fields.  
Clinical and bioethics are inseparable, because ethics consultation is impossible without 
each one of them. 
One goal of the following dissertation is to demonstrate how philosophy, in particular 
ethics, is necessary in medical practice to improve clinical ethics consultations; and, at 
the same time how medicine is the only substratum to improve clinical ethics 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 These considerations have been deduced from introductive lectures by Robert Baker, Rosamond 
Rhodes, George J. Agich and Stella Reiter to the ICCEC meeting occurred in New York, May 19th-22th, 
2015. See also Jonsen AR, The birth of bioethics, New York, Oxford University Press,1998, 6. 
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consultations.  In particular, this research will be geared towards the theorization of a 
method that finds its epistemological validity and utility in clinical ethics in different 
socio-cultural fields.  
 
The working hypothesis is to present a method of conducting a clinical ethics 
consultation, which can be applied in a pluralistic setting, not necessarily following a 
theoretically rigid form.  
This method is called “hermeneutic circle method”, and its theorization – here presented 
- starts from the analysis and critique of the most important methods already present in 
clinical ethics. 
To achieve this objective, the dissertation is structured in the following way. 
The first part presents two reflections about Clinical Ethics Consultation and the history 
of the Italian working groups of Clinical Ethics Consultation. 
The second one is divided into two parts. The first presents two ethics theories: 
Principlism, in particular as presented by Beauchamp and Childress and Personalism, as 
presented by Cardinal Elio Sgreccia. 
The third part analyses the role of Hermeneutics and Casuistry, as presented by 
Gadamer and Jonsen. I then present a method of conducting ethics consultation, which 
derives from all these ethics theories. 
All three ethics theories (Principlism, Personalism and Casuistry) are presented both in 
their general setting and as applied, with their respective methods, to real clinical cases 
in which an ethics consultation was required. 
 
The difficulty in identifying one common certainty which can take on the role of general 
guidance, depends on the fact that the map of moral values in the contemporary world 
has been defined on one hand by an aspect of the concept of the defense of life, which 
presents the concept of “good”, towards which each individual tends by nature; and on 
the other hand by the principle of protection of human dignity, understood as the right to 
self-determination by the individual. Each of these two principles, in and of themselves 
different, must be taken into close consideration in order to analyze the clinical ethics 
question, because they are values experienced both by the caregiver and by those 
receiving care. 
 
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
9	  
	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIRST PART 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
10	  
	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What is Clinical Ethics Consultation? 
 
 
 
The distinction between clinical research 
and clinical practice has dominated our 
conception of biomedical ethics for the last 
four decades… a distinction which is no longer tenable. 
KIE Scholar Tom Beauchamp 
 
 
Healthcare Ethics Consultation or Ethics Consultation is a specific field of 
bioethics and clinical ethics. The peculiarity of Ethics Consultation is the care of 
persons; in particular it “involves the identification, analysis and resolution of value 
conflicts or uncertainties that arise in the provision of health care in clinical setting”2. It 
is related to medicine, life sciences, philosophy, law and religion. 
Ethics Consultation, as presented by the American Society for Bioethics and 
Humanities3, is “a set of services provided by an individual or a group in response to 
questions from patients, families, surrogates, healthcare professionals or other involved 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Jennings B (ed.), Bioethics, vol. II, Farmington Hills, MacMillan USA, 20144, 596. 
3 American Society for Bioethics and Humanities is an important scientific society for Bioethics. The 
ASBH was founded in January 1998 through the consolidation of three existing associations in the field: 
the Society for Health and Human Values (SHHV), the Society for Bioethics Consultation (SBC), and the 
American Association of Bioethics (AAB). [http://asbh.org/, last seen 8/2/2016]. 
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parties who seek to resolve uncertainty or conflict regarding value-laden concerns that 
emerge in health care”4. 
The specific figure who conducts an Ethics Consultation is called the Healthcare Ethics 
Consultant or Ethics Consultant. In daily clinical practice all healthcare specialists are 
calling to respond to ethical issues, the Ethics Consultant “differs from other healthcare 
professionals in that [he has] been assigned by [his] institutions the distinctive role of 
responding to specific ethical concerns and questions that arise in the delivery of health 
care, and therefore require a distinctive set of competences to perform this role 
effectively”.5 
The goal of the consultant is to offer help regarding a correct decision, which will be 
taken by others. The choice must be as much as possible shared between patient, family 
members and health care team.6 
Ethics consultation can be requested both by the patient and the family members to find 
clarification regarding their dilemmas and future choices, and by the physicians, nurses 
and health care staff as support in making the most appropriate choices and examining 
all options.7 The administrative staff may also request the consultation, when it is 
needed to better explain the specifics of a clinical case or questions concerning health 
care policy.8 
The clinical decision has technical and existential values, therefore all protagonists of a 
clinical case - patients, families, health care professionals - have an opinion to express, 
but not a refusal to make. This opinion cannot be segmented – the technical aspect 
regards the doctors and the existential profile regards the patient - and entails a mutual 
integration.9 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 American Society for Bioethics and Humanities, Core Competencies Update Task Force, Core 
competencies for health care ethics consultation: A report of the American Society for Bioethics and 
Humanities, Glenview, American Society for Bioethics and Humanities, 20112, 2. 
5 Ibidem, 2. 
6 Delany C, Galvin J, Ethics and shared decision making in paediatric occupational therapy practice, 
Dev. Neurorehabil, 2013, 1-8. 
7 Weise KL, Daly BJ, Exploring accountability of clinical ethics consultants: practice and training 
implications. The American Journal of Bioethics, 2014,6:34-41; Finder SG, Bliton MJ, Responsibility 
after the apparent end: following-up in clinical ethics consultation. Bioethics, 2011;7:413-424; Hendrick 
J, Legal aspects of clinical ethics committees, Journal of  Medical Ethics, 2001, 27:i50-i53. 
8 Godkin MD, Faith K, Upshur REG, MacRae SK, Trancy CS, Project Examining Effectiveness in 
Clinical Ethics (PEECE): phase 1 – descriptive analysis of nine clinical ethics services, J Med Ethics, 
2005; 31: 505-512, 508. 
9 Deledda G, Moretti F, Rimondini M, Zimmermann C, How patients want their doctor to communicate. 
A literature review on primary care patients’ perspectives, Patient Education and Counseling, 2013; 90: 
297-306. Clayton JM, et al., When and How to Initiate Discussion About Prognosis and End-of-Life 
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The consultant acts for the good of those requesting a consultancy. The single clinical 
case is the starting point of the ethics consultation: the consultation is developed in both 
a specific setting and a particular relationship, it is inextricably linked to verbal and 
non-verbal communication skills and it is directly applicable to daily clinical practice.10 
The consultant’s point of view must be “interlocutor oriented”, helping him/her to 
consolidate the reasons of his/her positions, but must also underscore the critical issues 
regarding his/her observations. 
In bioethics literature different approaches11 to Ethics Consultation are described. The 
attitude of the Ethics Consultation can be collocated between two extreme approaches: 
the “authoritarian approach” and the “pure consensus approach”. Both of these 
approaches present limitations and criticalities and therefore they are not recommended 
in conducting an ethics consultation. 
The “authoritarian approach” emphasizes the figure of the Ethics Consultant “as the 
primary moral decision maker”: “the moral values or perspectives of the consultant are 
more correct or important than the moral perspectives of other participants in the 
consultation”.12 
This approach minimizes other protagonists of a clinical case (patient, family, 
surrogates, the health care team), their values and their abilities to analyze ethics issues. 
Likewise, the “pure consensus approach” also presents some limits: “the aim of this 
approach is only to forge agreement among involved parties. It fails to incorporate the 
importance of ethically justified norms or values”.13 
The latter can be related to other two approaches, used by the Ethics Consultant 
particularly in relation to the Institution in which he/she works. The first defines the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Issues with Terminally Ill Patients, Journal of Pain and Symptom Management, 2005; 30(2):132-144. 
Walczak A, et al., Patient perspectives regarding communication about prognosis and end-of-life issues: 
How can it be optimised?, Patient Education and Counseling 2013; 90: 307-314. Steinhauser KE, et al., 
Preparing for the End of Life: Preferences of Patients, Families, Physicians, and Other Care Providers, 
Journal of Pain and Symptom Management, 2001; 22(3): 727-737. Parker SM, et al., A Systematic Review 
of Prognostic/End- of-Life Communication with Adults in the Advanced Stages of a Life-Limiting Illness: 
Patient/Caregiver Preferences for the Content, Style, and Timing of Information, Journal of Pain and 
Symptom Management, 2007;34(1): 81-93 . Hancock K, et al., Discrepant Perceptions About End-of-Life 
Communication: A Systematic Review, Journal of Pain and Symptom Management, 2007; 34(2): 190-200. 
10 Carrese JA, Sugarman J, The inescapable relevance of bioethics for the practicing clinician. Chest 
Journal, 2006;130:1864-72. 
11 Loughlin M, Criticizing the data: some concerns about empirical approaches to ethics, Journal of 
Evaluation in Clinical Practice, 2011;17: 970-975. 
12  American Society for Bioethics and Humanities, Core competencies for health care ethics 
consultation: A report of the American Society for Bioethics and Humanities, cit., 6. 
13 Ibidem, 7. 
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Ethics Consultant as a “peacemaker”, who tries to correct the mistakes which arise with 
ethical issues, minimizing the damage, and preventing their return: this type of Ethics 
Consultation “keeps the peace for hospital staff by smoothing over conflicts, he puts 
patients and families who have to make agonizing choices at peace by easing the burden 
of that decision making”.14 The second one defines the Ethics Consultation as a “social 
activist”, it is a more motivated approach than that of the “peacemaker”, but it may 
create more difficulties: the Ethics Consultation identifies “the underlying institutional 
or structural features that generate ethical problems and change or remove them in a 
more sweeping effort at prevention”.15 
Each one of these approaches present limitations and difficulties: the “authoritarian 
approach” doesn’t pay specific attention to those who are called to take the last 
decision. It could be considered a “paternalistic approach”, by which the physician 
unswervingly recommends the best treatment to the patient, who can’t reply, as he/she 
hasn’t been informed. 
The “pure consensus” and the “peacemaker” approaches open a relevant question about 
the Ethics Consultation: must the choices be justified? During an Ethics Consultation, it 
is not sufficient that a choice be shared to make it “good”; it is necessary to justify it. A 
clinical ethical issue requires reasonable justifications to define a clinical choice as 
“good”. 
Defining the Ethics Consultant as a “social activist” also presents a problem: could the 
Ethics Consultant be identified as a social reformer? The aim of Ethics Consultation is 
not “doing ethics” or making social and institutional reforms. The Ethics Consultant is 
attentive to the social and institutional contexts in which he works, but he is a specialist 
of clinical ethics and his activity is primarily oriented toward the patient. 
The “ethics facilitation approach” is considered by international guidelines to be the 
best criterion to conduct an Ethics Consultation: “in this approach, the consultant helps 
to elucidate issues, aid effective communication, and integrate the perspectives of the 
relevant stakeholders. The consultant helps the relevant decision makers fashion a plan 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Hoffmaster B, Anatomy of Clinical Ethics Consultation, Human Studies, 22:53-68. 1999, in Zaner RM, 
Performance, Talk, Reflection, What is Going on in Clinical Ethics Consultation, Dordrecht, Kluwer, 
Academic Publisher, 1999, 67. 
15 Idem. 
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that respects the needs and values of those involved that is within the bounds of ethical 
and legal standards”.16 
Specifically the ethics consultant should carry out the following functions: providing 
consultations about clinical cases (the consultant with knowledge and training should be 
available to patients and medical staff to review a case, to offer informed and prudent 
counsel about ethical uncertainties, and to assist in mediating conflict for an ethical 
solution); supporting the drafting of guidelines of the institutional mission and the 
allocation criteria; ethical feed-backing about research protocols; systematic collection 
of ethical deontological documents (journals, books, encyclopedias, commentaries on 
judgments etc.); communicating with departments and ethicists operating on different 
levels (institutional, regional, national, international); connecting with the ethics 
committees (ethics committees and ethics consultants need each other, they are not 
identical or exchangeable, and their dialectic should be, in all cases, highly productive); 
planning, organizing and conducting  continuous specific ethical training for the clinical 
équipe, individual health professionals, administrative organs and committees. 
 
In particular, ethics consultation encompasses a variety of purposes17: 
-guiding clinical practice (clarifying the issues, offering a roadmap for navigating 
ethical dilemmas, helping clinicians to sort out the relevant issues from those which 
are more tangential); 
-contributing to the education of clinicians (prepare trainees to analyze the ethical 
dilemmas that arise frequently in clinical practice, development of core competencies 
– fostering understanding of basic concepts of medical ethics, development of skills 
in clinical moral reasoning, nurturing the attitudes and virtues that incline medical 
professionals to do their duty and be good physicians ; 
-making academic contributions to medical ethics (highlighting advances in the field, 
providing insight, clarify issues, challenging accepted views, providing useful 
guidance for clinicians and researchers, spurring further discussions); 
-informing biomedical researchers (laying out the factors that require attention in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16American Society for Bioethics and Humanities, Core competencies for health care ethics consultation: 
A report of the American Society for Bioethics and Humanities, cit., 7. 
17 Considerations deduced from introductive lectures of Rosamond Rhodes at ICCEC meeting occurred in 
New York, May 19th-22th, 2015. 
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animal and subject research, guiding study design by explaining how to answer 
research questions efficiently, emphasizing the importance of always being humane 
and respectful); 
-giving direction to health policy (being well-informed about issues in moral and 
political philosophy, and well-informed about the relevant medical facts and health 
systems concerns that are at issue). 
The ethics consultant is called to offer arguments that are measured, fair, presented in 
the interest of the appropriate stakeholders, his/her contributions should be well-
argued, well-organized and well-written. 
A good ethics consultation should be: coherent with what we take to be good medical 
practice, illuminating about the ethical issues which emerge in a specific context, 
accurate and able to serve as moral compass and not to create confusion, reasonable 
using simple rules, because knowing the rules seems to make it easier to know how to 
avoid wrong doing – every simple rule has an exception, but morality requires 
making difficult judgments and taking responsibility for them, it involves living with 
the uncertainty of not knowing if you made the right call even if the decision has been 
shared – consistent with the all other protagonists of a clinical case , informed about 
the recommendations offered, and measured, paying serious attention to choosing 
words and avoiding exaggerations. 
 
In a clinical context an ethical issue arises by doubt of a single (e.g. the patient) or two 
or more persons (e.g. family members, nurses, the medical team, administrators): “The 
ethics Consultant may listen empathetically [to their] moral distress and help to identify 
their values or commitments. In this way, […] values can be discussed and considered 
openly, which can lead to creative and mutually respectful decisions. The consultant 
[…] may help him or her point out unrecognized implications of the relevant parties 
‘views, allowing the primary decision maker(s) to come to more firmly grounded 
conclusions.”18 
Ethics consultation can be requested by the patient and the patient’s family in order to 
establish clear definitions regarding their present dilemmas and their choices for the 
future. A consultation can also be requested by physicians, nurses and health care staff 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18  American Society for Bioethics and Humanities, Core competencies for health care ethics 
consultation: A report of the American Society for Bioethics and Humanities, cit.,7. 
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as support regarding both what a most appropriate choice may be, and clarification of 
various available options. This perspective entails two requirements: firstly, the practice 
of medicine cannot be reduced to mere technique; secondly, the doctor - patient/family 
relationship must be considered the most convenient setting to make a free and 
conscious decision about a specific clinical case.19 
The Ethics Consultant must certainly have specific multidisciplinary training both in 
ethics and in clinical, deontological, legal, economic and organizational fields in order 
to face ethics issues in a clinical setting. The clinical ethics consultation requires 
specific skills to offer help to the applicant about a choice that generally has 
implications for the patient's life. For these reasons, bioethics and clinical ethics are 
different, although they are not separate: specific clinical and legal skills could diversify 
the consultant’s educational process from the bioethicist’s. The specificity of the 
consultant’s educational process entails attending both academic courses (Masters and 
Ph.D.) in order to obtain theoretical knowledge (philosophical, medical, legal, 
theological), and internships in hospital wards in order to acquire specific practical 
skills and aptitudes.20 The prominence is given to the skills possessed21: teaching 
bioethics does not automatically mean being able to perform an ethics consultation, just 
as an ethics consultant might not have the skills to teach bioethics. Another issue 
revealed during this meeting concerns the affinity between ethics consultation and all 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Nelson C, The Familiar Foundation and the Fuller Sense: Ethics Consultation and Narrative, Perm 
Journal, 2012;16(2): 60-63.  
20 In the international debate, there is not an official shared training program about the preparation of the 
clinical ethics consultant, but there are a lot of proposals about it. In Europe the Clinical Ethics 
Consultation has been of increasing interest during the past decade, clinical ethics services are already 
officially operating in the Healthcare realities of many other European Countries. In Italy there is no 
academic standard regarding the training of ethics consulting, therefore it seems to be only during 
postgraduate education that a formal graduate can acquire specific competences to lead an ethics 
consultation (in particular cases for those persons who do not have graduate training concerning 
healthcare). Dudzinski DM, Rhodes R, Fiester A, Pedagogical Goals for Academic Bioethics Programs, 
Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics Cambridge University Press 2013; 22: 284–296. Hurst SA, 
Perrier A, Pegoraro R, Reiter-Theil S, Forde R, Slowther AM, Garrett-Mayer E, Danis M,  Ethical 
difficulties in clinical practice: experiences of European doctors, J Med Ethics 2007; 33: 51–57. 
Akabayashi A (ed.), The Future of Bioethics: International dialogues, Oxford, Oxford University Press 
2014; Gusmano MK, Rodwin VG, Weisz D, Health Care in World Cities, Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2010; Pegoraro R, Putoto G, Wray E (eds.), Hospital based bioethics, Padova, Piccin, 
2007; Widdershoven G, Abma T, Molewijk B, Empirical ethics as dialogical practice, Bioethics, 2009; 
23:236-248. European Association of Centres of Medical Ethics, Eacme Newsletter, 2015,n.4. Pfäfflin M, 
Kobert K, Theil SR, Evaluating Clinical Ethics Consultation: A European Perspective, Cambridge 
Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics, Cambridge University Press, 2009; 18: 406-409. 
21 Smith ML, A possible solution, but not the last word, The  Hastings Center Report, 2009;39:3. 
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other types of medical consultations.22 Medical advice is generally required when there 
is a doubt23, a dispute or a diversity of approach in relation both to the means and the 
ends (which can both be subject to judgment) to resolve a specific problem. An essential 
requisite for the consultant is to clearly and precisely show the different, scientifically 
documented, treatments which can cure the patient, illustrating his/her personal 
position, if requested, and leaving at the patient the last word, but not the only one, 
regarding his/her choice. The ethics consultant applies the same method.24 
The goal of the consultant seems to be to provide help regarding making a decision 
which will often involve others. Choices must be, as much as possible, shared among 
the patient, the family and the health care team. The consultant acts for the good of 
those requesting a consultancy, with his/her specific skills and abilities. 
Advancement of this new kind of healthcare profession is strictly related to train on 
specific competencies to face a lot of issue in the daily clinical practice25 to find a good 
solution on single clinical case. This set of competencies does not concern only good 
abilities in ethics analysis26, but a set of things “including accurate factual information, 
effective communication skills, and the insights and contributions of a wide variety of 
professionals”27. In fact, patients and physicians could arrive to different choices in 
similar clinical situation: the possibilities to make different choices28 are related to the 
fact that every medical case is original, univocal and the consciences of the protagonists 
could present different judgments. 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22  American Society for Bioethics and Humanities, Improving Competencies in Clinical Ethics 
Consultation, Glenview, IL; American Society for Bioethics and Humanities, 2009: 57-58. 
23 Spike JP, The Birth of Clinical Ethics Consultation as a Profession, American Journal of Bioethics, 
2014; 1:20-22. 
24 Geppert CMA, Shelton WN, A comparison of general medical and clinical ethics consultation: what 
can we learn from each other?, Mayo Clinic  Proceedings, 2012; 4: 381-389; Caldjian LC, Weir RF, A 
clinician’s approach to clinical ethical reasoning, Journal of  General Internal Medicine, 2005; 20: 306-
311. 
25 Agich GJ, Education and the improvement of clinical ethics services, BMJ Medical Education, 2013; 
13:41. 
26Gligorov N, Sommer TM, Tobin Ballato EC, Frank LE, Rhodes R., Bridging the Gap between 
Knowledge and Skill: Integrating Standardized Patients into Bioethics Education, Hastings Center 
Report, 2015; 45(5): 25-30.  
27 American Society for Bioethics and Humanities, Improving Competencies in Clinical Ethics 
Consultation, An education Guide, cit., 8. 
28 Niebroj L, Bioethics of Life Programs: taking seriously moral pluralism in clinical setting, Eur J Med 
Res, 2010, 15(Suppl. II): 98-101. 
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Tarzian’s code 
 
 Anita Tarzian presented, along with other authors, “A Code of Ethics and 
Professional Responsibilities for Health Care Ethics Consultants”; in their opinion the 
“consultants should regard this statement of responsibilities as authoritative”.  
Anita Tarzian’s code29 clarifies the Responsibilities of Health Care Ethics Consultants 
writing the following set of norms:  
 
1. Be Competent. HCE30 consultants should practice in a competent manner. 
2. Avoid Conflicts of Interest. HCE consultants should identify and avoid, when 
possible, actual and perceived conflicts of interest. If it is not possible to avoid such a 
conflict, then it should be managed using ethically supportable strategies. 
3. Manage Conflicts of Obligation. HCE consultants should clarify and manage 
potential conflicting obligations when they perform multiple roles within an 
organization.  
4. Protect Confidentiality. HCE consultants should identify information that is 
confidential and ensure that such information is respected and shared in accordance 
with standards of ethics, law, and hospital policy. 
5. Preserve Integrity. HCE consultants should preserve professional integrity by not 
engaging in activities that compromise their ability to fulfill the obligations of their 
role as HCE consultants, and by not accepting terms of employment that will prevent 
them from performing responsibilities with integrity. HCE consultants should avoid 
conflating expertise with authority or abusing power.  
6. Make Responsible Public Statements. When addressing the lay public about HCE 
issues, HCE consultants should speak responsibly, and not make public statements 
outside of their area of expertise.  
7. Contribute to the Field. HCE consultants should participate in the advancement of 
the profession through contributions to practice, education, administration, 
knowledge, and skill development. 
8. Promote Just Health Care. HCE consultants should collaborate with other 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29  Tarzian A, et al., A Code of Ethics and Professional Responsibilities for Health Care Ethics 
Consultants, American Journal of Bioethics, 2015; 15(5): 38-51. 
30 HCE means “Healthcare Ethics”. 
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professionals and lay persons to promote a more just health care system. 
 
To conclude this section it seems useful to quote a small insert which show U.S. data31, 
as reported in the last document of the American Society for Bioethics and Humanities, 
regarding which kind of professionals perform Ethics Consultations and how many 
ethics services are performed in the United States. 
 
 
physicians 36%; nurses 30%; social workers 11%; chaplains 10%, administrators 
10%; lawyers, philosophers, theologians 3% 
 
In 68% of U.S. hospitals ethics consultation were generally performed by small teams 
(68%), as opposed to full committees (23%) or individual consultants (9%), with only 
5% of ethics consultation being conducted by people who had completed a fellowship 
or graduate program in bioethics, and only 41% by people who had learned to 
perform ethics consultation with formal, direct supervision by an experienced 
member of an ethics consultation service. 
 
After a general presentation about ethics consultation features, the next section focuses 
on the Italian debate about ethics consultation, illustrating the history of the Italian 
Working Group of Clinical Ethics and Healthcare Ethics Consultation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Fox E, Myers S, Pearlman RA, Ethics consultation in U.S. hospitals: a national survey, American 
journal of bioethics,2007;7(2): W1-3. In American Society for Bioethics and Humanities, Improving 
Competencies in Clinical Ethics Consultation, An education Guide, Chicago, American Society for 
Bioethics and Humanities, 20152, 2.  
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History of the Working Group of Clinical Ethics Consultation in Italy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Italian debate about the role of clinical ethics and ethics consultation has 
brought about the need to create a working group of Healthcare Ethics Consultants. The 
group began to take shape and to be organized in 2010; its activities are largely directed 
to share experiences, to analyze this field and to develop a professional profile of the 
clinical ethicist recognized throughout the nation.32 
The working group of Clinical Ethics and Healthcare Ethics Consultation was the result 
of some initial meetings, and the group subsequently started to draft a Document about 
Clinical Ethics Consultation in Healthcare in Rome (June 2013). The Document was 
approved in Trento at the Kessler Foundation (October 2013) and undersigned by more 
than two hundred people. The newborn document was called “The Document of 
Trento”: it is the first Italian document regarding clinical ethics consultation. 
Since 2010 the newborn working group of Clinical Ethics and Healthcare Ethics 
Consultants has organized meetings and conferences to debate about the situation of 
Clinical Ethics in Italy and the ways to perform Ethics Consultation. The goal that the 
organizers of the meetings have proposed is to make a contribution to developing 
clinical ethics services, especially in view of the fact that these services are already 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 I would like to thank Professors M. Picozzi and R. Pegoraro for recommendations on writing this 
section. 
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officially operating in the Healthcare realities of many other European Countries.33 The 
first meeting was organized as a seminar by invitation, for those who were truly 
involved in the ethics consultation activity. 
The preamble to the group works was the meeting “Towards professionalization in the 
bioethicist” regarding the ethics consultant and clinical ethics consultation, took place in 
January 2001 in Varese. National and international researchers discussed theoretical 
issues and practical consequences of the ethics consultation in the Italian health care 
system. Warren T. Reich wrote about the field of clinical bioethics in the preface of the 
volume that collects the proceedings of the meeting: “A common experience in today’s 
medical institutions is the struggle over the proper locus of bioethics as an academic 
discipline, and an underlying theme in clinical ethical consultations is the power 
struggle over which discipline should be dominant in shaping, governing, and managing 
those consultations. Put bluntly, the question is: Who “owns” clinical ethical 
consultation from academic, disciplinary and professional perspectives? Parochial 
disputes of this sort are not good for the field of clinical bioethics. We can neutralize 
those disputes by constantly asking the question: Where should our attention lie? How 
can we jointly turn our attention to the people, the values, and the issues that call out for 
our assistance?”34 In addition, at the end of his speech, by recalling the differences 
between the American setting, where ethics consultation has been an established tool, 
and the European scenery, where it has only started to develop, Warren T. Reich warned 
that “those differences need to be respected; and each culture needs to promote its own 
investigations of the contours, methods and limits of clinical ethics and clinical 
consultation”.35 
A decade later, those words have preserved their originality and significance with 
regards to the development of ethics consultation in the Italian context. New thinking 
has developed, different local experiences have been consolidated and others have taken 
their first steps, even though the profiles of the ethics consultant and the clinical ethics 
consultant have not been officially established in the Italian health care system. 
The first meeting of the working group was organized in April 30th 2010 at the 
Department of Medicine and Public Health at the University of Insubria in Varese 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 See note 20. 
34 Reich WT, Preface, IX-XII in: Picozzi M, Tavani M, Cattorini P, Verso una professionalizzazione del 
bioeticista. Analisi teoriche e ricadute pratiche, Milano, Giuffrè, 2003. 
35 Idem. 
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among those who directly carried out ethics consultation. The goal was to begin drafting 
a picture of the current experiences of the ethics consultation services in the Italian 
health care system. 36  During this first meeting every participant was given the 
opportunity to explain his/her experience in the ethics consultation field, highlighting 
perspectives and issues. In that context twelve realities were presented. It was noted that 
consultation was generally conducted in three different ways: by the ethics committee, 
within the Department of Forensic Medicine, and by autonomous organizations. Two 
important aspects emerged from the seminar. First, the ethics consultation service was 
often handled as volunteer work, without an official acknowledgement 37  by the 
institution in which it was carried out, and without a formalization of the service. 
Secondly, the Department of Forensic Medicine38 was the main author of the ethics 
consultation. 
A second meeting took place in October 2010 at the Institute of Bioethics of the 
Catholic University in Rome. The working group discussed the historical development 
of ethics consultation. Clinical ethics was recognized as a branch of bioethics, but with 
its own distinctive aim of research oriented towards clinical cases39, and it was always 
considered in connection with a theoretical reflection about the reasons for the 
expressed judgments.  
The third and fourth meeting took place in 2011, the first in April at the Lanza 
Foundation in Padua, the second in October at the Center for Clinical Bioethics of the 
Mediterranean in Cagliari. The main topic of the conferences was the undergraduate and 
postgraduate training in clinical ethics. Two aspects about the undergraduate courses 
were highlighted. The first regarded the different names of the academic courses on 
clinical ethics: it was decided that it could be advantageous to use the same diction as in 
the medical field (not only formal but substantial characteristic regarding teaching 
clinical ethics) because this teaching method is different from those of the human 
sciences and forensic medicine. The second concerned the need to lead the students with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Pegoraro R, Picozzi M, Spagnolo AG, La Consulenza di Etica Clinica in Italia. Lineamenti e 
Prospettive, Padova, Piccin, 2016. 
37 Miles S, Purtilo RB, Institutional support for Bioethics Consultation. In: Ausilio MP, Arnold RM, 
Youngner SJ, eds. Ethics consultation. From Theory to practice, Baltimore, The John Hopkins University 
Press, 2003:11-128. 
38 Benciolini P, La medicina legale clinica. Rivista Italiana di Medicina Legale 2005; 3: 451-459. 
39 Carrese JA, et al., HCEC pearls and pitfalls: suggested do’s and don’t’s for Healthcare Ethics 
Consultation. The Journal of Clinical Ethics, 2012; 3: 234-240. 
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focused teaching both during the preclinical phase and in the following experience with 
the patients. 
Postgraduate training in Italy was usually more focused on bioethics than on clinical 
ethics. A necessary specification about graduate degree training has emerged over the 
past four years. As has occurred in other Countries, in Italy as well there is no academic 
standard regarding training on ethics consultation. This issue underscores the 
importance of defining the professional profile of the clinical ethics consultant. 
The fifth meeting occurred in April 2012 at Fatebenefratelli Hospital in Rome. The 
topic focused on the different models of ethics consultation. The international 
experience has shown that a single person, a small group, or the ethics committee of an 
institution can conduct an ethics consultation. Each of these models has its own 
potentialities and criticalities40. In the United States the dominant models are the single 
consultant and the small group41, whereas in Italy there is the experience, although 
limited, of the “ethics committee for clinical practice” in each single Local Health and 
Social Care Unit in the Veneto Region. The ethics committee is characterized by multi-
tasking and pluralism, but at the same time it seems unsuitable to engage in both 
emergency situations and a daily relationship with the patient, the family, and the 
physicians. The ethics committee seems to be the best means to draw up 
recommendations and ethics guidelines about specific issues, as well as to supervise the 
consultations conducted by a single consultant or a small group, but it does not seem to 
be able to conduct daily ethics consultations. The small group seems to guarantee a 
pluralistic and multidisciplinary approach, as it has the opportunity to work with the 
patient and caregivers over a brief period. At the same time it presents the same 
criticisms: three ethicists with different backgrounds - clinical, juridical, ethical – could 
unduly burden the consultation, generating the suspicion that each ethicist is trying to 
defend his/her multidisciplinary position, rather than to support the patient in making 
his/her decision.42 The single consultant might respond to emergencies and offer his/her 
space and time to listen to everyone involved. The limits of this model can be both the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Adams DM, Winslade WJ, Consensus, clinical decision making and unsettled cases, The Journal of 
Clinical Ethics, 2011; 4: 310-327. 
41 Troug RD, et al., Microethics: the ethics of everyday clinical practice. The Hastings Center Report 
2015; 1: 11-17. Cho MK, et al., Strangers at the benchside: research ethics consultation. The American 
Journal of Bioethics, 2008; 3: 4-13. 
42 Rushton, Youngner, Skeel, cit., 2003: 88-95. Casarett DJ, Daskal F, Lanots J, Experts in ethics? The 
authority of the clinical ethicist., The Hastings Center Report 1998; 6: 6-11. 
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difficulty for a single consultant to have the multiple skills required to conduct a 
consultation, and the risk of taking a directive or paternalistic approach. This issue, 
given its importance, was re-examined during the sixth meeting which took place in 
October 2012 in Verona. The working group suggested the model of the single 
consultant as preferable for practical reasons and also economic sustainability. 
Therefore the group underlined the importance of verifying the specific clinical ethics 
consultant’s skills and competencies (not only considering his/her background – e.g. 
medical, philosophical, juridical education). 
The considerations presented in the Document of Trento are the result of these above-
mentioned meetings. 
 
 
The Document of Trento 
 
 The Document presents the definition of Healthcare Ethics Consultation as 
stated in the Report of the American Society for Bioethics and Humanities43. Clinical 
Ethics concerns the identification, analysis and resolution of bioethical issues current in 
ordinary clinical practice. 
The Document of Trento is composed by five paragraphs: a) Ethical issues in clinical 
practice, 2) What is the Healthcare Ethics Consultation, 3) Who is the clinical ethics 
consultant, 3) Ethics Consultation Service, 5) The presence of Ethics Consultation in 
Healthcare Institutions. 
The Document took two strong stances: it considered Ethics Consultation just as any 
other “medical” specialized consultation with some special features, and recognized the 
individual consultant as a more appropriate figure to conduct bedside consultations. 
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Italian Working Group of Clinical Ethics and Healthcare Ethics Consultation 
 
DOCUMENT OF TRENTO 
(Approved on October 10th, 2013) 
 
 
1- The ethical issues in clinical practice 
 
The Mass Media reports almost daily cases that raise bioethical issues. This is also the 
experience of many health care providers and administrators as well as patients and 
their families, facing doubts and conflicts regarding clinical practice such as: IVF, the 
use of stem cells, the allocation of organs for transplantation, informed consent, the 
request to suspend treatments, the demand of psycho-physical enhancement 
treatments, the allocation of resources which are more and more limited, the need to 
ensure appropriate care without neglecting the ethical issues relating to new medical 
technologies. Bioethical issues do not apply only to exceptional cases, but to ordinary 
clinical practice as well. One might wonder whether, as a result of rapidly advancing 
medical technology these exceptional cases might become the rule: an ethical 
dilemma concerns all subjects involved in health care: what is it best thing to do in 
such situations? No one is alien to that or exempted from the question: from the 
patient, to the health care providers as well as the family and the health care 
institutions. For this reason, ethics is a central part of clinical practice and not 
auxiliary. 
 
2-What is Healthcare Ethics Consultation 
 
Health Care Ethics Consultation is “a service provided by an individual or a group for 
giving an answer to questions posed by patients, relatives, tutors, health professionals 
or other people involved in health care, about uncertainties and conflicts between 
values that can emerge in clinical practice” (A Report of the American Society for 
Bioethics and Humanities, Core competencies for Healthcare Ethics Consultation, 2a 
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ed., 2011, 2). 
Ethics has a goal, which is to improve the care of the patients, with reference to both 
methods and results through the identification, analysis and resolution of ethical 
issues.  
The Ethics Consultation is a specialist consultancy comparable to all other health care 
consultations, but with some special emphases and peculiarities: a more closely and 
focused approach to relationships, dialogue, and pluralism, both in contents and 
methods. 
 
3-Who is the Clinical Ethics Consultant 
 
To perform ethics consultation it is necessary to have a specific knowledge of ethical, 
clinical and legal topics. For this reason, the health care ethics consultant is a new 
professional figure. Therefore, in the characterization and definition of his/her 
professionalism, what matters are skills and abilities which regard clinical ethics. 
This figure requires specific training. Although there is no core curriculum, there are 
Master’s and Ph.D. degrees, which will be targeted to Ethics Consultation. Simple 
training in bioethics is not sufficient: an adequate and specific education is needed to 
address issues “by the bedside of the patient”, as well as at the decision-making level 
in healthcare. As an example, it is necessary to train professionals to be able to 
respond to emergency situations. The ethics consultant isn’t an intermediary, a 
defense attorney, a spiritual consultant or a psychologist; he creates the conditions, he 
leads and helps subjects in taking an ethically sound and possibly shared decision. 
The international experience shows that ethics consultation can be carried out by a 
single person, a small group, or the ethics committee. Each mode has its own 
potentials and criticalities. 
 
4-Ethics Consultation Service 
 
It is desirable that the Healthcare Ethics Consultation be integrated in an Ethics 
Consultation Service with a single ethics consultant or a small team. This service 
would ensure continuity and sustainability in different fields such as ethics 
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consultation, the training of all the operators, the support to the work of ethics 
committee, research in bioethics and the development of ethics in health care 
institutions. If we consider the Italian situation which is still marked by a lack of 
experience in institutionalized ethics consultation, we believe that the model of the 
single ethics consultant is, for reasons of feasibility and sustainability, to be preferred. 
The ethics committee, when effective, would play a role in the review of 
consultations and in the discussion about more general topics which often emerge in 
critical situations while making recommendations and offering ethical guidelines.  
 
5-The presence of Ethics Consultation in the Healthcare Institution 
 
We believe it is crucial that an ethics consultation service be offered in hospitals, in 
nursing homes, in healthcare institutions, in social care homes and in hospices. 
Wherever such service is already effective we think that an institutional recognition 
should be formally given for several reasons: ethical issues in clinical practice are 
more and more relevant for patients, care-givers, families and administrators; there is 
finally a consolidated profile of skills and abilities of the ethical consultant along with 
specific training programs designed specifically for this educational background; 
ethics consultation is internationally considered not just merely effective, but also 
efficient; health care institutions need be able to respond to moral issues in order to 
achieve accreditation (see for example the requirements of the Joint Commission on 
accreditation of Healthcare Organizations). 
The ways to implement Ethics Consultation can be different: the Institution can 
integrate the Ethics Consultation in its own organization or it can outsource Ethics 
Consultation as a service. We believe that specific training programs for ethics 
consultants should be promoted and we strongly recommend that in Italy a bioethical 
service be introduced and nurtured as soon as possible. 
 
The Document resulted from a choral work of people with different cultural 
backgrounds who perform clinical ethics consultations in different ways; it was 
promptly endorsed by more than two hundred people. This Document is an Italian first 
step towards improving both the role of clinical ethics and healthcare ethics 
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consultation, and the method of conducting an ethics consultation as a central part of 
clinical practice to better treat the sick and dying. 
 
The first public presentation of the Document occurred on March 27th 2014 in Rome. It 
generated an interesting debate about the practical need for Ethics Consultation Services 
and the role of the clinical ethicist in Italian hospitals: this last topic in particular has 
stimulated discussions between physicians and philosophers. 
For these reasons, after exactly one year, on March 27th 2015 at Insubria University 
(Varese) a meeting regarding Clinical Ethics Consultation in the Italian Healthcare 
System was organized.44 The working group on Clinical Ethics and Healthcare Ethics 
Consultation promoted the conference. The debate focused on some important, 
previously explained, points: the role of the ethics consultant in a pluralistic social 
context; the ethics consultant’s competencies; the functions of the consultant; and the 
similarities and differences between ethics consultation and all the other types of 
medical consultation. The meeting was divided into two parts. During the first phase, 
various theorists, philosophers and bioethicists presented the theoretical and 
philosophical meaning of ethics consultation in health care system. The second, more 
clinical phase was oriented towards reflections on the role of the ethics consultant in 
everyday clinical practice. The lecturers, specialists in different fields of medicine, 
made the focal point of their speeches, each one from their own specific vantage point, 
the issue and, indeed, the need to rely on Clinical Ethics Services in order to perform 
their daily medical tasks. 
The considerations presented in the Document of Trento regarding the aims of Ethics 
Consultation (“improving the care of patients, with reference to both methods and 
results through the identification, analysis and resolution of ethical issues”45) were the 
core concept and the impetus for all of the reports. 
This document was well accepted by all the speakers, with some clarifications, in 
particular regarding the tasks of the ethics consultant. The following were specifically 
highlighted: the need to be present near the health care team to engage ethical issues in 
the daily clinical practice; the need for adequate training to operate in different social 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Cfr. Medicina e Morale, 2015,6 (in press). 
45 American Society for Bioethics and Humanities, cit., 2011, 2. 
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and cultural contexts46; and the necessity to improve a methodologically rigorous 
activity of research, given that ethics consultation is also an integral part of the clinical 
environment.47 
After these meetings, the Working group is paying specific attention to the organization 
and concrete activities of a clinical ethics services. Therefore it is developing three 
courses of the research. The first topic focuses on the training in clinical ethics both for 
the specialist consultant, and for the health workers. The second one concerns the 
organization of the ethics service in a hospital or in other healthcare centers (e.g. private 
clinic, hospice and nursing home). The third takes on the evaluation about the quality 
and the efficiency of the clinical ethics service. 
 
This first part has presented peculiar characteristics of the ethics consultant and the 
Italian situation about ethics consultation. In the second part two ethics theories, 
Principlism and Personalism are presented. The second part focuses on the investigation 
and critiques of these theories and the analysis of clinical cases following the methods 
originated from them. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Jonsen AR, Siegler M, Winslade WJ, Clinical Ethics, A practical approach to ethical decisions in 
clinical medicine, New York, McGraw Hill, 2010, 2. 
47 Giannini A, Pessina A, Tacchi E, End-of-life decisions in intensive care units: attitudes of physicians in 
an Italian urban setting. Intensive Care Medicine, 2003; 29: 1902-1910; Bertolini G, et al., End-of-life 
decision-making and quality of ICU performance: an observational study in 84 Italian units. Intensive 
Care Medicine, 2010; 9: 1495-1504. 
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 Principlism and Kidney Transplant 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The AMA Code of Medical Ethics 
 
 The Principles of Medical Ethics are contained in the Code of Medical Ethics of 
the American Medical Association (AMA). The first nine ethics principles presented in 
the Code are the most important of more than two hundred ethical issues in Medicine: 
“a single Principle should not be read in isolation from others; the overall intent of nine 
Principles, read together, guides physicians’ behavior”.48 
The origins of Ethical Principles regarding the medical profession come from the Oath 
of Hippocrates (Fifth century BC), one of the most important declarations about medical 
principles. In the past, this set of principles “protected the rights of the patient and 
appealed to the inner and finer instincts of the physician without imposing sanctions or 
penalties on him or her”. It was Christianized between the tenth and the eleventh 
centuries “to eliminate reference to pagan gods”49 and after other developments it has 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 AMA Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Code of Medical Ethics, American Medical Association, 
2012, Preface. 
49AMA Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Code of Medical Ethics, American Medical Association, 
2012, History. “The most significant contribution to Western medical ethical history subsequent to 
Hippocrates was made by Thomas Percival, an English physician, philosopher, and writer. In 1803, he 
published his Code of Medical Ethics”. 
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
32	  
	  
lasted as a milestone50 until now: “at the first official meeting of the American Medical 
Association (AMA) at Philadelphia in 1847, the two principal items of business were 
the establishment of a code of ethics and the creation of minimum requirements for 
medical education and training. The AMA’s first adopted Code of Ethics was based on 
Percival’s Code”.51 
In the Preamble it is written, before the first nine Principles that: “The medical 
profession has long subscribed to a body of ethical statements developed primarily for 
the benefit of the patient. As a member of this profession, a physician must recognize 
responsibility to patients first and foremost, as well as to society, to other health 
professionals, and to self. The following Principles adopted by the American Medical 
Association are not laws, but standards of conduct which define the essentials of 
honorable behavior for the physician”.52 
The first nine Principles are: 
 
1- A physician shall be dedicated to providing competent medical care, with 
compassion and respect for human dignity and rights. 
2- A physician shall uphold the standards of professionalism, be honest in all 
professional interactions, and strive to report physicians deficient in character or 
competence, or engaging in fraud or deception, to appropriate entities. 
3- A physician shall respect the law and also recognize a responsibility to seek 
changes in those requirements which are contrary to the best interest of the patients. 
4- A physician shall respect the rights of patients, colleagues, and other health 
professionals, and shall safeguard patient confidences and privacy within the 
constraints of the law. 
5- A physician shall continue to study, apply, and advance scientific knowledge, 
maintain a commitment to medical education, make relevant information available to 
patients, colleagues, and the public, obtain consultation, and use the talents of other 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Baker RB, Caplan AL, Emanuel LL, Latham SR (eds.), The American medical ethics revolution, 
Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999: 159. The single most important figure was the 
philosopher-physician John Gregory (1724-73). He presented the lectures to the University of Edinburgh 
medical students that gave rise to the most important volume of the day: Lectures on the Duties and 
Qualifications of a Physician (Gregory 1772). He influenced decisively the work of Thomas Percival 
(1740-1804). 
51 AMA Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Code of Medical Ethics, cit., History. 
52 AMA Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Code of Medical Ethics, cit., XV. This Code has been 
adopted since June 1957; and it has been constantly revisited. 
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health professionals when indicated. 
6- A physician shall, in the provision of appropriate patient care, expect in 
emergencies, be free to choose whom to serve, with whom to associate, and the 
environment in which to provide medical care. 
7- A physician shall recognize a responsibility to participate in activities contributing 
to the improvement of the community and the betterment of public health. 
8- A physician shall, while caring for a patient, regard responsibility to the patient as 
paramount. 
9- A physician shall support access to medical care for all people. 
 
The Code of Medical Ethics also offers a definition of Ethics Consultation and it 
includes guidelines about Clinical Ethics Services. 
 
 
 2- AMA Ethics Consultation Guidelines 
 
 The AMA guidelines present some directives regarding the circumstances and 
modalities that make possible the establishment of an ethics consultation service. 
According to the Code, ethics consultation could be conducted by an ethics committee, 
or its subset, by an individual consultant, or by a consultation team. The ethics 
consultation should be called: “to clarify ethical issues without reference to a particular 
case, facilitate discussion of an ethical dilemma in a particular case, or resolve an ethical 
dispute”.53 
The Code presents guidelines about ethics consultation. They are:54 
1- All hospitals and other health care institutions should provide access to ethics 
consultation services. Health care facilities without ethics committees or consultation 
services should develop flexible, efficient mechanisms of ethics review that share the 
burden of committee functioning among collaborating health care facilities. 
2- Institutions offering ethics consultation services must appreciate the complexity of 
the task, recognizing the potential for harm as well as benefit, and act responsibly. This 
includes true institutional support for the service. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 AMA Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs , Code of Medical Ethics, cit., 362. 
54 Ibidem, 362-363. 
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3- Ethics consultation services require a serious investment of time and effort by the 
individuals involved. Members should include either individuals with extensive formal 
training and experience in clinical ethics or individuals who have made a substantial 
commitment over several years to gain sufficient knowledge, skills, and understanding 
of the complexity of clinical ethics. A wide variety of background training is preferable, 
including such fields as philosophy, religion, medicine, and law. 
4- Explicit structural standards should be developed and consistently followed. These 
should include developing a clear description of the consultation service’s role and 
determining which types of cases will be addressed, how the cases will be referred to 
the service, whether the service will provide recommendations or simply function as a 
forum for discussion, and whether recommendations are binding or advisory. 
5- Explicit procedural standards should be developed and consistently followed. These 
should include establishing who must be involved in the consultation process and how 
notification, informed consent, confidentiality and case write-ups will be handled. 
6- In general, patient and staff informed consent may be presumed for ethics 
consultation. However, patients and families should be given the opportunity, not to 
participate in discussions either formally, through the institutional process, or 
informally. 
7- In those cases where the patient or family has chosen not to participate in the 
consultation process, the final recommendations of the consultant(s) should be 
tempered. 
8- In general, ethics consultation services, like social services, should be financed by the 
institution. 
9- A consultation service should be careful not to take on more than it can handle, i.e., 
the complexity of the role should correspond to the level of sophistication of the service 
and the resources it has available. As a result, some services may offer only information 
and education, others a forum for discussion but not advice, others might serve a 
mediation role, and some might handle even administrative or organizational ethics 
issues. 
 
Today this does not seem to be enough to be applied to daily clinical practice, since a 
general set of values can create various difficulties as regards resolving concrete ethical 
issues which can arise in specific clinical cases. 
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Therefore, another set of principles seems to be required, which lies somewhere 
between general principles and clinical practice. 55  These mid-level principles, as 
presented by Beauchamp and Childress 56 , can be used to resolve bioethical 
controversies.57 
Beauchamp and Childress refer to the single and concrete situation in order to balance 
these different principles,58 because they are important59: 
1- To resolve moral controversies between individuals with similar moral sentiments 
but different theoretical approaches; 
2- To explore and compare the ways in which different theories reconstruct the same set 
or similar sets of moral sentiments and intuitions; 
3- To determine the differences among moral views and their implications for bioethics 
and health care policy, but not 
4- To resolve controversies between individuals who do not share the same moral vision 
or moral sense. 
 
 
 Beauchamp and Childress’ principles 
 
 The four-principle approach, or principlism, attempts to examine ethics aspects 
of a biomedical question. They derive from “considered judgment”60 in the common 
morality and daily activities of healthcare professionals. 
They are:  
Respect for autonomy: respecting the decision-making capacities of autonomous 
persons; enabling individuals to make reasoned informed choices. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 Post SG (ed.), Encyclopedia of Bioethics, 3 ed., vol.2, New York, MacMillan, 2003, 821. 
56 Beauchamp TL, Childress JF, 1979, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, New York, Oxford University 
Press, 20096. Engelhardt HT Jr, The foundations of Bioethics, New York, Oxford University Press, 19962, 
56. 
57 Some other ethical norms are considered basic moral notions, whose aims are to act as normative 
guides: “these guides, depending on their level of specificity, can serve either to motivate behavior 
directly or to justify and make sense out of other, more detailed, action directives”. Meyers C, A Practical 
Guide to Clinical Ethics Consulting, Lanham, Rowman & Littlefield, 2007: 36. These norm will not be 
presented in this dissertation, because they does not present a method to conduct an ethics consultation. 
58 Mordacci R, Una introduzione alle teorie morali, confronto con la bioetica, cit., 84. 
59 Engelhardt HT Jr, The foundations of Bioethics, cit., 58. 
60 Beauchamp TL, Childress JF, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, cit., 25. 
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Non maleficence: avoiding the causation of harm; the healthcare professional should 
not harm the patient. All treatment involves some harm, even if minimal, but the harm 
should not be disproportionate to the benefits of treatment. 
Beneficence: considers the balancing of benefits of treatment against the risks and 
costs; the healthcare professional should act in a way that benefits the patient. 
Justice: distributing benefits, risks and costs fairly; the notion that patients in similar 
positions should be treated in a similar manner. 
 
 
 a- Respect for Autonomy 
 
 The principle of Autonomy of a subject defends the decision-making capacities 
of autonomous persons. It is used and approved especially in contemporary society, but 
at the same time, it is the principle that mainly requires many specifications regarding 
its role and its implications in healthcare settings where there are many individual 
subjects. 
Beauchamp and Childress write “respect of autonomy is not excessively individualistic 
(thereby neglecting the social nature of individuals and the impact of individual choices 
and actions on others), not excessively focused on reason (thereby neglecting the 
emotions), and not unduly legalistic (thereby highlighting legal rights and downplaying 
social practices and responsibilities)”61. 
The principle of respect for autonomy does not seem to give the subject full 
independence regarding his/her own actions. Respect for the individual’s actions 
primarily entails not harming other persons (negative obligation). It implies a duty to 
acknowledge some specifics of this principle, like the “right and obligations of liberty, 
privacy, confidentiality, truthfulness, and informed consent”62.  Secondly, the respect 
for autonomy implies a specific dialogue, between caregiver and patient, in order to 
disclose this information so that the patient is able to take autonomous decisions 
(positive obligation): “many autonomous actions could not occur without others” 
material cooperation in making options available; respect for autonomy obligates 
professionals in healthcare and research involving human subjects to disclose 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 Beauchamp TL, Childress JF, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, cit., 99. 
62 Ibidem, 104. 
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information, to probe for and ensure understanding and voluntariness, and to foster 
adequate decision making”63. 
These two slides of the respect for autonomy are related to other moral rules, like the 
following64: 
- Tell the truth; 
- Respect the privacy of others; 
- Protect confidential information; 
- Obtain consent for interventions with patients; 
- When asked, help others make important decisions. 
 
The essential basis of the principle of autonomy is the capacity for autonomous choice 
and as a consequence the consent about the treatment, the care or the medical procedure: 
“consent should refer to an individual’s actual choices, not to presumptions about the 
choices the individual would or should make.”65  It could be expressed or tacit, but an 
important question seems to be related to the previous step: how does the autonomous 
patient choose? 
Some patients encounter various difficulties in making choices about their present or 
future medical treatments because they probably do not have a complete set of 
competencies66 necessary to make an adequate judgment: competence could vary from 
hour to hour; sometimes a competent person who can usually select appropriate means 
to reach his or her goals will act incompetently in a particular circumstance”67. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 Idem. 
64 Idem. 
65 Beauchamp TL, Childress JF, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, cit., 107. 
66 Culver CM, Gert B, Philosophy in Medicine, New York, Oxford University Press, 1982: 123-126, In 
Beauchamp TL, Childress JF, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, cit., 112. The concept of competence 
could be defined as “the ability to perform a task”. This criteria can change by the different contexts in 
which a person is called to choose and by different abilities owned by the decision-maker. 
67 Beauchamp TL, Childress JF, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, cit., 112. 
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 b- Non Maleficence 
 
 The second principle presents the obligation to not cause harm and to not impose 
risks of harm on others68: “primum non nocere”. This principle can be elaborated using 
other rules, such as: 
- Do not kill; 
- Do not cause pain or suffering; 
- Do not incapacitate; 
- Do not cause offense; 
- Do not deprive others of the goods of life. 
It is significant that this principle and its specifications are prima facie, not absolute69: 
“all general moral norms are justifiably overridden in some circumstances, […] 
Principles, duties, and rights are not absolute merely because they are universal”.70 
Following Beauchamp and Childress’ line of reasoning, the observance of not inflicting 
harm is related to some other fields of bioethics and clinical ethics, such as the concept 
of Proportionality and the rule of Double Effect. 
 
The concept of proportionality is related to the themes regarding withholding and the 
withdrawing of Treatments71, and the distinction between ordinary and extraordinary 
Treatments. 
 
 The concept of proportionality: an historical development. 
 
 
The concept of proportionality is related to the concept of ordinary and extraordinary 
means of conserving human life, which has been developing in philosophical and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 Ibidem, 149,153. 
69 Ibidem, 153. 
70 Ibidem, 15. For example, we might justifiably not tell the truth to prevent someone from killing another 
person; and we might justifiably disclose confidential information about a person to protect the rights of 
another person. 
71 Terman SA, Is the principle of Proportionality Sufficient to Guide Physicians Decisions Regarding 
Withholding/Withdrawing Life-Sustaining Treatment After Suicide Attempts?, The American Journal of 
Bioethics, 2013; 13(3): 22-24. 
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theological moral traditions the since XVI century. Only since 1980 has this set of 
terms been changed to proportionate and disproportionate means. This latter set of 
terms better interprets the relationship with the concept of person.72 Caring for the 
person is the center of the question regarding whether a clinical choice is “good”. 
Moral tradition started to look at this question addressing the issue of suicide, thanks 
to St. Thomas: «a man has the obligation to sustain his body, otherwise he would be a 
killer of himself […] by precept, therefore, he is bound to nourish his body and 
likewise, we are bound to all the other items without which the body cannot live».73 
No theologians immediately following St. Thomas developed a position which 
differed from his regarding suicide. 
In the Catholic moral tradition, after St Thomas, three fields concerning the difference 
between ordinary and extraordinary means of conserving human life can be 
identified.74 
 
1- In the XVI-XVII centuries the main factors used to explain the difference between 
ordinary and extraordinary means are related to food and drugs. 
During the XVI century the main commentary on Secunda Secundae of St. Thomas is 
the Relectiones Theologicae by the Spanish Dominican F. de Vitoria (†1546). Vitoria 
explains his position on the relationship between a patient’s life and the questions 
regarding administering food and drugs. He writes in the chapter Relectio de 
Temperantia: «If one uses foods which men commonly use and in the quantity which 
customarily suffices for the conservation of strength, even though from this his life is 
shortened, even notably and this is noticed, he would not sin… From this, the 
corollary follows that one is not held to use medicines to prolong his life even where 
the danger of death is probable, for example to take for some years a drug to avoid 
fevers or anything of this sort»4. For F. de Vitoria there is no obligation to use all 
means available to conserve one’s own life: it is morally admissible to use only the 
proportioned mean designated to this end.75 
This omission is not equivalent to a suicide, but to living using only the ordinary 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 Spaemann R, Persone, Roma Bari, Laterza, 2007; 31. 
73 Thomas S. Super Epistolas S. Pauli. Taurini-Romae, Marietti, 1953; II thess, lec. 11, n. 77. 
74 Smith RE, Conserving Human Life, Massachusetts, Pope John XXIII Medical-Moral Research and 
Educational Center, 1989: 32-76. 
75 Vittoria F, Relectiones Theologicae, Lugduni, Relectio de Temperantia, 1587: n.1. 
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
40	  
	  
means possible to put off imminent death. In general only food is recognized as an 
ordinary means, but not in every instance – a sick person is excused from taking food 
only when there is limited or no hope of life.76 
 
2- In the XVII-XX centuries another study-question emerged: can the mutilation of a 
limb or an essential part of the body be evaluated as an extraordinary means to 
conserve a human life? 
The Jesuit Francisco Suarez (†1617) in his Opera Omnia asserts that the mutilation of 
«a principal member is almost equivalent to death, for this reason a man is not bound 
to undergo it in order to save his life»77. 
Regarding amputation, Suarez explains that the reasons for differentiating ordinary 
means from extraordinary means are related to pain: no one has the duty to conserve 
his life if suffering is tremendous and the result is uncertain. The exception, as 
Cardinal De Lugo (†1660) writes, concerns a person whose life is very necessary for 
the public good78. A person can accept the order to be operated (mutilated) but only 
on the condition that the outcome will be safe and certain. 
N. Mazzotta (†1746) in his Theologia Moralis explains the features of the 
extraordinary means (therefore not mandatory): 1- there is no hope of recovery, 2- 
great horror or torment, 3- extraordinary expenditure. These would excuse a person 
from employing these means.79 
 
3- The moral reflection changes with the introduction of the modern use of the 
anesthesia (from the XIX century to 1957). 
The physician C. Capellmann applies traditional moral theological principles to 
modern medical science. In his opus De Operationibus Vitae Periculum Afferentibus 
he mentions the obligation of conserving one’s life and the duty to submit to 
treatment, now considered safer, if one’s life is at risk. Pain is no longer the criterion 
which justifies the withholding of a surgical operation. But anesthesia doesn’t 
necessarily remove the concept of extraordinary means regarding a difficult surgical 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 Sayrus G, Clavis Regia Casuum Conscientiae, Lib. VII, Cap. IX, n.38. 
77 Suarez F, Opera Omnia, Paris, Berton, Vives, 1858;  tom. XII, disp. 9, sect. 3, concl. 5. 
78 De Lugo J, De Justitia et Jure, disp. 10, Sect. I, n. 21. 
79 Mazzotta N, Theologia Moralis, Venetiis, 1760, tom I, tract. II, disp. II, quaest. I, cap.I. 
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operation. This clinical data made a significant impact on choices of treatment, given 
the new, more readily available resources. As A. Lanza and P. Palazzini write in their 
Theologia Moralis (1955), extraordinary means should be decided in individual cases, 
in which no one has the duty to undergo a grave incommodum – serious 
disadvantages – to conserve his life.80 
 
4- Since 1957 there have been some important pronouncements by the Catholic 
Church, in which the notion of proportionality is related to the criteria regarding the 
terminally ill and to end-of-life issues. In a famous document, entitled An address of 
Pope Pius XII to an International Congress of Anesthesiologists, published in 
Osservatore Romano, November 25-26, 1957, the Pope considers objective ethical 
aspects (clinical condition) related to subjective ethical patient and familial aspects 
(existential condition).81 The difference between “right” and “obligation” opens up 
the question of the relationship between two free wills: those of the patient or his 
family and those of the physician; who together must arrive, as closely as possible, at 
a mutually consensual therapeutic choice. 
Only in 1980 do the terms “ordinary” and “extraordinary” come to signify change in 
“proportionate” and “disproportionate” means of conserving life. The new 
terminology is mentioned in the document Iura et Bona (1980) published by the 
Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith.82 
Pope John Paul II, in the Encyclical Evangelium Vitae, explains the difference 
between killing and allowing someone to die, referring to the notion of the 
proportionality of care83. 
 
From an historical point of view, it can be deduced that the notion of proportionality is 
relevant in every clinical choice – also today – regarding patient care and freedom of 
choice.84 
A sound medical approach considers how both clinical and living conditions affect the 
patient’s quality of life. Proportioned treatment originates from a precise evaluation of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 Lanza A, Palazzini P, Theologia Moralis II, Taurini-Romae,  Marietti, 1955: n.125. 
81 Smith RE, Conserving Human Life, cit.,1989, 316. 
82 Iura et Bona, 1980, IV. 
83 Evangelium Vitae, 1995, 65. 
84 Jansen LA, Sulmasy DP, Proportionality, terminal suffering and the restorative goals of medicine, 
Theoretical Medicine, 2002; 23: 321–337. 
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both clinical conditions and personal history, and is developed through the specific 
relationship between patient and physician (the so called “therapeutic alliance”) in 
which the significance of every choice is identified.85 
 
Proportionality must be evaluated for each single patient, considering his⁄her particular 
clinical history, objective state of health, needs, psychological resources, and personal 
values (ascertained through careful listening, open dialogue, and with sufficient time).86 
 
 
 The Rule of Double Effect (RDE) 
 
Another important question related to the principle of non-maleficence is the Rule of 
Double Effect (RDE). RDE is related with the principle of Non Maleficence because it 
helps to recognize a good action even if this good action implies a harmful effect, a 
minimally foreseeable effect. 
There are four conditions which justify an act with a double effect87: 
1 The nature of the act. The act must be good, or at least morally neutral, independent of 
its consequences; 
2 The agent’s intention. The agent’s intent is only the good effect, not the bad effect. 
The bad effect can be foreseen, tolerated, and permitted, but it must not be intended. 
3 The distinction between means and effects. The bad effect must not be a means to the 
good effect.  Even if the good effect were the causal result of the bad effect, the agent 
should not produce the bad effect in pursuit of the good effect. 
4 The proportionality between the good effect and the bad effect. The good effect must 
outweigh the bad effect. That is, the bad effect is permissible only if a proportionate 
reason compensates for permitting the foreseen bad effect. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 Clayton JM et al., When and How to Initiate Discussion About Prognosis and End-of-Life Issues with 
Terminally Ill Patients, Journal of Pain and Symptom Management, 2005; 30(2): 132-144. 
Walczak A et al., Patient perspectives regarding communication about prognosis and end-of-life issues: 
How can it be optimised?, Patient Education and Counseling, 2013; 90: 307–314. 
86 Giannini A, et al., End-of-life decisions in pediatric intensive care. Recommendations of the Italian 
Society of Neonatal and Pediatric Anesthesia and Intensive Care (SARNePI), Pediatric Anesthesia 2008; 
18:1089-1095. 
87 Beauchamp TL, Childress JF, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, cit., 162. 
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 The distinction between Non maleficence and Beneficence 
 
The Principles of Non Maleficence and Beneficence may be interpreted as similar, and 
considered two different aspects of the same phenomenon as well88. 
It seems to be better to distinguish them, as the second principle focuses on one single 
medical treatment for one specific patient and its implications regarding his/her pain; 
instead the principle of Beneficence highlights operative actions used to improve the 
patient’s clinical condition. 
The principle of Beneficence is different from that of Non-maleficence because: “the 
rules of Non-maleficence are 1- negative prohibitions of action, 2- must be followed 
impartially, and 3- provide moral reasons for legal prohibitions of certain forms of 
conduct. Furthermore, the rules of Beneficence 1-present positive requirements for 
action, 2- need not always be followed impartially, and 3- generally do not provide 
reasons for legal punishment when agents fail to abide by them”89. 
 
 
 c- Beneficence 
 
 The Principle of Beneficence involves helping people with an active 
contribution, acting for the benefit of others, not only avoiding damaging acts. 
Beauchamp and Childress present two principles of beneficence: positive beneficence 
and utility. Positive beneficence “requires agents to provide benefits to others.  Utility 
requires that agents balance benefits, risks, and costs to produce the best overall 
results”90. 
The principle of positive beneficence can include different kinds of moral rules. Some 
examples are91: 
1- Protecting and defending the rights of others; 
2- Preventing harm from occurring to others; 
3- Removing conditions that will cause harm to others; 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 Cattorini PM, Bioetica, Milano, Elsevier,20114: 16. 
89 Beauchamp TL, Childress JF, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, cit., 199. 
90 Ibidem, 197. 
91 Ibidem, 199. 
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4- Helping person with disabilities; 
5- Rescuing persons in danger. 
 
Moreover, Beauchamp and Childress explain that the principle of utility, in their 
analysis, is not identical to the principle of utility as presented in the moral theory called 
utilitarianism 92 .Classical Utilitarianism has had two important exponents: Jeremy 
Bentham and John Stuart Mill. Bentham describes the principle of utility as the most 
important principle useful to clarify every action: “Nature has placed mankind under the 
governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out 
what we ought to do… By the principle of utility is meant that principle which approves 
or disapproves of every action whatsoever according to the tendency it appears to have 
to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in question: or, what 
is the same thing in other words to promote or to oppose that happiness. I say of every 
action whatsoever”93. Beauchamp and Childress distance themselves from this position: 
the principle of utility is “one among a number of prima facie principles, and it does not 
determine the overall balance of moral obligations”94. 
In general the principle of beneficence “refers to a statement of moral obligation to act 
for the benefit of others”95. The principle of beneficence responds to the most important 
aim of medicine: to provide benefits to others. In particular, as expressed in the 
Hippocratic Oath: “to help, or at least to do no harm”. 
In the last decades this principle is often presented in contrast with the patient’s right to 
choose autonomously about our treatments: “the principle of respect for autonomy has 
grounded several rights for patients, including rights to receive information, to consent 
to and refuse procedures, and to have confidentiality and privacy maintained. Others 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92  Maclean A, The Elimination of Morality. Reflections on Utilitarianism and Bioethics, London, 
Routledge, 1993. Laing JA, Critical Essays in Consequentialist Bioethics, London, Macmillan Press, 
1997. 
93 Bentham J, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, 1789, I, § 2-3; tr. It. Di Pietro 
S, Introduzione ai principi della morale e della legislazione, Torino, Utet, 1998: 90-91, in R. Mordacci, 
Una introduzione alle teorie morali, confronto con la bioetica, Milano, Feltrinelli, 2003: 94. 
94 Beauchamp TL, Childress JF, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, cit., 199. 
95 Beauchamp TL, Childress JF, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, cit., 197. A significant example of 
beneficent behavior is that of the Good Samaritan in the New Testament. The Good Samaritan is not the 
only one inclined to take care of the sick man. The publican also accepts taking care of a stranger, without 
requesting money, based only on a promise from the Samaritan. Luke 10, 25-37. The parable of the Good 
Samaritan. 
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ground such obligations on the health care professional’s primary obligation of 
beneficence, which is to act for the patient’s medical benefit”96. 
Thus an important problem arises in clinical ethics: the relationship between the 
principle of Autonomy and the principle of Beneficence. 
This argument finds its origins in the Paternalism, attitude under which the physician is 
compared to a father and the patients to his children. Paternalism is “the intentional 
overriding of one person’s preferences or actions by another person, where the person 
who overrides justifies this action by appeal to the goal of benefiting or of preventing or 
mitigating harm to the person whose preferences or actions are overridden”97. 
This paternal position of the physician has two features: “beneficence, and that he 
makes all or at least some of the decisions relating to his children’s welfare, rather than 
letting them make those decisions”98. 
The distinction between soft and hard paternalism could better balance the principles of 
autonomy and beneficence. 
Hard paternalism seems not to consider the patient’s opinion about his/her own choices, 
and the physician is considered the only well-informed individual able to perform care 
planning for the patient’s good: “the hard paternalist will restrict forms of information 
available to the person or will otherwise override the person’s informed and voluntary 
choices”99. 
Hard paternalism is morally justified if the following conditions are satisfied: 
1- A patient is at risk of a significant, preventable harm; 
2- The paternalistic actions will probably prevent the harm; 
3- The projected benefits to the patient of the paternalistic actions outweigh their risks 
to the patient; 
4- There is no reasonable alternative to the limitation of autonomy; 
5- The least autonomy-restrictive alternative that will secure the benefits and reduce the 
risks is adopted. 
Soft paternalism seems resolve the conflict between the principle of beneficence and the 
principle of autonomy: it reflects “the intended beneficiary’s own conception of his or 
her best interest, even if the intended beneficiary fails to fully understand or recognize 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 Beauchamp TL, Childress JF, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, cit., 207. 
97 Ibidem, 208. 
98 Idem. 
99 Ibidem, 210. 
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those interests or to fully pursue them because of inadequate willfulness, commitment, 
or self-control”100. This conception of soft paternalism seems to be able to respect the 
autonomy of the patient, because it is oriented to offer support in order that the patient 
can choice the better things for itself. In fact there are three positions on the justification 
of paternalism in literature 101 : Anti-paternalism; Paternalism that appeals to the 
principle of respect for autonomy; Paternalism that appeals to principles of beneficence. 
In general, all these three forms accept and justify soft paternalism. 
 
 
 Paternalism and the Pasteur’s case 
 
To better explain the theme of paternalism, a clinical episode of euthanasia in XIX 
century France is presented below. This case presents paternalistic behavior on the part 
of one of the most famous scientist of XIX century, Louis Pasteur, the father of 
biochemistry. 
 
Louis Pasteur and the case of the six Russian peasants.102 
The young Dr. Munthe observed the suffering of many patients in a famous hospital 
in Paris during the second half of nineteenth-century and left moving written 
descriptions of his initial wonder about the desolation of the death that struck most of 
those poor souls: «How could He be so cruel, He who could be so gentle? How could 
He take away so much of youth and life with one hand, when He could give so much 
peace and happiness with the other?”103 
Axel Munthe immediately developed a significant relationship with death, despite the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 Ibidem, 211. 
101 Ibidem, 213. 
102 This is a clinical case of euthanasia which occurred at the end of the Nineteenth Century. Regarding 
the practice of euthanasia in the nineteenth century, was there an undisputed or conditioned acceptance? 
Following we will present a few pages which clarify the thought processes, but at the same time 
underscore a surprising aspect of cruelty involved in a particular case: they were obtained from the 
reflections of the fascinating autobiographical narrative by Axel Munthe, The Story of San Michele, a 
masterpiece by the great Swedish physician and writer. They describe a nineteenth-century clinical case 
of euthanasia, which was forgotten or eluded medical history and bioethical reflections: this case is not 
described in works of scientific literature, but it is part of the cultural baggage of narrative doctrine and 
the memorandums of the well-known author. I would like to thank Professors G. Armocida and M. 
Picozzi for recommendations on writing this case. 
103 Munthe A, The Story of San Michele, kindle version, New York, E.P. Dutton & Co.,1945: 492. 
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
47	  
	  
fact that his medical career was just beginning. He worked in that old hospital in the 
hopes of authenticating his approach and he believed that his mission had inevitably 
obliged him to combat the arrival of the implacable enemy. 
Later on, however, experience caused him to change his mind regarding the idea of 
death; it subsequently became so familiar that he was able to call it “colleague” and 
“friend”, believing that: «He had his share in the work, as well as I had mine, His 
mission to fulfill just as I had mine […] that when the wrestling over a life was over 
and He had won, it was far better to look each other fearlessly in the face and be 
friends»104. 
The doctor felt “defeated”, but not “disarmed” when confronted by death. Death had 
its eternal narcotic, but the young doctor had his as well: «When he was slow in 
dealing out His remedy, why should not I deal out mine with its merciful power to 
change anguish into peace, agony into sleep? Was it not my mission to help those to 
die I could not help to live?”105. 
Basing his reflections on the “relationship” which developed resulting from his 
experiences regarding death, Axel Munthe recounts a significant episode which 
regarded two of the biggest names in the history of medicine and science: Pasteur and 
Tillaux. 
Six Russian peasants (moujiks), who had been attacked by a pack of mad wolves, had 
been sent to Paris at the expense of the Tsar to be cared for in the famous Pasteur 
Institute: «They were all horribly mauled in the face and hands and their chances 
from the outset were almost nil”. 
They had been hospitalized in a separate ward at the Hôtel Dieu, under the care of the 
surgeon Tillaux, friend and collaborator of Pasteur. Axel Munthe writes: «Pasteur 
knew this better than anybody, and hadn’t he been the man he was, he would no 
doubt have declined to take them in hand. Pasteur came himself every morning with 
Tillaux to inoculate them, watching them anxiously from day to day. Nobody could 
understand a word they said». 
Munthe said that no one wanted to get close to the ward where the six moujiks were, 
not even the courageous sisters: «Their screams and howls could be heard all over the 
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Hotel Dieu, people said even below in Place Notre Dame. The whole hospital was 
flooded with emotion. Nobody wanted to go near the ward, not even the courageous 
Nuns fled in terror. I can see now the white face of Pasteur as he passed in silence 
from bed to bed, looking at the doomed men with infinite compassion in his eyes». 
The young doctor describes a sequence of difficult situations in which he found 
himself having to take care of the six patients: «One afternoon, it was on the ninth 
day, I was trying to pour a drop of milk down the lacerated throat of one of the 
moujiks, a giant whose whole face had almost been torn away, when suddenly 
something wild and uncanny flashed in his eyes, the muscles of the jaws contracted 
and opened spasmodically with a snapping sound, and a ghastly cry I had never heard 
before either from man or animal rang out from his foaming mouth. He made a 
violent effort to spring out of bed and nearly knocked me down, as I tried to hold him 
back. His arms, strong as the paws of a bear, closed on me in a clasp, holding me 
tightly as if in a vice. I felt the foul breath from his foaming mouth close to mine and 
the poisonous saliva dripping down my face. I grasped at his throat, the bandage 
slipped off his ghastly wound, and as I drew back my hands from his snapping jaws, 
they were red with blood. A convulsive trembling passed over his whole body, and 
his arms relaxed their grasp and fell back inert at his side. I staggered to the door in 
search of the strongest disinfectant I could get hold of. […] In the evening the moujik, 
tied hand and foot to the iron bars of the bed, was carried to a separate pavilion, 
isolated from the others. I went to see him the next morning with Sœur Marthe. The 
room was semi-dark. The bandage covered his whole face and I could see nothing but 
his eyes; they haunted me for years afterwards. His breathing was short and irregular, 
with intervals similar to Cheyne-Stokes respiration – the well-known precursory 
symptom of death. He talked with vertiginous rapidity in a hoarse voice, now and 
then interrupted by a wild cry of distress or a hooting moan which made me shudder. 
I listened for a while to the rush of unknown words half-drowned in the flow of 
saliva, and soon I thought I distinguished one same word repeated incessantly, with 
an almost desperate accent: “Crestitsa! Crestitsa! Crestitsa! [Crucifix]”. I looked 
attentively into his eyes, his kind, humble, imploring eyes. “He is conscious,” I 
whispered to Sœur Marthe, “and he wants something, I wish I knew what it was. 
Listen!” “Crestitsa! Crestitsa! Crestitsa!” he called out incessantly. “Run and fetch a 
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crucifix,” I said to the nun. We laid the crucifix on the bed. The flow of words ceased 
instantly. He lay there quite silent, his eyes fixed on the crucifix. His breathing grew 
fainter and fainter. Suddenly the muscles of his giant body stiffened in a last violent 
contraction and his heart stood still. The next day another moujik showed 
unmistakable signs of hydrophobia, and soon another, and three days later they were 
all raving mad». 
Munthe remembers the white face of Pasteur as he passed quietly from bed to bed, 
watching the condemned men, with infinite compassion: «He sank down on a chair, 
his head between his hands. Accustomed as I was to seeing him every day I had not 
noticed till then how ill and worn he looked, though I realized from an almost 
imperceptible hesitation in his speech and a slight hesitation in the grip of his hand 
that he had already received the first warning of the fate that was to overcome him 
soon after». 
Tillaux was called while he was working; he arrived with his coat still stained with 
blood, approached Pasteur, and put his hand on his shoulder: “The two men looked at 
each other in silence. The kind blue eyes of the great surgeon, who had seen so much 
horror and suffering, glanced round the ward and his face grew white as a sheet. “I 
cannot stand it,” he said in a broken voice and sprang out of the room». The surgeon 
and chemist looked into each other’s eyes: «The same evening a consultation took 
place between these two men. Few people know of the decision they ultimately 
arrived at, but it was the only just one, and did them both honor. The next morning all 
was silent in the ward. During the night the doomed men had been helped to a 
painless death”. 
For several days in Paris there was talk of nothing else but the case of the six moujiks. 
The clinical case exposes choices which could be interpreted as the only practicable 
ones, but which at the same time could be defined as acts of disarming cruelty. 
 
This case makes one think that even the greatest scientific minds, when confronted with 
the limits of modern medicine, cannot help but to take into consideration equally 
objective factors such as excruciating pain and suffering. The case reported presents 
several ethical questions. For us the most significant question is: What to do when you 
have no alternatives? 
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
50	  
	  
This issue, initially presented in the nineteenth century, is no less urgent today. Pasteur 
and the great surgeon Tillaux agreed to put an end to the suffering of the six Russian 
peasants, and so to their lives, after attempting every possible therapeutic means of 
conserving their lives. But is this choice ethically justifiable? According to the Kantian 
perspective, putting an end to the existence of a human life is always to be condemned. 
This concept can be inferred from the second formulation of the categorical imperative 
(The Principle of Respect for Persons), described in the Critique of Practical Reason:  
“Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in any other 
person, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means”106. In Kantian 
ethics man is always recognized as the end of any human action.107 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106 Cfr. Kant I., Critique of Practical Reason, kindle version, New York, Dover Publications, 2004: 2104-
2112. 
107 The first moral theory originated from Kant’s reflections and is therefore called Kantian theory. It is a 
theory based on the principle of duty and today it is also called deontological theory (“i.e. a theory that 
some features of actions other than or in addition to consequences make actions obligatory”, Beauchamp 
T, Le Roy W, Jeffrey PK, Mastroianni AC (eds.), Contemporary Issues in Bioethics, cit., 15.). Kant, 
unlike Mill, believed that certain types of actions (including murder, theft, and lying) were absolutely 
prohibited, even in cases where the action would bring about more happiness than the alternative.  For 
Kantians, there are two questions that we must ask ourselves whenever we decide to act:  Can I rationally 
will that everyone acts as I propose to act? If the answer is no, then we must not perform the action.  Does 
my action respect the goals of human beings rather than merely using them for my own purposes?  Again, 
if the answer is no, then we must not perform the action - Kant believed that these questions were 
equivalent. In the Metaphysics of Morals (1797) Kant (1725- 1804) analyzes the duties of the human 
being especially towards himself: the human being is considered both as a reasonable being and a being 
capable of obligations (in particular towards himself). This double characteristic allows the human being 
to recognize a duty towards himself: “Man as a moral being (homo noumenon) cannot use himself as a 
natural being (homo phaenomenon) i.e. as a mere means (a speaking machine), as if his natural being 
were not bound to the inner end (of communicating thoughts), but is bound to the condition of using 
himself as a natural being in agreement with the declaration of his moral being and is under obligation to 
himself to truthfulness”( Kant I, Metaphysics of Morals, Mary Gregor M (ed.), Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2003, 183). Kant believes that pure reason is the ultimate basis of moral rules: “the 
moral worth of an agent’s action depends exclusively on the moral acceptability of the rule on the basis of 
which the person is acting; the person’s motive for acting must be recognition of the act as resting on 
duty” (Beauchamp T, Le Roy W, Jeffrey PK, Mastroianni AC (eds.), Contemporary Issues in Bioethics, 
cit., 15). With this idea of the agent’s action Kant develops a supreme principle, the categorical 
imperative, called the moral law. The formulations of the categorical principle are different (Cattorini P, 
Bioetica, cit., 19). Kant’s formulation of the Categorical Imperative could be interpreted as: “Act only 
according to that maxim whereby you can, at the same time, will that it should become a universal law”. 
And the Second formulation of the Categorical Imperative, highly influential in bioethics, might be: “Act 
in such a way that you treat humanity... never merely as a means to an end, but always at the same time as 
an end”. The Categorical Imperative is a completely formal law, it needs to be respected as pure intention, 
following its formulation and nourishing it as an internal and personal duty. Kant’s imperative 
underscores that each person in such a situation must be treated with the same respect as all other human 
beings: “to treat persons merely as a means, strictly speaking, is to disregard their personhood by 
exploiting or otherwise using them without regard to their own thoughts, interest and needs” (Beauchamp 
T, Le Roy W, Jeffrey PK, Mastroianni AC (eds.), Contemporary Issues in Bioethics, cit., 17). Every 
person has equal worth and dignity and no one can be used as a means (but considered only as end) 
towards utilitarian or egoistic behavior, or for any other reasons. 
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According to this perspective, Pasteur and Tillaux would seem to have no ethical 
justification to support their final choice: the intentional killing of six Russian peasants 
also clashes with a basic principle of medical ethics “Primum non nocere”. 
However, according to the Kantian perspective one practical question, anything but 
minor, remains unresolved: should keeping a patient alive always be the only criterion 
which is used to justify a medical strategy, when there are no alternatives in the extreme 
fight against pain, and there is no reasonable expectation of recovery? 
Therefore the aim of therapeutic action becomes making every kind of effort to reduce 
or eliminate pain, given that there are apparently no other possibilities. In this case, 
given that the aim of therapeutic action is restricted to providing relief from pain, does 
the patient become nothing more than a means to an end? In addition, in the clinical 
case presented, another useful aspect which supports the two scientists’ final choice can 
be observed: the option of ending life may also have been indirectly recognized, and 
taken into consideration given the request of the farmer to have a crucifix placed in 
front of him. It would seem to be an acknowledgment by the patient of the imminent 
end of his/her own life. 
Therefore, could the two expert scientists’ choice be justifiable? For the previously 
mentioned reasons, it may be said that the shared choice of the two scientists presents 
reasonable justifications, given both the lack of means of controlling pain, and a 
physician’s moral obligation to alleviate suffering, where there are no therapeutic 
alternatives. 
 
 
 d- Justice 
 
 As for the principle of beneficence, there is not one single principle of Justice. 
There is one formal principle and different material principles of Justice. 
The principle of formal equality is traditionally attributed to Aristotle: “Equals must be 
treated equally, and the unequal must be treated unequally”108. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
108 Aristotele, Metafisica, G. Reale (a cura di), Rusconi Libri, Milano, 1993, V, 9, 1018 a 7. 
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In its contemporary form, this principle is sometimes expressed as follows: “Individuals 
should be treated in the same manner, unless they differ in ways that are relevant to the 
situation in which they are involved”109. 
As regards the formal principle, there are material principles of distributive Justice. 
They are110: 
1- To each person an equal share; 
2- To each person according to need; 
3- To each person according to effort; 
4- To each person according to contribution; 
5- To each person according to merit; 
6- To each person according to free-market exchanges. 
The material principles could be considered as normative and practical criteria to be 
used to decide about a “good” distribution of resources and obligations. These 
principles can be deduced from common-sense: “No obvious barrier prevents 
acceptance of more than one of these principles, and some theories of justice accept all 
six as valid”111. Beauchamp and Childress do not recognize any specific ethics theory 
(i.e. utilitarian theories, libertarian theories, communitarian theories, egalitarian 
theories, cosmopolitan theories112) under which it would be possible to include all of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109 Velasquez M, et al., Justice and Fairness, Issues in Ethics, Spring, 1990; 3: 2. 
110 Beauchamp TL, Childress JF, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, cit., 243-265-266 
111 Idem. 
112 Ibidem, 244. The liberal tradition found its origins in the jusnaturalistic tradition (Locke, Rousseau, 
Kant). The idea of safeguarding individual liberties found in utilitarism (Mill) a fertile ground in which to 
analyze various socio-political problems. During the XX century the Rawls’ Theory of Justice was 
recognized as a valid foundation for liberal justice and was recognized as being different from the 
utilitarian moral theory, especially regarding some paradoxical utilitarian conclusions that seem to violate 
the rights of the subject (Mordacci R, Una introduzione alle teorie morali, confronto con la bioetica, cit., 
131-132). Rawls’ position about liberalism is called neocontractualism (Mordacci R, Una introduzione 
alle teorie morali, confronto con la bioetica, cit., 131-132). From this thoughtful judgment, guaranteed by 
the common sense of the members of the society, Rawls deduces many principles which are useful in 
order to found an orderly society. It is important for our discourse to underscore Rawls’ position about the 
relationship between moral subjects and the principles deduced from the idea of Justice: “the best 
principles will be represented by the reflection on those moral subjects that will be disinterested, neutral 
about specific situations and will be provided with a sense of justice (Mordacci R, Una introduzione alle 
teorie morali, confronto con la bioetica, cit., 131-132). Rawls defines the relationship between thoughtful 
judgments and the reflexive equilibrium principles. This type of reflection made by the moral subjects 
develops the idea of a contract between people called to decide about the validity of the principles, not 
about a specific situation in which the principles could be used to determine a good action. There is a 
significant difference between the idea of reflexive equilibrium of Beauchamp and Childress and that of 
Rawls. In Principialism the reflexive equilibrium is used to balance different principles in order to resolve 
a specific situation ( a clinical case or ethics dilemma). In the Rawls’ idea of justice the reflexive 
equilibrium is utilized to identify and adjust its own principles in their original definition, not to 
determine which principle should be used in a specific situation (Mordacci R, Una introduzione alle 
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characteristics of a coherent theory of Justice.113 Instead they refer to each single and 
concrete situation in order to balance different principles, so as to recognize the 
importance of the right to health and health care. In particular Beauchamp and Childress 
recognize certian difficulties concerning the principle of justice regarding allocating, 
rationing and setting priorities.114  
 
Beauchamp and Childress present four types of allocation (partitioning the 
comprehensive social budget; allocating within the general budget; allocating within the 
health care budget; allocating scarce treatments for patients) and three meanings of 
rationing (the first is related to “denial from lack of resources”; the second derives from  
social policy limits; the third sense is related to an allowance that is distributed 
equitably, but “those who can afford additional goods are not denied access beyond the 
allotted amount”). 
A third aspect, the setting of priorities, is in particular related to costs, especially for 
insurance, new technology, deteriorating health conditions and longer life expectancy: 
“the question in setting priorities is how to determine what ought to be done when 
resources are inadequate to provide all of the health benefits that it is technically 
possible to provide”. 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
teorie morali, confronto con la bioetica, cit., 140). This position is also called coherentism. Relating to 
this idea of Justice, Hugo Tristram Engelhardt develops his skeptical position about the possibility of 
finding a shared rational agreement regarding the substantial moral question that pervades society: the 
“failure to recognize the depth of the moral diversity that characterizes our context is understandable. The 
presumption that there is a concrete morality available to all through rational reflection has deep roots in 
Western History”(Engelhardt Jr HT, The foundations of Bioethics, cit., 3). His position is called 
proceduralism, because what we can only aim for is the respect of a neutral procedure, which allows us to 
provide a tolerant and peaceful choice, despite geographical and moral diversities (Cattorini P, Bioetica, 
cit., 20). Engelhardt does not believe that public cohesion about some substantial principles could be 
arrived at through human reasoning. Human beings are moral strangers, and the rational argument is not 
able to bridge the differences. Therefore the principle of autonomy is called the principle of permission, 
the only one valid, because this principle defines the absolute limits of any relationship between 
individuals, without any moral judgment about their respective moral visions (Mordacci R, Una 
introduzione alle teorie morali, confronto con la bioetica, cit., 140). 
113 Mordacci R, Una introduzione alle teorie morali, confronto con la bioetica, cit., 84. 
114 Beauchamp TL, Childress JF, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, cit., 267-275. 
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 Clinical Case: Jehovah’s Witnesses and Organ Transplants. 
 
 Jehovah’s Witness patient legitimately could present a request of admission in 
an organ transplant list. This application is generally related to the prohibition to accept 
whole blood and some blood constituents for religious reasons.115 
These two requirements open ethical issues for the patient, the physician and the 
healthcare system. On the one hand the principle of autonomy remembers the duty to 
respect the decision-making capacities of autonomous patient, and on the other hand the 
principle of justice implicates an analysis of fair allocation – non-discrimination – of the 
resources and the obligations. The aim of the analysis of the following clinical case is to 
offer an ethical analysis of the possible care for Jehovah’s Witness patients who request 
admission to an organ transplant list but who refuse whole blood transfusions, and the 
reasons why physicians might accept this religious clause. 
 
Clinical Case 
Our case is about a 61-year-old woman with kidney failure due to high blood pressure 
and diabetes and complicated by coronary artery disease and Hepatitis C infection, 
acquired from a blood transfusion after during childbirth. In late 2013 she was 
referred to the Mount Sinai Hospital’s Recanati/Miller Transplantation Institute 
(RMTI) because our institution’s transplant program includes kidney transplants from 
cadaver donors with Hepatitis C infection to patients with Hepatitis C. The patient 
was receiving dialysis, but she did not tolerate it well primarily because she 
experienced persistent Dialyzer Reaction type B, a condition characterized by onset 
15-30 minutes into dialysis with symptoms of chest/back pain, nausea, and mild 
hypotension. In addition, she no longer had dialysis access in her arms, and was being 
dialyzed through a thigh graft. The medical team was unsure how long they could 
maintain access for the patient’s dialysis treatment. Our patient could not find a living 
kidney donor, so the transplant team had to decide if the patient was a candidate to 
register for kidney transplant with the Organ Procurement and Transplantation 
Network (OPTN). (At one point in the course of the patient, she did find a living 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115 I would like to thank dr. Paul Cummins. We have presented this work at ICCEC 2015 in New York. 
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kidney donor, but the transplant team judged the donor not to be a suitable match due 
to age and ill health.) The decision to register our patient on OPTN was made more 
complex because the patient informed the team that she would not accept blood 
transfusion or blood products because she was a Jehovah’s Witness. The patient 
expressed a strong to desire to undergo kidney transplant because she wished to live 
to see her grandchild learn to walk and talk, her adult sons settle down, and spend 
quality time with her husband without being a burden on him. She was certain, 
though, she would not accept blood transfusion or blood products, and expressed 
frustration with prior “ugly experiences” at other institutions, in which her 
commitment was “ridiculed,” and physicians told her they would transfuse when she 
was unconscious. The patient explained that she understood that her health was 
precarious, but “it would be silly to make a decision that would displease Jehovah, 
when my life is at risk, especially if there are alternatives to transfusion.”  
 
 
 Case Analysis 
  
 Biblical Foundations 
 It is well known that Jehovah’s Witnesses patients refuse whole blood 
transfusion and some blood constituents; should these refusals disqualify Jehovah’s 
Witnesses from being listed for organ transplant?  
Jehovah’s Witnesses base their refusal of blood transfusion and blood constituents on a 
textual interpretation of Scripture. There are no clear references to blood transfusion in 
Scripture, but some verses forbid the consumption of blood as food because the life of a 
being is found in blood; e.g. Genesis 9:3-4 says, “Every moving animal that is alive 
may serve as food for you. Just as I gave you the green vegetation, I give them all to 
you. Only flesh with its life —its blood —you must not eat,” Leviticus 17:14 says, 
“You must not eat the blood of any sort of flesh because the life of every sort of flesh is 
its blood. Anyone eating it will be cut off,” and Acts 15:28-29 says, “It seemed good to 
the Holy Spirit and to us not to burden you with anything beyond the following 
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requirements: You are to abstain from food sacrificed to idols, from blood, from the 
meat of strangled animals and from sexual immorality”116. 
The Jehovah’s Witness religion was founded in 1872 in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, is 
administered by the Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society of Pennsylvania (WTS), 
which itself is under the supervision of the Governing Body of Jehovah’s Witnesses. 
The WTS has been headquartered in Brooklyn New York since 1969. Since 1945 the 
WTS has promulgated a doctrine that “Blood transfusions and blood products are 
officially banned as ‘pagan and God-dishonoring,’”117 effectively forbidding Witnesses 
to accept them. The WTS bans these medical therapies because it believes blood is a 
nutrient, and blood transfusion is “eating” blood, which is forbidden by Scripture. And, 
from 1967 to 1980 the WTS also rejected the organ transplant: “When men of science 
[…] suggest removing the organ and replacing it directly with an organ from another 
human, this is simply a shortcut. Those who submit to such operations are thus living 
off the flesh of another human. That is cannibalistic. However, in allowing man to eat 
animal flesh Jehovah God did not grant permission for humans to try to perpetuate their 
lives by cannibalistically taking into their bodies human flesh, whether chewed or in the 
form of whole organs or body parts taken from others”118. 
From the late 1980s and 2000, the WTS revised its guidance to Jehovah’s Witnesses on 
blood transfusion and organ transplant.119 Jehovah’s Witnesses are to continue to reject 
transfusion of whole blood, red blood cells, platelets, plasma, hemoglobin solution, 
stored autologous blood, and blood donation. However, Witnesses should consult their 
personal consciences to decide whether to accept hemodilution, intraoperative blood 
salvage, and blood fractions like albumin, immune globulins, or clotting factors.120 
The WTS also made the choice for organ transplant a matter of personal conscience 
when it reversed its previous guidance: “Some Christians might feel that taking into 
their bodies any tissue or body part from another human is cannibalistic. […] Other 
sincere Christians today may feel that the Bible does not definitely rule out medical 
transplants of human organs. It may be argued, too, that organ transplants are different 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
116 New World Translation of the Holy Scriptures (2013 version), [www.jw.org, last seen 27/12/2015]. 
117 The Watchtower, July 7th, 1945, 198-201, [http://ajwrb.org/watchtower/blood-vaccines-and-organ-
transplants, last see27/12/2015]. 
118 The Watchtower, November 15th, 1967, 702. 
119 The Watchtower March 1st, 1989. 
120 The Watchtower, June 15th, 2000, 29-31. 
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from cannibalism since the ‘donor’ is not killed to supply food. […] There is no Biblical 
command pointedly forbidding the taking in of other human tissue”121. 
 
 Is the blood transfusion a real prohibition? 
The WTS’s ban on blood transfusion had presented a dilemma for Witnesses 
whose condition is optimally treated by organ transplant: disqualify oneself from organ 
transplant by refusing blood transfusion or disobey the religion’s principles, risking 
exclusion from the congregation. The medical and scientific community responded to 
this dilemma by developing protocols for “bloodless” surgery and peri-operative 
management to preclude the necessity of blood transfusion. Today bloodless organ 
transplants are possible, though they are more complex and raise the possibility of post-
operative complications. 
Because the WTS has ruled that the choice to receive some blood components and 
undergo organ transplant are matters of personal conscience some physicians may be 
puzzled when Witnesses continue to refuse blood transfusion. And while “to be sure, 
honoring patient values in health care decision making and respecting patient self-
determination are of the utmost importance,” other physician may worry that Witnesses 
are psychologically manipulated to refuse blood transfusion.122 Formerly, a Witness 
who accepted a blood transfusion was disfellowed, a finding imposed by a judicial 
committee when a Witness is found to violate the religion’s standards without 
repenting. A disfellowed believer “has been spiritually cut off from the congregation; 
the former spiritual ties have been completely severed.”123 Today, a Witness who 
accepts a blood transfusion is disassociated from the religion by his own action. 
Disfellowed or disassociated Witnesses are subject to communal shunning, the Biblical 
justification for this is found in the apostle Paul’s claim that Christians should “quit 
mixing in company” with persons who unrepentantly reject certain Scriptural 
standards.124  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121 The Watchtower, March 15th, 1980, 31, [http://www.4jehovah.org/jehovahs-witnesses-and-blood-
transfusions/last seen 27/12/2015]. 
122 Ridley DT, Jehovah’s Witnesses’ refusal of blood: obedience to scripture and religious conscience, 
Journal of Medical Ethics, 1999; 25: 469-472, 470. 
123 Idem. 
124 The Watchtower, March 15th, 1980, p. 31, [http://www.4jehovah.org/jehovahs-witnesses-and-blood-
transfusions/last seen 27/12/2015]. 
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The practice of shunning pressures Witnesses to adhere to the WTS’s ban on blood 
transfusion, but this should not be interpreted as compromising the autonomy of 
patients. The elders of a Jehovah’s Witness congregation are not authorized to make 
health-care decisions for a Witness “even if he asks what to do. […] They can, of 
course, call attention to what Jehovah has said that may have a bearing on the decision. 
For example, a Christian needs to remember the Biblical command “to keep abstaining 
from…blood.” (Acts 15:29). […] This knowledge could even influence a Christian’s 
conscience when he makes a personal decision regarding minor fractions derived from 
one of those four components.”125 The WTS counsels “it may be that [they] need to 
examine [their] own conscience, which may need further training in line with divine 
principles. On matters like health care, each of [them] should be willing to make a 
personal decision and accept the responsibility that comes with it.”126 
Though physicians may be tempted to judge that a Witness’ refusal of blood transfusion 
is coerced, this would be a mistake. The faithful Witness must choose between selecting 
the optimal surgical protocols for organ transplant, and adhering to his religious 
convictions. While medical professionals are ethically permitted to withhold or 
withdraw treatments both when the patients fail to adhere to treatment plans and when 
the risk of a surgery is too much high, a Witness’ refusal of blood transfusion should not 
be interpreted as a failure to adhere to treatment requirements. When a Witness refuses 
blood transfusion, he is autonomously choosing to follow his religion’s guidance and 
observe rigid Biblical norms. 
 
 The Principles of Bioethics and the role of the medical community 
Witnesses desire medical care that is compatible with their religious 
commitment to refuse blood transfusion. The medical community’s development of 
surgical protocols for performing “bloodless” surgery reflects its collective commitment 
to the principle of beneficence, which Beauchamp and Childress define as “obligations 
to provide benefits and to balance benefits against risks.” 127 Dr. Denton Cooley 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125 The Watchtower, September 2015, [http://www.jw.org/en/publications/magazines/w20150915/bible-
trained-conscience-guide/ last seen 27/12/2015]. 
126 The Watchtower, September, 2015, point 10. 
127 Beauchamp TL, Methods and principles in biomedical ethics, J Med Ethics, 2003; 29: 269–274. 
Beauchamp TL., The ‘four principles’ Approach to Health Care Ethics, in Ashcroft RE, Dawson A, 
Draper H, McMillan J (eds.), Principles of Health Care Ethics, Chichester, John Wiley & Sons, 2007: 3-
11. Beauchamp TL, Childress J, Principles of biomedical ethics, New York, Oxford University Press, 
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pioneered bloodless open-heart surgery, and other surgeons have continued to push the 
boundaries of bloodless surgery, so that now bloodless organ transplant is possible.128 
The same techniques that reflect the medical community’s devotion to the good of 
Jehovah’s Witnesses also generate autonomy 129  – “the obligation to respect the 
decision-making capacities of autonomous persons” – and justice – “obligations of 
fairness in the distribution of benefits and risks”. On the one hand the principle of 
respect for autonomy supports that if the patient has decisional capacity, then physicians 
should accept the patient’s choice, which in the case of a Jehovah’s Witness is that the 
best treatment for her is to be listed as a transplant candidate and undergo bloodless 
transplant when she is allocated an organ. On the other hand the provision of medical 
care sometimes requires medical professionals to make decisions about how to allocate 
scarce medical resources.130 The Jehovah’s Witness’ physician may be reluctant to 
accept the her decision because the physician may think that refusal of blood transfusion 
during the perioperative course of organ transplant jeopardizes the success of transplant: 
“blood transfusion is directly related to preoperative hematocrit level and intraoperative 
blood loss, both can and should be controlled by better perioperative strategy, higher 
technical skills, and optimal use of available new drugs and technologies.”131 Because 
there is a shortage of organs for transplant, this may unfairly deny an organ to a patient 
who is willing to accept treatments to optimize success of the transplant. 
The principles of autonomy and justice come into because the principle of autonomy is 
patient-centric vale that safeguards the patient’s self-determination. Conversely, the 
principle of justice is a socially oriented value that compels physicians to evaluate the 
practical social consequences of clinical choices. The patient is the ultimate arbiter of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20137. 
128 It is important to note that Jehovah’s Witnesses would not be the only beneficiaries of these advances: 
reducing the reliance on blood transfusion in surgery reduces the risk of immunological reaction or 
infection, and it reduces surgical costs. 
129 To see also: Beauchamp, Tom L., History and Theory in "Applied Ethics", Kennedy Institute of Ethics 
Journal, 2007; 17(1): 61-62. If a person makes a decision from passion or from religious conviction or 
from a desire to complete personal projects, this decision is not autonomous on Kant’s account. Any 
principle not based on autonomy of the will cannot form the will’s law, and thus acting from desire, 
impulse, interest, personal commitment, or habit is no less heteronomous than actions manipulated or 
coerced by others. 
130 Silva DS et al., Clinical Ethicists Perspectives on Organisational Ethics in Healthcare Organisations 
Source, Journal of Medical Ethics, 2008; 34(5): 320-323. 
131 Jabbour N et al., Transfusion free surgery: single institution experience of 27 consecutive liver 
transplants in Jehovah’s Witnesses, Journal of the American College of Surgeons, 2005; 201(3): 412–
417. 
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the procedures she is willing undergo, but in the contemporary transplant environment 
the physician must determine whether to recommend her as a transplant candidate. 
The medical community’s commitment to beneficence toward Jehovah’s Witnesses is 
demonstrated by its development of techniques that do not require blood transfusion to 
transplant heart132, liver133, lungs134, pancreas, kidneys135, stem cells136; and techniques 
to perform “bloodless” surgeries compatible with Jehovah’s Witness patients’ faith. 137 
Since 1986 (first reported successful cardiac transplant in a JW) 138 the advancement of 
own surgical techniques has entailing good results with a risk always more acceptable to 
engage operations without blood transfusions: “special consideration to surgical detail 
[…] and improved methods of perioperative management can result in a successful 
outcome at tolerable risk levels for this group of patients”.139 
 
 Justifications for refusing a Jehovah’s Witness patient as a transplant candidate. 
Because a physician’s personal conscious alone should not guide the provision 
of medical care, the reluctance of the surgeon to list this patient as a transplant candidate 
cannot be decisive. The surgeon’s ambivalence about whether or not to list this patient 
for transplant reflects uncertainty about how the principle of justice applies in this case. 
Aristotle thought that justice was a question of fair distribution of goods, and in 
medicine the concept requires the fair allocation of scarce resources.140 Thus, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
132  Elmistekawy E et al., Should Jehovah’s Witness patients be listed for heart transplantation?, 
Interactive Cardiovascular and Thoracic Surgery, 2012; 15(4):716–719; Burnett C. et al., Heart 
Transplantation in Jehovah’s Witnesses:  An Initial Experience and Follow-up, Archives of Surgery, 
1990; 125(11): 1430-1433. 
133 Jabbour, N et al., Transfusion free surgery: single institution experience of 27 consecutive liver 
transplants in Jehovah’s Witnesses, cit., 412-417. 
134 Partovi S et al., Bloodless lung transplantation in Jehovah’s Witnesses: impact on perioperative 
parameters and outcome compared with a matched control group, Transplantation Proceedings, 2013; 
45(1): 335–341. 
135 Figueiro, J et al., Simultaneous pancreas-kidney transplantation in Jehovah’s Witness patients., 
Clinical Transplantation, 2003; 17(2): 140-143. 
136 Sloan JM et al., SCT in Jehovah’s Witnesses: the bloodless transplant, Bone Marrow Transplantation, 
2008; 41(10): 837–844. 
137 Ott DA, Cooley DA, Cardiovascular surgery in Jehovah’s Witnesses. Report of 542 operations 
without blood transfusion, Journal of the American Medical Association, 1977; 238(12): 1256–1258; 
Magner D et al., Pancreaticoduodenectomy after neoadjuvant therapy in a Jehovah’s witness with locally 
advanced pancreatic cancer: case report and approach to avoid transfusion, The American Surgeon, 
2006; 72(5): 435-437; Vaislic CD et al., Outcomes in cardiac surgery in 500 consecutive Jehovah's 
Witness patients: 21 year Experience,  Journal of Cardiothoracic Surgery, 2012; 7(95). 
138 Corno AF et al., Heart transplantation in a Jehovah's Witness, J Heart Transplant, 1986; 5:175-177. 
139 Burnett C et al., Heart Transplantation in Jehovah’s Witnesses: An Initial Experience and Follow-up, 
Archives of Surgery, 1990; 125(11):1430-1433. 
140 Aristotele, Etica Nicomachea, trad.it. Natali C, Roma, Laterza, 1999; 15-19. 
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surgeon’s ambivalence is a product of his uncertainty about whether allocating an organ 
to a patient who refuses blood transfusion is fair; the dilemma the surgeon faces can be 
put as follows: is it just to allocate an organ to a patient whose autonomous refusal of 
blood transfusion will be honored? 
In order to begin to answer that question it is important to consider the validity of the 
justification for excluding the Jehovah’s Witness patient from being a transplant 
candidate. Two plausible rationales that the medical community could offer for this 
decision are triage-type and non-adherence justifications. 
The principle of triage guides the allocation of scarce medical resources, including 
medical professional’s time and attention, in emergencies, and it aims to minimize the 
worst outcomes.141 A triage-type principle for the allocation of scarce resources may 
permit the surgeon to choose not to list the patient to allocate the organ to a patient for 
whom the loss of the organ is less likely because he will accept blood transfusion. 
Boggi et al note that, “most Jehovah’s Witnesses can safely receive a kidney and/or a 
pancreas transplant without transfusions. However, in a low, though not negligible, 
proportion of recipients, blood transfusions cannot be avoided without the risk of 
recipient death.”142 Since the patient’s death and the loss of the organ are the worst 
possible outcome, a triage-type justification would support not listing the Jehovah’s 
Witness patient as a transplant candidate to avoid it.  
While the triage-type justification for not listing this patient for transplant is prima facie 
ethically defensible, it should be rejected for three reasons: First, while it is undeniable 
that there is a severe shortage of organs for patients awaiting transplant, we doubt that 
this qualifies as an emergency; organ transplants are a matter of urgency for patients, 
but rarely is it an emergency (in such cases the patient who emergently needs the 
transplant would be prioritized on the transplant list). A triage-type principle of 
allocation is only appropriate in cases of emergency. Second, at the time, UNOS’ 
standards for organ allocation, did not factor survival benefit into its kidney matching 
criteria. Until this factor was formally adopted as part of the criteria, relying on it in the 
case of Jehovah’s Witnesses is unacceptably ad hoc (in 2013 the Board of Directors of 
OPTN/UNOS approved changes to its kidney allocation criteria that take survival 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
141 Rhodes R, Justice Pluralism: Resource Allocation in Medicine and Public Health. In Rhodes R, Battin 
M, Silvers A (eds.), Medicine and Social Justice, New York, Oxford, 2012: 66. 
142 Boggi U et al., Kidney and pancreas transplants in Jehovah’s witnesses: ethical and practical 
implications, Transplantation Proceedings, 2004; 36(3): 601–602. 
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benefit into account, going into effect in late 2014143). Third, applying this triage-type 
standard to Jehovah’s Witnesses may violate medicine’s value of non-judgmental regard 
since they will be made ineligible for transplant in virtue of their commitment to their 
religious values rather than by medical factors alone, as in triage. 
An alternative justification to triage-type one just reviewed is that refusal of blood 
transfusion constitutes non-adherence to a treatment plan. Medical professionals are 
ethically permitted to withhold or withdraw treatment when patients fail to adhere to 
treatment plans. Complications are not uncommon in the operative and postoperative 
course of transplant, and they may require blood transfusion; when transfusion is 
viewed as part of the standard medical practice for transplant, then refusal of transfusion 
is failure to adhere to a treatment plan. Bramstedt suggests that considerations of non-
adherence can justify refusal of transplant to Jehovah’s Witnesses because “if a patient 
refuses [peri] operative rescue transfusion, this puts the survival of the graft at risk.”144 
 Support for requiring acceptance of blood transfusion as a condition for transplant 
candidacy is based on a comparison to the conditions imposed on liver transplant 
candidates whose disease is the product of alcoholism. Bramstedt makes this exact 
analogy when patients who are recovering from alcoholism and Jehovah’s Witnesses. 
She notes that patients whose liver disease is a product of alcohol abuse must sign 
alcohol abstinence contracts in order to be considered for transplant since continued 
alcohol use may compromise the transplant. Patients that relapse are not listed for 
transplant for failure to adhere to the treatment plan. 
Like the triage-type justification, non-adherence is prima facie ethically plausible, but 
we think it should be rejected for three reasons also. First, the analogy is not apt because 
the organ is not put in jeopardy by the same factor in the case of an alcoholic and a 
Jehovah’s Witness. The behavior of a recovering alcoholic is a factor in the disease, 
while a Jehovah Witness’s convictions are not factors. Behavior contributes to 
possibility of disease relapse, which may generate future need for re-transplant and 
future demand for another share in organ allocation. A Jehovah’s Witness patient who 
refuses transfusion if needed after transplant poses no risk of future need of re-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
143  Board approves significant revisions to deceased donor kidney allocation policy. 
https://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/news/board-approves-significant-revisions-to-deceased-donor-kidney-
allocation-policy/ [last seen 27/12/2015]. 
144 Bramstedt KA, Transfusion contracts for Jehovah’s Witnesses receiving organ transplants: ethical 
necessity or coercive pact?, Journal of Medical Ethics, 2006; 32(4): 193-194. 
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transplant. Second, as Bramstedt notes, attempts to impose transfusions would be 
unethical because patients are free to withdraw consent to transfusions at any time. To 
transfuse the Jehovah’s Witness despite his/her refusal would constitute unjustified 
paternalism, because interventions against a patient’s will must be for the good of the 
patient and this would aim at the good of other patients who will accept transplant and 
transfusion. Third, this justification appears to assume that the behavior of the person 
who abuses alcohol and the Jehovah’s Witness’ refusal of blood transfusion represent 
equivalent risk to the viability of the transplant. There is reason to doubt this assumption 
since reports indicate that with proper perioperative care and careful selection of 
transplant candidates for health, the outcomes for Jehovah’s Witnesses receiving 
transplant but no blood transfusion are comparable to transplant patients who receive 
transfusions.145 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
145 Good medical ethics must reflect sound medical science. We review the medical literature reporting 
transplant surgeons’ experience with kidney and liver transplants in Jehovah’s Witness patients. In 1988, 
Kaufman et al. published the results of their positive experience with kidney transplant for Jehovah’s 
Witnesses; they found comparable success rates from Jehovah’s Witnesses and non-Jehovah’s Witnesses. 
And, in 1996, Seu et al. made the first published report of successful liver transplant in a Jehovah’s 
Witness, and they discussed the techniques they employed in this procedure. Since this article appeared, 
other transplant specialists have reported their experiences in kidney and liver transplant with their 
Jehovah’s Witness patients; the consensus in the literature is that Jehovah’s Witnesses refusal of blood 
transfusion should not bar them from receiving a transplant. 
Kandaswamy et al. found no statistically significant difference in the one to ten-year survival rates in a 
comparison of 50 kidney and kidney-pancreas transplant cases of Jehovah’s Witnesses and non-Jehovah’s 
Witnesses. Figueiro et al. also reported on pancreas-kidney transplant in Jehovah’s Witnesses, and they 
found similar graft survival rates between Jehovah’s Witnesses and patients who accepted blood 
transfusion. Boggi et al. also report that Jehovah’s Witnesses may safely undergo pancreas-kidney 
transplant (though they argue that Jehovah’s Witnesses should be obliged to agree to rescue transfusion). 
Hernández-Navarrete et al. reported on three kidney transplant patients who were Jehovah’s Witnesses, 
and they found an acceptable graft function and survival from three to twenty-four months. 
The literature on liver transplant in Jehovah’s Witnesses is more extensive than for kidney transplant. In a 
series of articles starting in 1999, Oliver Detry and colleagues discussed their experience with liver 
transplant in Jehovah’s Witnesses; they reported successful transplants without transfusion, and they 
suggested that their techniques could benefits non-Jehovah’s Witnesses by reducing the need for 
transfusion in transplants overall. Nicolas Jabbour and colleagues also published multiple papers on their 
experience with transfusion-free transplants, and found comparable outcomes among Jehovah’s 
Witnesses and non-Jehovah’s Witnesses. Like Detry et al., Jabbour et al. also found that the techniques 
developed for Jehovah’s Witnesses would have a positive effect on care for no-Jehovah’s Witnesses by 
decreasing the need for transfusion. Other published cases of successful liver transplant in Jehovah’s 
Witnesses come from Nebraska (Stoye et al.), Brazil (Garcia et al.) and Australasia (Jeffrey et al.). 
The reports of successful transplant treatment in Jehovah’s Witnesses are encouraging, and they should 
expand access to treatment for them. It is important to note that these reports emphasize the role of peri-
operative care in the success of the transplants; it is important to manage the patient prior to the transplant 
to reduce the risks associated with bloodless surgery: optimizing medical conditions (particularly 
anemia), optimizing blood volume, prevent unnecessary hemoglobin reduction, minimizing post-
operative blood drawing and optimizing Red Blood Cells (RBCs) synthesis with erythropoietin, iron, folic 
acid, and vitamin B12 (Figuiero, et al.). Two of Jabbour and colleagues’ eight Jehovah’s Witness patients 
who received deceased donor livers died – one intraoperatively and the other on the second postoperative 
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Conclusions and Clinical Case Resolution 
Contrary to the claims of Bramstedt and Boggi et al., a Jehovah’s Witness’s 
willingness to undergo blood transfusion should not be a precondition for kidney or 
liver transplant, nor should it bar listing a Jehovah’s Witness to receive a deceased 
donor organ. Neither the ethical arguments nor the biomedical literature support the 
exclusion of Jehovah’s Witnesses as transplant candidates. And, non-Jehovah’s 
Witnesses may also benefit from surgical techniques that reduce the need for blood 
transfusion. At Mount Sinai Medical Center, the transplant program assesses each case 
on its own merits, and frequently agrees to list and transplant Jehovah’s Witnesses. The 
most common obstacles to listing Jehovah’s Witnesses are medical, e.g., a patient with a 
history of clotting cannot stop his blood thinner. As one transplant surgeon said to us, 
“It seems unfair to focus on refusal of blood transfusion as a reason not to transplant. 
There is a reason to reconsider the wisdom of transplant for everybody – nobody’s a 
perfect candidate”. 
The transplant surgeons at the Recanati/Miller Transplant Institute believed that they 
could take perioperative and operative steps to transplant the patient successfully, and 
because the patient was likely to die without a kidney transplant, she should be 
registered with OPTN for a kidney from either a Hepatitis C positive or negative donor. 
The patient was listed for transplant in January 2014. The patient nearly received a 
kidney after three to four months on the OPTN registry, but another patient was a better 
match for the kidney. The patient also was notified of a possible match while visiting 
her daughter out of state, but was not able to come to Mount Sinai Hospital due to 
inclement weather. Finally, a little over a year after registering with OPTN, the patient 
was matched to a kidney from a Hepatitis C positive donor, and underwent transplant. 
The patient continues to be monitored by the transplant team at RMTI, and she is doing 
well, soon to begin the new treatments for Hepatitis C. When the patient reflects on her 
time waiting to be matched, she said, she was preparing to die, but Jehovah orchestrated 
the circumstances that allowed her to receive a kidney. “It would be devastating to have 
been denied the extra days free of dialysis to spend with my family.” 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
day (Jabbour-2005). Jabbour et al. do not attribute the deaths to failure to transfuse. They cite the 
advanced disease of the patients; they received livers because they were at the top of the transplant list. 
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 The necessities and the limits of Principlism. 
 
Tom Tomlinson presents some arguments in defense of Principles. The arguments for 
the necessity of principles in ethical reasoning are146: 
1- Principles or rules are what we end up with when we demand reasons; a demand that 
is, at least up to a point, always legitimate when dealing with ethical matters. 
2- The principles reply to the requirement of universalizability; if my ethical judgments 
are not merely arbitrary or ad hoc, I will concede that at least I must be consistent. 
3- Moral principles can serve to unify or systematize our more specific moral 
judgments. 
4- Principles allow us to maintain moral reasoning within a more general and well-
understood deductive model (its logical structure is no different from Socrates’ famous 
syllogism). 
5- Principles seem to form the content of our moral sensibility. They serve to identify 
morally relevant features in the environment, alerting us to the possibility that we are 
entering morally risky territory that many require us to make a moral judgment. 
6- Principles don’t tell us what we should do. Rather, they direct our attention to the 
sorts of things that must be taken into account in deciding on an ethically appropriate 
course of action. 
7- Principles play an essential role in the beginning of deliberation, not only towards its 
end. 
 
On the other hand, one question proffers some reflections about the limits of Principles: 
Are principles alone adequate to explain and justify our moral judgments, in particular 
in a clinical ethics consultation? 
Following Tomlinson’s reasoning, there are some limits to the Principlism Theory147: 
1- The theoretical validation of principles could be offered in order to justify every 
moral or ethical conclusion; 
2- In many clinic situations no single principle can resolve an ethical problem; 
3- It is often very difficult to balance two or more principles involved in a clinical case; 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
146 Tomlinson T, Methods in Medical Ethics, New York, Oxford University Press, 2012: 4-6. 
147 Tomlinson T, Methods in Medical Ethics, cit., 23-27. 
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4- Principlism refers to the “common morality” as a starting point to  justify our 
considerations; 
5- “Principles, rules, and rights require balancing as well as specification. We need both 
methods, because each addresses a dimension of moral principles and rules: range and 
scope, in the case of specification, and weight or strength, in the case of balancing”148; 
6- There must be balancing among competing principles in a pluralistic system. 
 
Balancing competing goods means, as Beauchamp and Childress wrote, to make 
“unavoidable intuitive and subjective weightings”. Balancing judgments and  justifying 
acts refers to presenting good reasons, inter-subjectively shared (and in this sense 
“objective”): “balancing would not then be a mode or method of justification; it would 
instead mark the end of reasoned justification as a tool of moral reflection”149. 
Beauchamp and Childress’ balancing principles set forth “six minimal conditions that 
must be met to justify infringing one prima facie norm to adhere to another”150.  
The conditions are151: 
1- Good reasons can be offered to act on the overriding norm rather than on the 
infringed norm; 
2- The moral objective justifying the infringement has a realistic prospect of 
achievement; 
3- No morally preferable alternative actions are available; 
4- The lowest level of infringement, commensurate with achieving the primary goal of 
the action, has been selected. 
5- Any negative effects of the infringement have been minimized; 
6- All affected parties have been treated impartially. 
 
Principlism has the merit of guiding ethics reflections using four principles as cardinal 
points. Otherwise it would be difficult for these four principles to summarize all the 
aspects of the ethics issues involved in daily clinical practice. 
Referring to the method to conduct an ethics consultation explained by Beauchamp and 
Childress, it seems important to underline some critics inherent to two interrelated main 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
148 Ibidem, 50. 
149 Ibidem, 53. 
150 Ibidem, 55. 
151 Idem. 
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aspects: firstly, if the four principles guarantee an equal opportunities to everyone - is it 
possible to build a global bioethics (only) with a common words?-, secondly, if the 
principles are a priori characterized by the idea to be good - is one man’s autonomy 
another man’s prison?-.152 
Creating a common moral language useful to all stakeholders of a case could be 
recognize as an significant outcome: “we all think that autonomy is good, that justice is 
good, that it is good to do good, and that it is good not to inflict harm, in short, […] we 
think that good is good”153. But the good is characterized in different ways in various 
circumstances and for this reason a lot of questions could open, ad example: could we [a 
priori] recognize that common words are sufficient to build global ethics? Are good and 
bad objective or subjective? Is the patient to be understood as an individual, as family 
member, or as a citizen?154 
 
Beyond the principles there is a person, i.e. a suffering patient who asks to be cared for. 
The moral theory called “Personalism” tries to pay specific attention to the person, as its 
special goal in medical care. This will be the object of the next chapter. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
152 Takala T, What is wrong with Global Bioethics? On the Limitations of the Four Principles Approach, 
Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics, 2001; 10: 72-77. 
153 Ibidem. 
154 Ibidem. “If objective, who is to be trusted to know what the objective truth it? Is subjective, who is the 
one whose opinion we should listen to? The patient, the customer, the doctor, the ethics committee, 
family members, or who?”. 
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 Personalism and Palliative Sedation Therapy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Personalist bioethics recognizes the body-soul unit as the foundation of the 
subjectivity of every human being, also identified by the term person. This position is 
defended in particular by the Catholic Church. The notion of person indicates the homo 
sapiens species as the only one able to recognize the right to life for itself: “the human 
being is structurally a person, this condition does not depend on his will, but on his 
origins”155. 
Cardinal Elio Sgreccia156 wrote that respect for the truth about man is the foundation of 
ethics. Respect for man from the beginning of life to the end of life means in the first 
case, to respect a God who creates, and in the second case to respect the encounter 
between man and God: “respected man in the final phase of his life means to respect 
[...] his return to the Creator, excluding any other power on the part of man, both 
excluding the power to anticipate this death (euthanasia), and excluding the power to 
prevent this meeting with a form of biological tyranny (aggressive treatment). It is in 
this light that the line between “euthanasia” and “death with dignity” is drawn157. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
155 Sgreccia E, Manuale di Bioetica, Fondamenti ed etica biomedica, vol. 1, Roma, Vita e Pensiero, 
20074, 159-169. The term person or human being can be applied to everybody irrespective of the color of 
the skin, sex or race. 
156 Sgreccia E, Manuale di bioetica, cit., 893. 
157 Ibidem. 
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In this chapter, after a brief presentation of the term person and its intimate relationship 
with the term identity according to the teachings of the Catholic Church, a clinical case, 
which occurred in a hospice, will be presented. The analysis of the clinical ethics 
questions will be offered after the presentation of the method of analyzing this clinical 
case, following the principles of this moral theory. 
The last paragraph is dedicated to presenting a criticism of a method of conducting an 
ethics consultation which has its roots in personalist moral theory and the concept of the 
“sanctity of life”. 
 
 
 The human being as a person. 
 
We will try to answer, in the light of the personalist theory, to one of the most 
important theological and anthropological question, who is a human being? 
The notion of person, as presented by the Christian Church in order to resolve questions 
regarding Christological and Trinitarian nature, was used to identify the human being 
with the particular purpose of presenting the spiritual characteristics of human nature. 
The result was a way of interpreting man as related to the image of the Creator: “not 
enough - writes Karol Wojtyla -to define a man as an individual of the species Homo 
(not even Homo-Sapiens). The term person was chosen to emphasize that man cannot 
be locked up in the notion of ‘an individual of the human species’; that there is in him 
something more, a fullness and perfection of being special, that you cannot do more 
than define him/her with the term person”158 
In bioethics this ethics theory shows the set of rules to be referred to in defense of the 
human person seen in its totality. The acknowledgement of the other human being in 
front of me allows me to say something about myself. So the same question can be 
worded in two different manners: Who is the person? Or, Who is the other human being 
who is in front of me? 
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Personalism identifies all human beings with the term person. The idea that all human 
beings are persons entails the concept that “people are in a relationship based on mutual 
acknowledgement, but this acknowledgement does not come before of the human being, 
as our condition, but it responds to a need that comes from someone else”159. 
By the fact that we always identify a specific human being in a relationship, we must 
firstly know that the subject in front of us is a human being and therefore a person. 
On the subject, Robert Spaemann affirms that “we should before know if this is a man 
[...] in order to know if he/she is a person”160. 
It is very difficult to offer a definition of person because every categorization is 
insufficient to encompass all of the facets which are implied in the term. 
The term person in its original Greek meaning (in Greek: prosopon; in Latin: persona-
ae) indicates a theatrical mask, therefore signifies a character who plays a certain role 
during a performance. 
With the term person it is customary to indicate the mask used by actors during 
theatrical performances “to hide the face and resonate the voice loudly (per-sound: 
playing in all directions) 161. 
The purpose of the mask is to represent the transcendence of the actor to highlight the 
essential being of the character who he represents, and the words he speaks: “it was 
later, in this sense, that the term person lost the ancient meaning of “mask”, to be 
identified –in theological disputes- with the Greek word ipostasis (in Latin: sub-stantia, 
in English: substratum, foundation)” 162. 
In Dogmatic Theology the noblest use of person is represented by the three hypostases 
of God - Father, Son and Holy Spirit -. 
In Theology and Philosophy the different interpretations of this word are numerous.  It 
is possible to find specifics regarding the term by referring to the concepts of 
consciousness (Locke), rationality (St. Thomas) and of dignity and autonomy (Kant)163. 
 
In particular, the term person, for Christian theology, marks the opening to the 
transcendent because the single human being is a son, and therefore has a relationship 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
159 Spaemann R, Persone, Roma, Laterza, 2007², 5. 
160 Spaemann R, Persone, cit., 8. 
161 Idem. 
162 Idem. 
163 Aa.Vv., Enciclopedia garzanti di filosofia, Milano, Garzanti, 1993, 855-856. 
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with the Father. Thus being a human being signifies a relationship, because the person 
is in communion with God and his neighbor. 
Thus Boethius’ definition of person is significant for theology: “Persona est naturae 
rationalis individua substantia”164. 
Robert Spaemann, recouping the Boethius’ definition, says: “The rational nature may 
require a certain kind of attention. But primarily, in Boethius, the sense of the definition 
is ontological. Naturae Rationalis exists as being-itself. [...] But it means that the 
individual who exists in this way cannot be adequately described by any possible 
description” 165. 
Person cannot be described as something that can be only outlined by a set of 
characteristics. The person is someone 166 : mentioning it oversteps any possible 
qualitative description. 
Karol Wojtyla speaks about the person reflecting on the subject – object relationship. 
He expressed his position in this way: “Now the subject is [...] a being, being that exists 
and acts in one way or another. Thus it can be said that the world in which we live it is 
made up of a large number of subjects. [...] The human being is objectively someone 
and this is what distinguishes him from other beings of the visible world that, for their 
part, objectively are always only something” 167. 
So an evolution of the meaning of the word person can be seen during historical 
development: the term which was originally identified as an important object for the 
work of the actors, now identifies the essence of a human being. 
Regarding the concept of person, another important related term is identity. 
The word identity has its origins in Aristotle's Metaphysics; the Stagirite philosopher 
writes: "Identity is somehow a unit, whether that the unit refers to several things, or 
refers to one single thing, taken as two: as when it is said that the thing is the same as 
itself” 168. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
164 Boezio AMS, Contra Eutychen et Nestorium, in Spaemann R, Persone, cit., 30. 
165 Spaemann R, Persone, cit., 30-31. 
166 Cfr. Spaemann R, Persone, cit., 31. 
167 Wojtyla K, Amore e responsabilità, cit., 15. 
168 Aristotele, Metafisica, cit., V, 9, 1018 a 7. 
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A second definition, important for our discussion, is: “It is impossible for the same 
thing, at the same time be inherent and not be inherent to the same thing in the same 
respect” 169. 
Therefore it can be said that composed units, such as the living, are inclined to have an 
identity coherent with the totality (spiritual, somatic, psychological) of their own kind, 
which is not only characterized by the simple sum of its parts, but by the harmony of the 
parts with the personal entirety. 
Thus, personal identity does not develop from a pure solipsistic reasoning. Through the 
definition of the term person, the idea of a man as an individual can be surpassed, “the 
identification of ourselves necessarily includes the existence of others”170. 
 
Other persons perform gestures and develop practices of life by which we learn, and to 
which we belong. The practice of the practices of life is the alphabetic practice. The 
word, the Logos, is what allows us to communicate and to recognize another person in 
front of us, as similar to us. This is the substrate for personal identity: “solipsism is 
incompatible with the concept of person”171. 
The identity of a person exists and it is only formed in a intrapersonal relationship, in 
which the presence of a multitude of persons gives meaning to the personal existence 
and to the identity of the individual. 
 
 
 
 The sanctity of life 
 
The philosophical and theological paradigm which refers the concept of the 
sanctity of life172 is supported by Catholic Bioethics, which is based on faith and the 
Scriptures; this philosophical paradigm is composed as follows: “from that particular 
ethical-metaphysical teaching, originated by a Greek-scholastics conceptual matrix and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
169 Ibidem, IV, 2, 1005 B 20. 
170 Spaemann R, Persone, cit., p. 36. 
171 Ibidem, p. 40. 
172 Before presenting the critique of the theory of the sanctity of life defended by the Catholic Church, it is 
better to define its peculiar characteristics. 
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a finalistic-providential vision of the world, sees in human life [...] an ontological-
axiological reality worthy of “absolute respect”173. 
 
Throughout history the influence of this theory was enormous, even though it presents 
itself with a very precise orderliness. The ideological construction is articulated around 
three interconnected concepts, related to the first asset for a person, which is his/her life 
174: 
1) the characteristic of being a creature intrinsic to man; 
2) the total non-availability of the human life; 
3) the inviolability of the human life in all of its aspects. 
The theory of the Sanctity of life is rooted in the idea of life as a gift from God. In the 
encyclical of John Paul II, Evangelium Vitae, the Pope wrote175: “Man is no longer able 
to see himself as “mysteriously different” from other earthly creatures; he regards 
himself merely as one more living being, as an organism which, at most, has reached a 
very high stage of perfection. Enclosed in the narrow horizon of his physical nature, he 
is somehow reduced to being “a thing”, and no longer grasps the "transcendent" 
character of his “existence as man”. He no longer considers life as a splendid gift of 
God, something “sacred” entrusted to his responsibility and thus also to his loving care 
and “veneration”. Life itself becomes a mere “thing”, which man claims as his exclusive 
property, completely subject to his control and manipulation”. 
 
In this position it should be noted that the individual does not have an arbitrary hold on 
his life. The conception of human life as a gift is put into close relation to the principle 
of the absolute inviolability of life176: the principle of inviolability implies, therefore, 
positively, the norm of acceptance and respect and, in the negative, the rejection of its 
disability or suppression. 
In Catholic Bioethics there is no difference between life and the human person: life is 
always characterized as human. It is sacred, because it inherently possesses the ability to 
relate to God. Theological tradition says that life is not in man’s possession, but is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
173 Fornero G, Bioetica cattolica e bioetica laica, Milano, Mondadori, 2005, 27. 
174 Ibidem, 28. 
175 Evangelium Vitae, 22. 
176Fornero G, Bioetica cattolica e bioetica laica, cit., 30. See also in this dissertation § The concept of 
proportionality: an historical development, 38. 
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entrusted to him, and he will be accountable to the Creator177: what God commanded, 
and that man should respect and not coincide in any way with the determinism of 
biological processes. It coincides with what in those processes presents good reasons for 
a will which has a human heart. In this sense, the maturity with which modern man 
looks at his life can be appreciated, when he demands a higher quality and he considers 
his life increasingly as his responsibility, rather than a blind mechanical succession of 
natural events. 
For the Catholic religion life finds its deepest meaning in faith in God, who through an 
act of love, gave it to man. The goal of the creature is to live a good life and accept its 
conditions.178 
The Roman Catholic doctrine of the sanctity of life is presented as a rigorous 
deontologism, focused on some absolute prohibitions that apply regardless of the 
circumstances. 
In the Catechism of the Catholic Church we read179: “There are acts which, in and of 
themselves, independently of circumstances and intentions, are always gravely illicit by 
reason of their object; such as blasphemy and perjury, murder and adultery. One may 
not do evil so that good may result from it”. 
There are three important pronouncements, which definitively clarify the position of 
Catholic Church about the beginning and end of life180: 
 
1-Therefore, by the authority which Christ conferred upon Peter and his Successors, and 
in communion with the Bishops of the Catholic Church, I confirm that the direct and 
voluntary killing of an innocent human being is always gravely immoral. This doctrine, 
based upon that unwritten law which man, in the light of reason, finds in his own heart 
(cf. Rom 2:14-15), is reaffirmed by Sacred Scripture, transmitted by the Tradition of the 
Church and taught by the ordinary and universal Magisterium.  
2- The Church makes clear that abortion is a most serious and dangerous crime, thereby 
encouraging those who commit it to seek without delay the path of conversion. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
177 Cattorini P, Sotto scacco. Bioetica di fine vita, Napoli, Liviana Medicina,1993, 36. 
178 Ibidem, 38. 
179 Chiesa Cattolica, Catechismo della Chiesa Cattolica, Città del Vaticano, Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 
1999, §1756. 
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75	  
	  
3- Euthanasia is a grave violation of the law of God, since it is the deliberate and 
morally unacceptable killing of a human person. 
 
Bioethics Catholic echoes a personalism ontologically based on rational metaphysical 
scholastics. This metaphysical concept founded Catholic philosophical anthropology, 
and proceeded to outline the precise vision of man that emerged. 
Based on rational metaphysics, Catholic bioethics means that the theory of the sanctity 
of life has the following characteristics: 
• the primacy of being (agere sequitur esse); 
• the existence (and knowledge) of a universal human nature, from which to draw moral 
rules that apply to all and forever; 
• the normativity of natural structures, in which God’s project for life is embodied. 
In the encyclical Veritatis Splendor, which concerns the moral teachings of the Church 
on the freedom of man, it is asserted that181: “Freedom which claims to be absolute ends 
up treating the human body as raw datum, devoid of any meaning and moral values until 
freedom has shaped it in accordance with its design. Consequently, human nature and 
the body appear as presuppositions or preambles, materially necessary for its freedom to 
make its choices, yet extrinsic to the person, the subject and the human act. Their 
functions would not be able to constitute reference points for moral decisions, because 
the finalities of these inclinations would be merely “physical” goods, called by some 
“pre-moral”. To refer to them, in order to find in them rational indications with regard 
to the order of morality, would be to expose oneself to the accusation of physicalism or 
biologism. In this way of thinking, the tension between freedom and a nature conceived 
of in a reductive way is resolved by a division within man himself”. 
Starting from this position and expanding upon it, it can be said that the relationship that 
man must have with nature is not neutral: nature, in fact, reflects the wisdom that 
created it. 
The human body is the visible dimension of the person's life, and therefore must be 
defended182; it is significant, because only through it the morality of human actions is 
realized. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
181Veritatis splendor, 48. 
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According to the Magisterium, only the appeal to natural moral law would have the 
prerogative to provide clear and safe ethical answers. Following the official Bioethics of 
the Catholic Church, personalism without strong anthropological and metaphysical 
anchors, that is, without consideration for the objective ontological structure of the 
human person and of his roots in a natural order established by God, would risk falling 
into a form of subjectivism unsuitable to safeguard instances of sound doctrine183. 
About the particular vision of euthanasia that the Church of Rome defends, it is fair to 
mention one last time the Evangelium vitae184: “Today, […] the experience of dying is 
marked by new features. When the prevailing tendency is to value life only to the extent 
that it brings pleasure and well-being, suffering seems like an unbearable setback, 
something from which one must be freed at all costs. Death is considered "senseless" if 
it suddenly interrupts a life still open to a future of new and interesting experiences. But 
it becomes a “rightful liberation” once life is held to be no longer meaningful because it 
is filled with pain and inexorably doomed to even greater suffering. 
Furthermore, when he denies or neglects his fundamental relationship to God, man 
thinks he is his own rule and measure, with the right to demand that society should 
guarantee him the ways and means of deciding what to do with his life in full and 
complete autonomy. 
 
After a presentation of the concept of person from a Catholic point of view, below a 
clinical case which occurred in a Hospice185 is presented, in which different points of 
views about suffering, pain, judgments about palliative sedation and the patient-
physician relationship are highlighted. 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
183 Cfr. Fornero G, Bioetica cattolica e bioetica laica, cit., 58. 
184 Cfr. Evangelium Vitae, 64. 
185 Drane JF, A liberal Catholic Bioethics, Berlin, LIT, 2010, 192. The focus of the palliative medicine is 
“switched away from aggressive attack on body parts and defeat of the enemy death”. The specific place 
where the palliative medicine has a diriment role is the Hospice. The focus of the Hospice is “on the 
whole person and on the quality of a dying patient’s life. Their background medical theory or vision is 
more holistic. Their objective is to create a more humane medicine”. Objectives of palliative care are: 
effective focus on a management of pain and suffering; concern for both the bodily condition and for the 
inner life of the patient and decision-making which respects patient autonomy and the role of legal 
surrogates. 
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Clinical case: Why not palliative sedation? 
 
Mr. G. Rossi, 65 years old, medical doctor, not married, cohabitant. He stayed in 
Hospice from July 25th to September 1st (date of death), total days of stay - 39.186 
Diagnosis upon acceptance: neuroendocrine carcinoma. Main diagnosis: pulmonary 
infiltrate cancer. Complementary diagnosis: atrial fibrillation, heart failure, anemia. 
The patient is always alone during the night. He was conscious and responsive until 
August 31st. The evening of the 31st of August a therapy with midazolam 5mg to aid 
in sleeping was initiated. He then rested until 7:00 a.m. 
He had two sisters and a partner. They regularly came to visit him in the Hospice. He 
also had a couple of friends (husband and wife). They were medically competent, as 
one is a dentist and the other a general practitioner, but without experience in 
palliative care. For them, palliative care meant keeping the patient in the Hospice, 
letting him do whatever he wanted, and allowing him to make decisions regarding his 
condition and quality of life. 
 
The two sisters and partner were never questioned by the patient’s friends. They came 
to the hospice when the friends were not there. The partner agreed to a symptoms 
therapy, to appease the patient, and she approved of the use of morphine so the patient 
could breathe easier and so reducing dyspnea.  
Friends came to halt any medical procedures, and to persuade the patient do nothing 
after their initial visit to the facility. The patient was well-disposed to the palliative care 
to reduce the pain symptoms, but his friends persuaded him to change the therapy after 
every visit. 
For them he was to live to the end of his life in full command of his own situation. He 
was completely conscious although suffering and dyspnoic, and underestimated the 
symptoms which were masked by morphine. Friends attributed his pain to a 
cardiological problem (cardiopathy), even though they knew that he would die from 
lung cancer. Another friend, a lawyer, was favorable to the palliative care, but the other 
two competent friends silenced him. There was much coming and going in the room and 
in general the patient willingly seemed to accept all these visits. 
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For 38 days the doctors and the nurses offered their time to the friends to help them get 
used to the idea of death, of the end of life, and the need to use morphine. They brought 
vitamins from home. Vitamins were given to him orally or intravenously (glucosate). 
The staff did not prevent the administration of vitamins because it was not 
contraindicated. On August 27th, there was an acute event, it was treated with Dilzene 
and the symptoms passed immediately. 
On August 24th the catheter was applied. On August 27th only a sister visited the patient. 
The patient was no longer able to stand up. For the four nights before August 31st the 
patient slept in an orthostatic position in order to breathe more easily. 
During the evening of the August 31st the physician decided to start night therapy with 
Midazolam as the patient was suffering intensely, although the patient’s doctor friend, 
present in his room, was puzzled about the usefulness for the patient of breathing better. 
After the patient's consent, the nurses put him to bed. 
The patient slept until 7 o’clock am. During the morning the patient’s condition 
worsened and he died at midday. During the patient’s last ten days only the doctor 
friend came to visit him, and stayed with him for only a few minutes. In those days the 
couple of friends banned the partner from seeing the patient. The doctor friend arrived 
at 10 a.m. with her husband, and she began brightly to discuss use of the palliative 
therapy since the patient only had 2 or 3 days to live. She did not say that the patient 
was well, but in her opinion the patient could continue to draw breath and not to sleep 
during these days, thus prolonging the patient's suffering before his imminent death. 
 
Why should the doctor always convince everyone? If the patient agrees to the treatment, 
why  must the doctor convince his friends? 
If the doctor and patient agree about the treatments, it seems too difficult to listen to and 
be influenced by other opinions, especially if they are inadequate and not supported by 
experience. Friends were always disagreeing on therapies. They accused the doctor and 
nurses of wanting to free up the room. 
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 The triangular method and case analysis. 
 
 The ethics judgment about different bioethics questions is related to an 
epistemological and methodological configuration founded on the triangular method 
between experimental science, philosophical, anthropology and normative ethics. 
Fundamental philosophical configuration is guided by ontological personalism, which 
gives credit to human reason and remains open to revelation and dialogue with 
actuality.187 
 
    B- philosophical anthropology 
 
 
 
 
A- experimental science  C- normative ethics 
 
 
The starting point is the biomedical data (point A). After the scientific analysis (e.g. 
diagnosis, prognosis, therapy) the second is the anthropological point: it is useful to 
understand which values are present in the connection between life, dignity, and the 
integrity of the human person. The last one concerns the resolution of the ethics 
question: decisions regarding ethics issues in a clinical setting should take into 
consideration the values explained by anthropological reflections on specific clinical 
conditions.188 
In relation to our case the most important issue is palliative sedation: the point A 
concerning philosophical anthropology has already been treated in the previous 
paragraph. Now it is useful to concentrate on clinical and ethics questions in order to 
offer a solution. 
 
The clinical case presented regards many ethics issues. Some of them are: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
187 Sgreccia E, Manuale di bioetica, cit., XVI. 
188 Sgreccia E, Manuale di bioetica, cit., 74-75. 
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What kinds of implications are there for a dying patient consenting to palliative sedation 
during the last moments of own life? What kind of ethical issues are present in this kind 
of decision? And, how can an ethics consultant take them on? Could you kill the patient 
with palliative sedation therapy? What is the role of the family members or friends in 
choosing a palliative sedation therapy? Is the palliative sedation therapy understood as a 
sort of soft euthanasia? Is the palliative sedation therapy a proportionate treatment? 
 
Continuous Sedation until Death (CSD) is the act of reducing or removing the 
consciousness of an incurably ill patient until death. Terminal Sedation and Palliative 
Sedation are the most frequently used terms to describe CSD.189 
In the last twenty years a terminological development occurred: from 1998 to 1999 all 
studies referred to the procedure as ‘terminal sedation’. Enck R.E. first introduced the 
concept of “terminal sedation” in the palliative care literature in 1991: “Since then, 
sedation practices for patients who are terminally ill or in the final stages of dying have 
rapidly expanded. At the same time, there has been an extensive and growing debate 
about the ethical assessment of these practices. Almost from the start, the practices were 
considered controversial. Critics claimed that it was ‘‘slow euthanasia’’ or mercy killing 
in disguise. They argued that the adjective ‘‘terminal’’ was not simply an indicator of 
time, reflecting the final phase of a patient’s life when such sedation was typically 
administered; instead, it revealed the real purpose of the intervention, that is, to 
terminate the patient’s life. Because the concept of terminal sedation was deemed 
confusing, ambiguous, and open to different interpretations, it was argued that it should 
be abandoned altogether.190 
In 2006-2008 83% of studies were using the term ‘palliative sedation’ to indicate: the 
use of sedative medications to relieve intolerable suffering from refractory symptoms by 
a reduction in patient consciousness.191 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
189 Rys S et al., Continuous sedation until death: moral justifications of physicians and nurses – a content 
analysis of opinion pieces,  Med Health Care and Philos, 2013; 16:533-542. 
190 Henk t.H, et al., Palliative Sedation Versus Euthanasia: An Ethical Assessment, Journal of Pain and 
Symptom Management, 2014; 47(1): 123-136. Enck RE, Drug-induced terminal sedation for symptom 
control, Am J Hosp Palliat Care, 1991; 8: 3-5. 
191 Maltoni M et al., Palliative sedation in end-of-life-care, Current opinion in oncology, 2013; 25(4): 
360-367. Hasselaar JG et al., When cancer symptoms cannot be controlled: the role of palliative sedation, 
Curr Opin Support Palliat Care, 2009;  3: 14-23. 
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
81	  
	  
Today it seems better to use the term “palliative sedation” to specify the goal of this 
end-of- life practice.  
Palliative Sedation Therapy (PST)192: 
1- It is a clinical procedure that is an integral part of the palliative care continuum. 
2- Its ‘mission’ is to find a solution for a refractory symptom by reducing the level of 
consciousness only as much as needed. 
3- PST has no detrimental effect on survival. 
4- Life expectancy is referred to imminently dying patients with an expected survival 
equal to or less than 2 weeks. 
5- PST is an important clinical ethics issue in a physician’s daily practice.  
6- In many countries, PST is considered as clinically and ethically distinct from 
Physician Assisted Suicide (PAS). 
 
 Palliative sedation therapy is different from both euthanasia and from Physician 
Assisted Suicide. Euthanasia is generally defined as the act, undertaken only by a 
physician who intentionally ends the life of a person at his or her request. The physician 
therefore administers a lethal substance. In physician-assisted suicide (PAS) on the 
other hand, a person self-administers a lethal substance prescribed by a physician.193 
 
Two examples: 
1- PAS in Oregon 
 Physician-assisted suicide has been legal in Oregon since November 1997. The 
Death with Dignity Act requires that a patient must be: 
- An adult (18 years of age or older), 
- A resident of Oregon, 
- Capable (defined as able to make and communicate health care decisions), 
- Diagnosed with a terminal illness that will lead to death within six months 
- Self-administered lethal medications 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
192 Idem. 
193 Pereira J, Legalizing euthanasia or assisted suicide: the illusion of safeguards and controls, Current 
Oncology, 2011; 18(2): e38-e45. “To date, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg have legalized 
euthanasia. The laws in the Netherlands and Luxembourg also allow pas. In the United States, the states 
of Oregon and Washington legalized PAS in 1997 and 1999 respectively, but euthanasia remains illegal”.  
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2- PAS in Netherlands: 
The Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg have legalized euthanasia. The laws in 
the Netherlands and Luxembourg also allow PAS. 
The physician must fulfill these criteria:  
- to be satisfied that it is a spontaneous and well-considered request of the patient;  
- to be satisfied that the patient's suffering is unbearable with no prospect of 
improvement;  
- to have informed the patient of the situation in which it is located and the prospects 
arising;  
- to be sure, together with the patient, that no other solution is reasonable for his 
status;  
- to have asked the opinion of at least one other independent doctor who has 
examined the patient and have then formulated an opinion on the existence of written 
policies;  
-  to have scrupulously executed all the steps of life’s interruption or of PAS. 
It is not necessary that the patient is terminally ill. 
 
A PAS involves someone who has suicidal motives, intends to die, wants to do 
something to cause his or her death, and is not coerced into deciding to kill himself or 
herself. In contrast to “normal” suicide, a PAS requires aid from a relative or friend, a 
physician, or some other person who carries out the role of “enabler”.194 
 
5- PST- PAS: ethical differences 
 
The points of difference revolve around the intention, the act (or intervention) 
itself, and the outcomes of the act. 
General description of the setting (PST-PAS): 
1- the subject consciously chooses; 
2- the choice involves the conscious interruption of all the rapports: the leaving of  
loved ones takes place in a specific time and place (determined by the patient); 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
194 Weir RF (ed.), Physician-Assisted Suicide, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1997. 
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3- the need for  direct action by a health care worker (physician) is recognized; 
4- the patient loses consciousness;  
5- the patient dies. 
 
 PST PAS 
INTENTION To relieve symptoms To alleviate suffering? 
ACT sedation of the patient Cooperation with the patient’s desires 
regarding death 
OUTCOMES Allowing the patient to 
die  during sleep 
Death of the patient 
 
 
 “Allowing to die” or killing? 
 
 There are five kinds of actions that, under specific circumstances, can define the 
distinction between allowing someone to die and killing195: 
 
1- Withholding Life-Sustaining Treatment. Deciding not to use certain medical 
treatments that would prolong life (the ventilator for terminally ill patients or DNR for 
patients afflicted by severe illness) is not killing a patient; it is allowing the patient to 
die. It is not always morally right, but it is sometimes, indeed it is often, morally right if 
the means are ‘morally extraordinary’; i.e. not using that particular means is generally 
accepted as morally licit. 
2- Withdrawing Life-Sustaining Treatment. Deciding to stop the use of a means that has 
already been initiated (to turn off the ventilator) is considered by Catholic moral 
tradition as the equivalent of withholding life-sustaining treatment. If it is morally right 
and legal to withhold treatment X in circumstances ABC, it is also morally and legal 
right to withdraw treatment X in the same circumstances. The circumstance may 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
195 Kelly DF, Medical care at the End of Life. A Catholic Perspective, Washington D.C., Georgetown 
University Press, 2006, 13-20. 
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change, as when patients or surrogates state that they would have withheld treatment but 
are now unwilling to withdraw it. 
 
Is it only a question of who decides? Allowing the patient to die and deciding to 
withhold or to withdraw a treatment considered ‘extraordinary’ is not a means to 
actualize a ‘passive euthanasia’ or an ‘indirect euthanasia’. 
3- Pain Relief that Hastens Death. Relieving pain is a moral right act. Is it possible even 
if the drugs administrated to relieve the patient’s suffering can hasten death? This 
question can be analyzed with the principle of double effect (PDE).  Pain relief that 
hastens death meets the first condition of the PDE (the act-in-self must not be morally 
wrong) because the act itself is not a killing but an administration of medication that 
relieves pain. It meets the second (the bad effect must not cause the good effect) 
because the bad effect, death, is not caused by the good effect, pain relief. Rather, the 
medication causes both with equal causal immediacy. Third (the agent must not intend 
the bad effect), the intention of the agent is not that the patient die, but that the patient 
be free of pain. And fourth (the bad effect must not outweigh the good effect), in the 
case of a dying patient, the bad effect, a slightly earlier death, is outweighed by the good 
effect, the relief of pain. Thus this action, like the first two, may well be morally right 
according to Catholic moral tradition. 
 
The three most commonly cited arguments for why elimination of pain in a dying 
patient is not always possible are related to use and abuse of drugs and to the 
relationship with the family members. 
First, there is fear of addiction. Addiction is an important problem for those whose 
unwarranted use of drugs causes harm to their lives (heroin, cocaine, alcohol, nicotine 
and morphine used improperly by doctors for pain relief). But, in this context the term 
addiction has an opposite meaning. It indicates both a description of a physical 
condition (withdrawal causes physical symptoms) and a social condition (the need for 
rehabilitation): none of these are present in the imminently dying patient. Dying patients 
need pain relief as they die. 
The second concerns the increase in the use of drugs in dying patients. The standard of 
medical care clearly permits using enough drugs to eliminate pain in these patients. But 
families may feel guilty about withholding or withdrawing treatment or about pain relief 
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when this may hasten death. For them these acts could be understood as a lack of 
respect for their loved one’s death. 
The third reason opens the question about the consciousness of the dying person. The 
increase in drugs can render the person unconscious as he/she dies. This is called 
“palliative sedation”. If the patient decides it is better to stop the pain than to be 
conscious and in constant agony, surely that wish must be granted. There are cases in 
which dying people themselves choose to suffer pain rather than lose their capacity to 
complete tasks they wish to do before dying. In these cases the wishes of competent 
people should be followed. 
4- Physician-Assisted Suicide. It is a direct self-killing with the support of a practitioner. 
This practice is ethically and legal wrong both in Catholic tradition and in US and 
Italian jurisprudence. 
5- Active Euthanasia. The health care practitioner may take action that directly causes 
the patient’s death. It is a direct killing. 
 
The document “Declaration on euthanasia”196, approved by Pope John Paul II and 
originating from the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, explains the official 
position of the Catholic Church about euthanasia and voluntary suicide. In particular the 
passage  n. 371 explains that “when death is imminent and cannot be prevented by the 
remedies used, it is licit in conscience to decide to renounce treatments that can yield 
only a precarious and painful prolongation of life, but without interrupting in any way 
the ordinary care which is due to the sick person in such cases”. 
Therefore, on the one hand there is no moral obligation to prolong a life when “there is 
no longer any reasonable basis for such a hopeful prognosis”197 and on the other hand 
the ordinary care refers “to the obligation, common to all members of the human race, 
to conserve and sustain patient’s life.” 
We can reread these norms into the logic of the polarity of resistance/surrender.  
Resistance implies the recognition that the other person (the patient) is a “good for me”; 
and surrender entails no obligation to do the impossible. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
196 Enchiridion Vaticanum, VII, 1980; 332-351 (nn. 346-373).  
197 Conserving Human life, p. 154. 
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The resistance towards pain in order to protect the patient’s life validates the “right and 
duty in case of serious illness to take the necessary treatment for the preservation of life 
and health”198. 
And when the treatment cannot benefit the patient, and so it can be identified as 
“extraordinary”, it may be interrupted: “if treatment is of no benefit to the patient, it 
may be interrupted while continuing with the care of the patient”199. 
The surrender of active care opens up the possibility of directing palliative care towards 
the development of a type of care which improves the patient’s quality of life during 
his/her remaining time. 
 
 Open issues 
 
 Abuse and inappropriate use of the PST 
 Inappropriate use of sedation occurs when doctors sedate the patients 
approaching the end of life with the primary objective of accelerating death. 
This practice has been called "slow euthanasia": some doctors, in fact, administer 
medication, apparently to relieve symptoms, but with the hidden intention to hasten 
death. 200 
This can happen in the case of deliberate use of heavy sedation in patients who have 
refractory symptoms, or deliberate use of doses that far exceed what is needed to 
provide adequate comfort. These doses in excess may impair physiological functions 
such as spontaneous breathing and hemodynamic stability. 
These ambiguous practices represent an unacceptable and often illegal deviation from 
the rules of ethical practice.201 
Inappropriate use of palliative sedation occurs when sedation is practiced with the intent 
to relieve symptoms, but in clinical circumstances that are not appropriate. In such cases 
sedation is practiced with the intent to relieve symptoms which are considered 
untreatable and is carefully titrated to this effect, but the evidence is inadequate to 
justify such a radical intervention. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
198 Pope Pius XII, The Prolongation of life, 1957, in Smith RE, Conserving Human Life, cit., 157. 
199 Enchiridion Vaticanum, IX, 1727, n. 1768, in Smith RE, Conserving Human Life, cit., 174. 
200 Cherny NI, Radbruch L., The Board of the European Association for Palliative Care, European 
Association for Palliative Care (EAPC) recommended framework for the use of sedation in palliative 
care,  Palliative Medicine, 2009; 23(7): 581–593. 
201 Idem. 
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Representative examples of injudicious use202: 
1) Cases in which, for inadequate assessment of the patient, potentially reversible causes 
of discomfort are overestimated 
2) Situations where before resorting to sedation, you avoid engaging physicians who are 
experts in the relief of symptoms, despite their availability 
3) Use of sedation by a doctor who is tired and frustrated by a patient's complex care in 
symptomatic terms 
4) Situations in which the request is made for sedation of the patient by the family and 
not by the patient.203 
 
 Irrational refusal of sedation 
 Irrational rejection of sedation in the management of refractory symptoms 
occurs when doctors refer excessively to the use of sedation, while at the same time 
insisting on other therapeutic options that do not provide adequate relief. 
Given the subjectivity of the refractory evaluation and the profound inter-individual 
variability of the responses to palliative interventions, these evaluations are often very 
difficult to make. 
Physicians should be aware of the possibility of a “determination which is counter-
productive to dealing”, where the anxiety of having to deal with all of the difficult 
discussions on sedation and treatment of end of life issues leads to avoidant behaviors 
and treatment efforts that are futile, resulting in increased patient anxiety or resistance 
based on exaggerated concerns of hastening death. 
 
 Inadequacy of palliative sedation in clinical practice 
 This occurs in situations where sedation is used in appropriate circumstances, 
but without the proper attention to one or more processes essential for good clinical 
practice.  
Examples of inadequate clinical practice are the following204: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
202 Idem. 
203 In our opinion this request should not always be considered incorrect. 
204 Idem. Indications for palliative sedation: weighted average: Delirium = 65%; Dyspnea = 26%; Pain = 
14%; Other = 5% [emergencies: bleeding; Individual complex situations for which the answer cannot be 
reduced to just the domain of medicine: existential distress, psychological distress], Sykes N, Thorns A, 
The use of opioids and sedatives at the end of life, Lancet Oncology, 2003; 4(5): 312-318. 
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1) The improper consultation with the patient (if possible), family members, or other 
staff members to ensure their understanding of the indications for surgery, the 
objectives of the treatment plan, expected results and potential risks. 
2) Inadequate monitoring of symptom distress or adequacy of relief. 
3) The inadequate assessment of the psychological, spiritual and social factors can 
contribute to the patient's suffering. 
4) Inadequate monitoring of physiological parameters that may indicate a risk of 
overdose (when clinically relevant). 
5) The increase in hasty doses without the titration of sedative effects and without 
respecting the minimum effective dose. 
6) The use of inappropriate drugs to achieve adequate sedation (for example opioids). 
7) Inadequate care of the patient's family. 
8) Inadequate attention to the emotional and spiritual well-being of staff members in 
distress. 
 
 
 The Critique of the Sanctity of Life. 
 
 The critique of the Catholic thesis derives from the fact that it does not consent 
to addressing all of the issues that a lay person might consider important. A lay person 
generally maintains an anti-dogmatic and critical attitude, thinking in a manner 
independent from the hypothesis of a God. 
From this secular vision of life, made possible by the safeguards of secularity in many 
States, it is possible to configure a bioethics concept focused on the quality of life205:  
It is not life as such, or life as an expression of one particular religious or metaphysical 
value, to have value, but the quality (or well-being) of life, which constitutes a life that 
seems “worthy to be lived”.206  
Opposing the value of the sanctity of life and the nature of man, which is imbued with 
culture, means placing a higher value on the personal choices that the individual is 
called to make. These choices are based on freedom and the self-determination of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
205 Fornero G, Bioetica cattolica e bioetica laica, cit., 74. 
206 The most critical theory of the sanctity of life is utilitarianism: in it the secular paradigm differs from 
the sacred one, because it puts human nature in a rational metaphysical context. 
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individuals. This position is characterized by some conditions which characterize the 
concept of “quality of life”207:  
- Maximizing the good (the principle of Utility): For example, we ought to maximize the 
public benefits of scientific research, clinical medicine, public health measures. 
- A Theory of Value: The Standard of Goodness. There are various theories of the good 
(or of value) used by Utilitarians to specify the core of goodness: 1- happiness, 2- 
satisfaction of desires and aims, 3- the attainment of such conditions or states of affairs 
as autonomy, understanding, various kinds of functioning, achievement and deep 
personal relationships. 208  
- Consequentialism. Any Utilitarian theory decides which actions are right entirely by 
reference to the consequences of the actions. A Utilitarian demands that we take account 
of what can reasonably be expected to produce the greatest balance of good or least 
balance of harm. 
- Impartiality (Universalism). A moral point of view is impartial in the sense that a 
moral judgment is formed without regard to either personal preference or interest 
(opposite to the egoism) and the particular advantages or disadvantages of persons such 
as special talents or handicaps, because these properties are morally arbitrary. 
Therefore, all parties affected by an action must receive impartial consideration. 
 
The concept of “quality of life” has been elaborated using these parameters (minimum 
pain and often minimum total cost).209 
From this, the respect for the autonomous choices that each person is called to make, the 
idea of respect, which can be interpreted in two ways arises210: 
1- As the right to be left free to choose, without outside interference by governing 
authorities, who presume to tell people what they can or cannot do; 
2- As the duty of everyone to preserve as much as possible the spaces and the 
possibilities of choice (one’s own or those of others). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
207 Fornero G, Bioetica cattolica e bioetica laica, cit.,13-14. 
208 Cfr. Cattorini P, Bioetica, Milano, Elsevier, 20114, 18-19. Mill and Bentham are hedonistic: they 
believe that only pleasure or happiness (synonymous terms in this conditions) can be intrinsically good. 
Other Utilitarian philosophers, with specific attention to pluralism, believe that no single aim constitutes 
the good  and that many other values besides happiness possess intrinsic worth – the value of friendship, 
knowledge, love, culture, freedom might all qualify in a Utilitarian theory . 
209 Sgreccia E, Manuale di bioetica, cit., 96. This principle cannot be used in an ultimate and founding, 
balancing uneven goods, as comparing costs in money with the value of a human life.  
210 Fornero G, Bioetica cattolica e bioetica laica, cit., 81. 
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Secular bioethics focuses its critique on developing the concept of autonomy. In 
medicine the patient has a responsibility regarding the different possible treatment 
options. The patient decides what he considers to be most suitable in itself, in line with 
his value system. 
 
Starting from the concept of individual autonomy, secular bioethics recognizes the 
sovereign power of each person over his/her body. There is a kind of self-awareness 
with regards to the individual’s being. 
Secular bioethics subordinates the value of life to the value of quality: a relationship that 
implies a possible differentiation between types of human lives. Peter Singer, pointing 
out the extreme consequences of this position, says211: “It is highly unlikely that a 
person really believes that all human lives have equal value. The rhetoric, which is full 
of speeches and writings of Popes, theologians, ethicists, and sometimes doctors, is 
belied in practice every time these same people indulge in opposite admissions: when 
they deny that everyone must work to save a child with severe birth defects, when they 
recognize that we can let an elderly man suffering from an advanced form of 
Alzheimer's disease die of pneumonia, without treating it with antibiotics”. 
The Utilitarian position, based on the principle of self-determination, states that in the 
patient who decides to die, it is not the will to live, which is his determination to stay 
alive. It is precisely for this reason that secular bioethics’ voluntary euthanasia is 
certainly legitimate, and allows a dignified death in respect of the patient212. 
 
Hans Küng has a very particular position in favor of euthanasia, because it is aimed to 
respect both the secular view and that of Christianity. Küng deserves particular 
attention, because his thinking is aimed at a kind of democratic vision of euthanasia, in 
accordance with all of the views under consideration. He says213 believers should not 
contest the fact that even non-believers can bravely die. And, vice versa, the non-
believers should not deny that believers strong in their faith in God as the ultimate 
reality can have a different relationship with death. 
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The struggle for life is presented as valid only if it makes sense to have a hope of 
recovery. The fight against dying - believes the author - tends to see death as an enemy 
to fight. Actually for terminal patients the care of body and soul together with a 
minimum of therapy is the best way to assist them214: 
Today we can care in a largely optimum manner body aches, but the suffering of the 
soul is not helped in any way. Patiently donating time to terminally ill is perhaps the last 
best gift that we can do: to give him the time to listen to his insecurities, anxieties, 
anxieties, to give him a little comfort, and also to say a prayer for him. Today, we know 
that even a terminally ill patient who is unable to speak can still listen; we know that 
bodily contact can communicate spiritual comfort even when he/she is no longer able to 
move. 
After careful analysis of the care that is described by the theologian in a simple but 
exemplary manner, in some places I will now expose his thinking in favor of euthanasia. 
The feature of this argument is that, despite Christian assumptions, both accept active 
and passive euthanasia215: 
1- According to Christian belief, human life is a gift from God, that man himself does 
not deserve it. But at the same time life, according to the will of God, is also the duty of 
man. And it is so given to our (not alien!) responsibility. This also applies to the last 
stage of life; death. Euthanasia should be understood as a definitive support for the 
living. 
2- As man who continues to remain in a terminally ill condition (i.e. death is expected in 
the foreseeable future) or is dying (death is expected in the short term), he has the right 
not only to a humanly dignified life, but also to take leave from life and to die with 
dignity, as a human being. 
3- In the case of patients with a disease in course or irreversible lesions with poor 
prognosis, as in the case of infants with severe deformities incompatible with life, one 
can accept a “shortening of life”, which results in an alleviation of suffering. 
 
The different positions presented here lead us to draw a conclusion as well as a 
question: is there a right or a duty to die? Given that every man would like to recognize 
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the dignity of death without agony, it is legitimate to decide the when and how of his 
own death? 
After clarifying the opposing views of Catholic and secular bioethics and attempting 
along with Küng to join them, the legal and medical implications in any case present a 
dilemma about death, as difficult to solve as it is impossible for humans to relate 
precisely to that “event”. 
Beyond any valid hope of relieving pain, to treat the patient, to act according to the 
principle of being, or remain consistent with Catholic doctrine, death for man is the only 
certainty. Although it is an appointment which no one can put off, fear arises mainly 
because of the impossibility of defining the moment of its arrival. 
Modern man claims to be able to decide the moment of encounter with death, but this 
attitude poses the moral question on the validity or otherwise of the relevance of such a 
claim. Death is still waiting for the inevitable. 
Physician Assisted Suicide seems to be a shared choice about surrender to the patient’s 
disease; in Palliative Sedation Therapy there is not a direct choice regarding death, but 
we recognize a patient’s minimal resistance versus his/her imminent death. In 
conclusion Palliative Sedation Therapy may be ethically preferable to Physician 
Assisted Suicide. 
The personalist model is structured by a triple underlining of meaning: the relational 
personalism, the ontological personalism and the hermeneutical personalism. 
If the criticisms of the method proposed by Principlism are directed to relevant 
questions about the acceptability or not of the same principles as a common language 
regarding global bioethics, the criticisms of the personalist method are geared towards 
the theme of the sharing or not “a priori” of  a specific idea of the person which derives 
from this irreducible notion, ultimately referring back to the concept of the sanctity of 
life, on which the method bases its critical dialectic structure. The relationship with the 
transcendent seems to be a foundational criterion in order to understand the human 
being as a person. But this concept does not seem to be an irreducible a priori criterion 
shared by all. 
 
 
In the next and last chapter the hermeneutical position will be analyzed in order to 
structure our proposal of a method in clinical ethics consultation. 
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Between Hermeneutics and Casuistry 
 
The paradox is that 
while medicine seems to offer 
infinite possibilities, 
the practice of medicine 
is governed by limits. 
K.W. Wildes, 1995 
 
 
 From how to why 
 
 In this last chapter I will try to present a method of conducting an ethics 
consultation having as reference points both a specific methodology of interpretation – 
the philosophical theory called hermeneutics – and an example of an empirical method 
of conducting an ethics consultation – as presented by Jonsen, Siegler and Winslade in 
their book “Clinical Ethics: A practical approach to ethical decisions in Clinical 
Medicine”216. 
The main objectives of this method are resolving the principal criticalities of 
Principlism and Personalism, presenting a hermeneutic circle method in order to carry 
out a clinical ethics consultation. 
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The Hermeneutic philosophical position and the role of casuistry – the theoretical 
background from which this method was developed – seem to be the basis to develop a 
good and sharable method in order to carry out a clinical ethics consultation.217 
Principlism and Personalism theories were upon presented as important bioethics 
theories, underlying their critical aspects. In this section those theories are mentioned, 
but in different ways compared with their official definitions: the four principles open a 
lot of questions which are useful to analyze not only what kind of values are presented 
in a specific clinical case, but also a series of questions that seem to better help the 
consultant to resolve a clinical case. Personalism is here presented only with a double 
meaning – hermeneutical and relational -. The ontological foundation of the person 
presented in Personalism theory, as penned by the Catholic Church, is present as a 
position among other different ideas of person, but, especially in a plural socio-cultural 
context, it does not seem to be the only one position a priori which is fully shared. 
The following paragraphs present the structure of a method that would be attentive to 
both the empirical clinical aspect and the ethics theoretical aspects. The core of this 
method is the relationship, in which all stakeholders - patients, family members, health 
care professionals - have a word to say about a justified resolution of a specific ethics 
issue present in a clinical case. This word – about why – cannot be segmented 
(techniques by doctors, or existential profile by the patient) but involves mutual 
integration: in a good relationship the patient (or another person on his behalf) will be 
able to make a “good” choice. 
The following reflections attempt to formalize a way to help both patients and health 
care professionals to resolve an ethical dilemma, while trying to stay true to their own 
values and deontology. 
 
 Hermeneutics’ Foundations 
 
 Hermeneutics is the science of interpreting literary documents; it means the 
theory of interpretation, i.e. the theory of achieving an understanding of texts, 
utterances, and so on (it is not related to a certain twentieth-century philosophical 
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movement). Hermeneutics in this sense has a long history, reaching back at least as far 
as ancient Greece.218 
This focus on hermeneutics began in particular in Germany, with Martin Heidegger and 
Hans-Georg Gadamer in the twentieth century (“hermeneutics” is today often treated as 
synonymous to “Gadamer's philosophy”). 
Presenting Heidegger’s idea of care between persons seems useful to understand 
Gadamer’s position about its idea of the relation between truth and scientific method in 
a pluralistic context. 
Martin Heidegger defines the term “cure” as an “essential ontological-existential 
phenomenon”219. According to Heidegger, the ontological structure of care is based on 
the fact that the human condition is to be in a world, therefore a human being is of the 
world and he has the ability to relate with his own fellow beings,, and is open to that 
world.  
The German philosopher, in his Logic, says: “the fundamental way of being of a being, 
[…] we call it as cure. Cure is the fundamental way of being present, and as such it 
determines every way of being that follows from the constitution of the being and its 
being present” 220 
Cure is, therefore, the predecessor to every situation, because it is the fundamental 
characteristic of being a person. Moreover, it is from the kind of caring relationship 
which we have experienced, that we derive our being. Cure is the basilar relationship 
between persons starting from birth. 
Heidegger defines “cure” as the fundamental trait of what it means to live. In the current 
terminology regarding well-being all of the aspects of the person are involved: 
affectivity, rationality, emotionality, and physicality. This necessarily makes it a social 
matter which develops into a dyadic relationship, but it also requires that substratum of 
interpretation which determines the non-neutrality of the speakers. 
From this idea of non-neutrality it can be explained that the objectivity of a story always 
passes through the subjectivity of who tells it: “is understanding the sole and sufficient 
access to the reality of history? Obviously there is a danger that the actual reality of the 
event, […] will be weakened and misperceived by being seen in terms of the experience 
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of meaning”221. Therefore it can be difficult to recognize a neutral approach to ethics 
questions because beyond who will decide, the choice affects the history of all those 
who are involved: “When our historical consciousness transposes itself into historical 
horizons, this does not entail passing into alien worlds unconnected in any way with our 
own; instead,  together they constitute the one great horizon that moves from within and 
that, beyond the frontiers of the present, embraces the historical depths of our self-
consciousness. Everything contained in historical consciousness is in fact embraced by a 
single historical horizon. Our own past and that other past towards which our historical 
consciousness is directed help to shape this moving horizon out of which human life 
always lives, and which determines it as heritage and tradition”222. 
After having considered some important characteristics of care as a constitutive practice 
of human beings, it is important to share some reflections about the human activity of 
interpretation, not only considered as mere theoretical activity, but as a reflection on 
difficulties often present in a empirical and real context, in which care is a human 
activity oriented to the care of the whole person and not just to a disease. For this reason 
Gadamer’s position about the relationship between truth and scientific method is 
important and herewith examined.  
Hans-Georg Gadamer presents in his Truth and Method his own position about the 
difficulties in understanding the concept of truth using only the scientific method. 
His reflections are useful to us to better understand that an ethics problem cannot be 
resolved by only using a scientific method, but by opening up to the human experience, 
which  includes the scientific approach, but not only. Gadamer, in his introduction, 
affirms that: “The following investigations starts with the resistance in modern science 
itself to the universal claim of scientific method. They are concerned to seek the 
experience of truth which transcends the domain of scientific method wherever that 
experience is to be found, and to inquire into its legitimacy. Hence the human sciences 
are connected to modes of experience that lie outside science: with the experiences of 
philosophy, of art, and of history itself. These are all modes of experience in which a 
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truth is communicated that cannot be verified by the methodological means proper to 
science”223. 
Gadamer presents the hermeneutic experience as an open process to new experiences: 
“The truth of experience always implies an orientation toward new experience […] The 
dialectic of experience has its proper fulfillment not in definitive knowledge but in the 
openness to experience that is made possible by experience of itself”224. 
For our discourse it is important to present Gadamer’s approach as described in Truth 
and Method: “Fundamentally I am not proposing a method, but I am describing what is 
the case”225. This concept can be further explained by referring to other quotations: 
“The finite nature of one’s own understanding is the manner in which reality, resistance, 
the absurd, and the unintelligible assert themselves. If one takes this finiteness seriously, 
one must take the reality of history seriously as well. […] The experience of the Thou 
throws light on the concept of historically effected experience. The experience of the 
Thou also manifests the paradox that something standing over against me asserts its 
own rights and requires absolute recognition; and in that very process is 
“understood”226. 
Andrzej Wiercinski, in his paper Hans-Georg Gadamer and the Truth of Hermeneutic 
Experience227 , explains Gadamer’s idea of communication in the following way. 
“Understanding is not a mysterious communion of minds; it is an event. We want to 
grasp the character of the process of understanding, to comprehend what happens when 
we understand something. Convincing and successful interpretation brings us to 
understanding.228 Understanding is a participation in meaning. As an historical event it 
is embedded in language. The true meaning of language transcends the limits of 
methodological interpretation. Language as the medium for history is itself a place of 
mediation. Human understanding is always interpretive. Hermeneutic truth acquires a 
unique density and fullness of meaning. Hermeneutic understanding is not a process of 
construing a self-identical meaning of a text, but a continuous dialogue in which a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
223 Gadamer H-G, Truth and Method, cit., xx–xxi. 
224 Ibidem, 350. 
225 Ibidem, 512. 
226 Gadamer H-G, Truth and Method, cit., xx–xxi. 
227 Wiercinski A, Hans-Georg Gadamer and the Truth of Hermeneutic Experience, in 
http://journals.library.mun.ca/ojs/index.php/analecta/article/viewFile/2/1 [last seen 20/2/2016] 
228 Gadamer H-G, Reason in the Age of Science, trans. Lawrence FG, Cambridge, MIT Press, 1981, 111. 
Cit. in Wiercinski A, Hans-Georg Gadamer and the Truth of Hermeneutic Experience, cit. 
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
99	  
	  
mediation of meaning takes place. Dialogue is the model of hermeneutic understanding. 
A meaning cannot be determined from the perspective of propositional logic”.229 
Gadamer’s reflections offer us the possibility of better understanding the importance of 
posing the correct question, in a dialectic relationship in which the truth can be unveiled 
only by sharing meanings. 
Before presenting a method structured on a different type of question, it is significant to 
briefly describe the ethics theory – the casuistry – by which this method found its 
origins. Casuistry discusses the necessity to connect a specific case with other already 
resolved cases, in order to make the best decision concerning questions of ethics in 
clinical practice. 
 
 
 Casuistry and the four boxes 
 
 Casuistry is an empirical way of analyzing and resolving clinical ethics issues 
using particular cases “where the judgments reached rely on judgments reached in prior 
case”230. 
Casuistry focuses our attention “on practical decision making, in particular cases and on 
the implication of those cases for other cases”231. It does not consider that the principles 
and other general moral theories can resolve specific ethics questions in particular 
clinical cases. It prefers to appeal to narrative medicine, paradigmatic cases and cases 
beforehand resolved: “many individual factors, including the patient’s medical history, 
the physician’s success with other similar patients, paradigms of expected outcomes, 
and the like will play a role in formulating a judgment and recommendation to this 
patient, which may be very different from the recommendation made to the next patient 
with the same malady. The casuist views moral judgment and recommendations 
similarly”232. 
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Casuistry seems to be a valid alternative to the principle-based ethics approaches 
because there are two questions that it tries to avoid233: 
- One is the lack of consensus on any all-encompassing ethical theory or principle. By 
relying instead on what seem to be firmer and more common agreements about 
particular paradigm cases of right and wrong, casuistry hopes to sidestep this difficulty 
with foundational approaches; 
- The second is the problem of interpretation of general principles that plagues their 
application to particular cases – one cannot defend a specification of a general principle 
in its application to particular circumstances without relying on some intuitive balancing 
judgment. The casuist argues primarily from other cases rather than primarily from 
principles, therefore the problem of interpretation would seem not to arise. 
 
Jonsen and Toulmin are two casuists. They wrote about the relationship between the 
principles and their application in specific cases that “good casuistry … applies general 
principles to particular cases with discernment”234. Opposite to the Rawls’ moral theory, 
the casuistry focuses its attention on particular cases and practical judgments: 
“bioethics, like ethical theory has sometimes unduly minimized this avenue to moral 
knowledge. Casuists also have rightly pointed out that generalizations are often best 
learned, accommodated, and implemented by using cases, case discussion, and case 
methods. These insights can be utilized by connecting them to an appropriate set of 
concepts, principles, and theories that control the judgments we make about cases”235. 
An important question about the efficiency of a case-based method concerns the study 
of medical ethics and the acquisition of core abilities to resolve ethics questions in daily 
medical practice: “cases are at the hearth of teaching in medical ethics. […] The 
problems that are brought to the ethicist to solve are predominantly individual cases”236. 
The effort to argue and to resolve specific clinical cases by analogy with exemplary 
cases is exemplified in a Jonsen and Toulmin characterization: “it is this feature that 
draws the important contrast with principle-based approaches, whose idealized mode of 
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reasoning is a deductive inference from a well-specified principle to the case at 
hand”237. 
The paradigm cases can be understood using a combination of facts and settled values. 
The facts can be used to take on other cases – i.e. “The patient refuses the recommended 
treatments” –; the settled values – i.e. competent patients have a right to refuse 
treatment – can be in prima facie defined as principles, rules or rights and they must be 
considered different from the facts present in specific cases. Following the casuistry 
“rather than keeping values distinct from facts, the two are bound together in the 
paradigm case; the central values are generalizable and therefore preserved from one 
case to the next”238. 
 
In his “Casuistry as Methodology in Clinical Ethics”239 Jonsen describes the typical 
steps taken to conduct a casuistic analysis. 
He uses three terms to identify three categories useful to taking a practical approach to 
ethical decision-making in clinical medicine: 1- morphology; 2- taxonomy; 3- kinetics. 
 
 Morphology 
This first step concerns the circumstances – the circumstances, say the casuists “make 
the case”240. In general they are delineated by seven questions: who, what, when, where, 
why, how and by what means”. The circumstances are the center of the case: “that 
center is constituted of certain maxims, brief rule-like sayings that give moral identity to 
the case”241. 
The circumstances are related to a history (the patient’s history) and to the maxims (e.g. 
competent persons have the right to determine their fate): “this interplay of 
circumstances and maxims constitute the structure of a case”242. 
Another important part of the morphology of the case is the practical discourse: “any 
argument contains a sample of one or more standard and invariant patterns of discourse, 
that is an argument about causality, or about sequences, or about priority or about 
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contingency, etc. These arguments have invariant patterns that can, and must be used, in 
any substantive argument”243. 
Invariant arguments could be also called “special topics”. In clinical medicine and in 
clinical ethical activity Jonsen Siegler and Winslade had defined these topics, and they 
are four: medical indications, patient’s preferences, the quality of the patient’s life, 
social and economic factors external to the patients. 
These four topics have an invariant structure in which different contents may be 
identified: “the morphology of a case reveals the invariant structure of the particular 
case, whatever its contingent features, and also the invariant forms of argument relevant 
to any case of this sort. The first task of the casuist is to discern this structure”244. 
 
 Taxonomy 
 The second step concerns the order and the categorization of the case: “the 
taxonomy of cases is crucially important in casuistry. It puts the case at hand into its 
moral context and reveals the weight of arguments that might countervail a presumption 
of rightness or wrongness”245. 
Taxonomy is significant in clinical ethics because it shows that a specific case is not 
unique: “the judgment of the case is based, not on a principle or a theory, but upon the 
way in which circumstances and maxims appear in the morphology of the case itself and 
in comparison with similar cases.246 
 
 Kinetics 
 Kinetics is “the way in which one case imparts a kind of moral movement to 
other cases”247. Jonsen recalls the term “kinetics” from classical physics, as he has 
borrowed the term “morphology” from classical biology and he uses the term “motion” 
to understand the way in which one case initiates a kind of moral movement onto other 
cases.: “the motion is a shift in moral judgment between paradigm and analogous cases, 
so that one might say of the paradigm, ‘this is clearly wrong’ and of an analogous case, 
‘but, in this case’ what was done was justified, or excusable’. 
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244 Ibidem, 301. 
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247 Idem. 
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In the conclusion of this paper, Jonsen writes about the aim of the casuistry and the 
reasons for its validity: “the casuist will be able to scan or parse the case, revealing its 
structure of claims, maxims, grounds, rebuttals. Casuistry will be able to collocate the 
case in a taxonomy of cases, recognize the similarities and differences, and appreciate 
the shift from moral certainty to moral doubt. Above all, casuistic reasoning is 
prudential reasoning: appreciation of the relationship between paradigm and analogy, 
between maxims and circumstances, between the greater and fewer of circumstances as 
they bear on the claim and the rebuttals”248. 
 
Following these considerations, Jonsen, Siegler and Winslade presented their method, 
called by some users the method of “the four boxes”. 
As stated before, Principialism is present in Jonsen’s Siegler’s Winslade’s reflections, 
but only explained briefly: “we rather direct our reader’s attention to how these general 
principles interact within the concrete circumstances of a clinical case, and how they 
serve as guides to action in specific circumstances”.249 
The three authors propose a method structured in four topics considered as constitutive 
of the essential structure of a clinical case: Medical Indications, Patient Preferences, 
Quality of Life and Contextual Features. 
Each topic concerns a specificity of a clinical case. They are helpful to identify an 
ethical problem and, at the same time, they are useful to offer a complete image of the 
ethical dimensions of the case:250 
- Medical indications refer to the diagnostic and therapeutic interventions that are being 
used to evaluate and treat the medical problem in the case; 
- Patient preferences state the express choices of the patient about their treatment, or the 
decisions of those who are authorized to speak for the patient when the patient is 
incapable of doing so; 
- Quality of life describes features of the patient’s life prior to and following treatment, 
insofar as these features are pertinent to medical decisions;  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
248 Ibidem, 306. 
249 Jonsen AR, Siegler M, Winslade WJ, Clinical Ethics, a practical approach to ethical decisions in 
clinical medicine, cit., 3. 
250 Idem. Under each of these headings, a series of questions are posed to assure that needed information 
has been gathered. 
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- Contextual features identify the familial, social, institutional, financial, and legal 
settings within which the particular case takes place, insofar as they influence medical 
decisions. 
The three authors believe that “these four topics are essential and constant constituents 
of any clinical case, which is, of course, unique and varying in its own circumstances”. 
Jonsen Siegler and Winslade put in relation the four topics with the Beauchamp’s 
Childress’ principles (as showed in the table). These two positions are in relation, but at 
the same time different. Following the method of four topics it can be explained that 
ethical principles are relevant to a clinical case, however it is possible to go beyond: a 
case “must be compared to similar cases. It is certainly true that in medicine every case 
is unique, and every patient a statistic of one”251. Nevertheless a case “at hand will have 
similarities with other cases”252. 
Before offering a solution “other cases may have to be thoughtfully considered”. It is 
true that “such cases are called paradigm cases” because “even similar cases have 
variable circumstances” but comparing one case to similar other cases can be considered 
a valid support to guide clinicians in their daily activities: “clinicians and ethicists 
should be familiar with these paradigm cases, and be able to discern how they differ and 
how the circumstances bond with principles in [a] current case”253 
 
The four topics are: 
A practical approach to ethical decision-making in clinical medicine: 
MEDICAL INDICATIONS 
The Principles of Beneficence and Non-maleficence 
1- What is the patient’s medical problem? Is the problem acute? Chronic? Critical? 
Reversible? Emergent? Terminal? 
2- What are the goals of treatment? 
3- In what circumstances are medical treatments not indicated? 
4- What are the probabilities of success of various treatment options? 
5- In sum, how can this patient be benefited by medical and nursing care, and how can 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
251 Jonsen AR, Siegler M, Winslade WJ, Clinical Ethics, a practical approach to ethical decisions in 
clinical medicine, cit., 4. 
252 Idem. 
253 Ibidem, 5. 
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harm be avoided? 
 
PATIENT PREFERENCES 
The Principle of Respect for Autonomy 
1- Has the patient been informed of benefits and risks, understood this information, and 
given consent? 
2- Is the patient mentally capable and legally competent, and is there evidence of 
incapacity? 
3- If mentally capable, what preferences about treatment is the patient stating? 
4- If incapacitated, has the patient expressed prior preferences? 
5- Who is the appropriate surrogate to make decisions for the incapacitated patient? 
6- Is the patient unwilling or unable to cooperate with medical treatment? If so, why? 
 
QUALITY OF LIFE 
The Principles of Beneficence, Non-maleficence, and Respect for Autonomy 
1- What are the prospects, with or without treatment, for a return to normal life, and 
what physical, mental, and social deficits might the patient experience even if 
treatment succeeds? 
2- On what grounds can anyone judge that some quality of life would be undesirable for 
a patient who cannot make or express such a judgment? 
3- Are there biases that might prejudice the provider’s evaluation of the patient’s quality 
of life? 
4- What ethical issues arise concerning improving or enhancing a patient’s quality of 
life? 
5- Do quality-of-life assessments raise any questions regarding changes in treatment 
plans, such as forgoing life-sustaining treatment? 
6- What are plans and rationale to forgo life-sustaining treatment? 
7- What is the legal and ethical status of suicide? 
 
CONTEXTUAL FEATURES 
The Principles of Justice and Fairness 
1- Are there professional, inter-professional, or business interests that might create 
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conflicts of interest in the clinical treatment of patients? 
2- Are there parties other than clinicians and patients, such as family members, who 
have an interest in clinical decisions? 
3- What are the limits imposed on patient confidentiality by the legitimate interests of 
third parties? 
4- Are there financial factors that create conflicts of interest in clinical decisions? 
5- Are there problems of allocation of scarce health resources that might affect clinical 
decisions? 
6- Are there religious issues that might affect clinical decisions? 
7- What are the legal issues that might affect clinical decisions? 
8- Are there considerations of clinical research and education that might affect clinical 
decisions? 
9- Are there issues of public health and safety that affect clinical decisions? 
10- Are there conflicts of interest within institutions or organizations (e.g. hospitals) that 
may affect clinical decisions and patient welfare? 
 
 
 Clinical Case in ICU: if should an acute event arise? 
 
The following case is presented in reply to the question included in the four boxes 
previously presented.254 
 
Mr. M.G. 59 y.o., Belgian, a sportsman, lives with his second wife and their 12 y.o. 
son. He has a brother who works as a nurse. While cycling wearing a helmet, he has a 
violent fall, coincidentally near a clinic. Thanks to the intervention of a doctor and to 
proper resuscitation, cardiac arrest is avoided. He is transferred to the hospital by 
ambulance. He undergoes a cervical CT scan, which shows a cervical lesion of C1-
C2, without any possibility of surgery. An Angio-Rm and Rm examination of the 
neck is performed in the ICU and shows the following result: complete spinal 
truncation at the height of the base of the epystropheus dens with the cranial 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
254 It is answered only to those questions appropriate to the clinical case considered. I would like to thank 
dr. Giulio Minoia that presented us the case. 
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medullary stump moved forward. Edematous intramedullary alterations above and 
below the line of truncation. No current evidence of perilesional blood flow. 
Confirmed fracture both of the anterior and the posterior arch of the atlas, of the dens 
and of the posterior arch of C2. The dens is displaced anteriorly and to the right. 
Diffuse degenerative changes with synostosis between C6-C7. Edematous alterations 
in the laterocervical soft tissues. Complete occlusion of the right vertebral artery at 
the height of C2. The posterior circulation appears currently totally supported by the 
vertebral artery. Regular carotid arteries. They also perform brain/chest/abdominal 
CT. All examinations give negative results. It is assumed that the patient has no 
neurological injuries. After the event Mr. M. is treated with sedative and hypnotic-
inducing drugs. Antibiotics are given for a rise in temperature, probably due to a 
small infection of the catheter, in the following three days. 
 
 
 Medical Indication 
 
- What is the patient’s medical problem? Is the problem acute? Chronic? Critical? 
Reversible? Emergent? Terminal? What are the goals of treatment? 
The first goal of medical care turns out to be the stabilization of the patient. So all 
interventions are considered owed to and targeted to producing a benefit for the good of 
the patient. This implies that the tracheotomy, the administration of antibiotics, the 
possibility of the use of adrenaline and life-saving maneuvers in the case of an acute 
event would be considered treatment due to the patient. The futility of care must be 
balanced with the effectiveness of treatment and with the objective to stabilize the 
patient. This is justified by the objective of preventing unnecessary suffering, and 
preserving as much as possible the quality of life of Mr. M. 
The second objective is the autonomy of Mr. M., which means he awakens and is able 
to decide on medical treatments. The benefits for Mr. M. cannot be evaluated according 
to the version of his wife, who was reported “to be against any form of overtreatment, 
but making Mr. M. capable of discernment and informed properly on his status.” 
 
- In what circumstances are medical treatments not indicated? 
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The use of life-saving maneuvers or the use of antibiotics must be subjected to the non-
repetitive criteria, and must be in favor of minimally invasive treatment, which would 
be disproportionate given the current conditions and the prognosis of the patient. 
 
- What are the probabilities of success of various treatment options? 
The treatments are not intended to cure the disease, now ominous, but to be able to 
bring Mr. M. to a state in which, after being fully and completely advised about his 
status, he can in a balanced and free manner make an informed decision regarding his 
future. 
 
- In sum, how can this patient be benefited by medical and nursing care, and how can 
harm be avoided? 
This path to the awakening of Mr. M. should be gradual, accompanied by counseling, 
and neurological rehabilitation and, not the least, by his family. An optimal route in the 
recovery of Mr. M. and of his decision-making process should involve a long-term 
timeframe. The discharge from the intensive care unit and transfer to a place more 
suitable to his condition would ensure a better quality of life. This step towards 
rehabilitation also implies that the whole family (his second wife and son) be involved 
in understanding the condition of Mr. M. and his choices. 
 
 
 Patient Preferences 
 
- Has the patient been informed of benefits and risks, understood this information, and 
given consent? 
The condition of Mr. M. is stable, but he is not alert. His wife visits every day. After the 
first three days an ethics consultation by doctors is requested.  
- If incapacitated, has the patient expressed prior preferences? 
His wife explains his preferences. 
- Who is the appropriate surrogate to make decisions for the incapacitated patient? 
Probably it is his second wife. When the patient arrived in the hospital the physicians 
contacted his family. His wife immediately declared his opposition to any form of 
overtreatment, but she signed the consent form for the tracheotomy. 
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- Is the patient unwilling or unable to cooperate with medical treatment? If so, why? 
Yes, he is. Because he is not conscious. 
 
 Quality of life 
 
- What are the prospects, with or without treatment, for a return to normal life, and what 
physical, mental, and social deficits might the patient experience even if treatment 
succeeds? 
Given the gravity of the situation, the wife continues to repeat the patient's wishes about 
not agreeing to aggressive therapy. 
- On what grounds can anyone judge that a certain quality of life would be undesirable 
for a patient who cannot make or express such a judgment? 
The second day, Mr. M. is transferred to the ICU. His wife reports that Mr. M. had 
talked about refusing a life as a quadriplegic. 
 
- Are there biases that might prejudice the provider’s evaluation of the patient’s quality 
of life? 
No, there aren’t. 
- What ethical issues arise concerning improving or enhancing a patient’s quality of 
life? 
During the ethics consultation, the questions posed by the clinicians should be about 
what the right course to take is if an acute event should occur. 
- Do quality-of-life assessments raise any questions regarding changes in treatment 
plans, such as foregoing life-sustaining treatment? 
Caregivers, knowing the position of the wife regarding overtreatment, ask whether it is 
permissible to use antibiotics or perform resuscitation in the case of a new cardiac 
arrest. Doctors would like to understand the extent to which treatment in this case could 
be considered proportionate. During the counseling they express their concerns with 
respect to Mr. M., forced to live connected to an artificial ventilator and under the 
constant care of health care professionals and their families. 
- What are plans and rationale to forgo life-sustaining treatment? 
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During the ethics consultation, it was decided that the patient would be reanimated if an 
acute event should arise. It was decided that the resuscitation process would not be 
repeated many times. 
- What is the legal and ethical status of suicide? 
There is no status. 
 
 Contextual Features 
 
- Are there professional, inter-professional, or business interests that might create 
conflicts of interest in the clinical treatment of patients? 
No there aren’t. 
- Are there parties other than clinicians and patients, such as family members, who have 
an interest in clinical decisions? 
Yes, there are. His wife. 
- What are the limits imposed on patient confidentiality by the legitimate interests of 
third parties? 
There are none. 
- Are there financial factors that create conflicts of interest in clinical decisions? 
No, there aren’t. 
- Are there problems of allocation of scarce health resources that might affect clinical 
decisions? 
No, there aren’t. 
- Are there religious issues that might affect clinical decisions? 
No, there aren’t. 
- What are the legal issues that might affect clinical decisions? 
There are none. 
- Are there considerations of clinical research and education that might affect clinical 
decisions? 
No, there aren’t. 
- Are there issues of public health and safety that affect clinical decisions? 
No, there aren’t. 
- Are there conflicts of interest within institutions or organizations (e.g. hospitals) that 
may affect clinical decisions and patient welfare? 
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No, there aren’t. 
 
The patient woke up after a few weeks, was moved to Belgium and died not too long 
after. We do not know how he died. It can be assumed for a “not too aggressive medical 
treatment” at the first complication. 
 
 
 A Criticism of Casuistry: Tomlinson’s Position 
 
 According to Tomlinson’s position, the casuistic model opens up a series of 
problems regarding its application. Its limitations and objection can be related to these 
issues using a principle-based approach to analyze a clinical ethics problem. 
There are three types of limits on casuistry255: 
- Regarding selecting the paradigm cases; 
- Regarding connecting maxims and paradigm cases; 
- Regarding settled convictions on paradigm cases. 
 
Firstly, Tomlinson notes that “any appeal to a set of ‘paradigm cases’ assumes that the 
proper ones have been selected for comparison”256, but “where there are competing 
ethical considerations or ‘maxims’, there will also be alternative sets of paradigm cases 
to which analogies can be drawn. It seems to show that casuistry is not the better 
alternative to a principle-based approach: it too requires a balancing of moral weights 
between principles, or some alternative way of choosing between competing lines of 
paradigmatic cases before the analogical, casuistic part of the argument can even 
begin”257. 
Secondly, it seems not be clear “how casuistry is any more articulate than a rule-based 
approach in explaining the connection between rules, principles, or maxims on the one 
hand, and specific moral judgments on the other”258. The risk is that the casuistic 
method is considered as one which veils intuitionism.259 
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256 Ibidem, 94. 
257 Idem. 
258 Ibidem, 96. 
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The third critique concerns the difficulty regarding casuistry about “its reliance on 
settled convictions about paradigm cases, where it runs the danger of uncritical 
conventionalism and conservatism. Casuistry seems to “provide no way by which the 
settled paradigms themselves might be challenged”.  
Therefore for Tomlinson the reference to some cases defined as paradigmatic does not 
offer any avenues for other cases.260 
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 Circle Hermeneutic Method 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The proposal of a method that can be called circular can be recognized as valid 
as it responds to the criticalities and at the same time it serves as a synthesis to the 
ethical theories previously presented. 
From Principlism (method of the four principles) by Beauchamp and Childress one can 
recognize as valid the effort to have a common language structured in order to face 
ethical issues in daily clinical practice. Such language can also be applied in a 
multicultural context in which it can also share different positions related to the concept 
of care. 
Personalism (triangle method) can be a useful tool to fully understand who  the 
interlocutor is that you have in front of you, be he patient or care-giver. A person cannot 
be described as something, a person is someone261:  Mentioning it defies any possible 
qualitative description. This concept of the person, as described by Robert Spaemann, 
allows us to consider each act as a bearer of certain significance both for the person who 
carries it out, and for those who receive it. The concept of person as presented by the 
Catholic Church, as already mentioned, does not seem to be fully accepted by everyone, 
but, from that concept of what a human being is, we can presume which type of respect 
for each one human being should be owed.  
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Casuistry (method of the four boxes) opens up the possibility of linking a specific 
clinical case with other similar cases – therefore at the same time they can be considered 
different and equivalent, thus already solved. Moreover, Jonsen, Siegler and Winslade 
offer us a valuable guide to facing ethics issues in clinical settings. 
 
 
 Anerkennung and the certainty of not being alone 
 
 Martin Buber in his famous essay The dialogical principle says, “I become me 
telling you” 262. In today's more and more multicultural society, clinical ethics is called 
upon not only to develop a procedural method263, by which we can understand “who” 
should decide and therefore have the final word (but not necessarily the only one); but 
also relational and interpretative processes thanks to which we can arrive at a 
satisfactory solution for the patient which is, as much as possible, shared by all those 
who can be a reference to that specific clinical case. 
Before presenting a Circle method, I would like to make some reflections about the 
concept of acknowledgement –as expressed by Hegel and taken on by Mead and 
Habermas – because it seems a useful precondition on which to base a method that 
could be applied both in a clinical context and in a multicultural society.   
It can be said that the notion of acknowledgement refers to that specific form of will that 
obliges the individual to claim the personal desire to be recognized as himself by 
another counterpart in a relationship between individuals. 
The concept of acknowledgement (in German, Anerkennung) refers to the pre-dialogical 
time in a relationship between two or more people. It simultaneously recalls both the 
differences and the similarities between individuals. This terminological dichotomy is 
what characterizes the major difficulties in the social relationships between people. 
In the Self-Consciousness, the second moment of the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel 
presents the relationship Lordship-Bondage, a metaphor that helps us to understand the 
origin of mutual recognition between individuals. Hegel considers the subject as a self 
that establishes relations with other selves. The subject has the security to be conscious 
of himself only in relation to other subjects that give him the certainty to be such. These 
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115	  
	  
individuals should be free and thinking like him. Thus a conscious person becomes, in 
relation to others, self-conscious (conscious of himself). For Hegel, a person is 
conscious only if he can be recognized by another being like him: “Self-consciousness 
is in and for itself as and because it is in and for itself for another; that it is only as 
something recognized”264. 
On the basis of mutual acknowledgement Jürgen Habermas reflects on the rules that 
emphasize a tolerant behavior. Habermas explains his own concept of tolerance in Faith 
and science taking the Kant’s philosophy of religion. 
The concept of acknowledgement, says Habermas, includes in itself some rules for 
tolerant behavior. Habermas recognizes in the condition of equal freedom for everyone 
the possibility to “take away the sting of intolerance to tolerance”. He affirms that: 
“People concerned must take into account of the perspectives of those whom they are 
from time to time faced with, if they want to fix by mutual agreement the conditions 
under which they want to exercise mutual tolerance, because all people deserve the 
same respect”. 
In light of Kantian thought Habermas introduces the concept of dissent and says that 
“the mutual refusal of practices and beliefs can be recovered in accordance with good 
subjective reasons, even if there is not a reasonable hope of a cognitive solution for 
dissent”265. 
For Habermas, the idea of dissent, if it remains in the individuals, should be dropped 
from the public and social plan, so that interpersonal relationships between citizens of 
the same community can continue undisturbed.  
In order to implement this concept “a commonly accepted basis of impartial reasons that 
do not neutralize [...] the reasons for the refusal, but [who have] the better of them”266 is 
necessary. Later he writes: “In the other we must respect the citizen even when we think 
it is wrong thinking, and the way of an unhappy life. Tolerance prevents a pluralistic 
society from being torn, as a political community, by conflicts between world views”267. 
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A relationship of mutual acknowledgement provides for the individual both the freedom 
to assess negatively the behavior of others, and the responsibility for the social 
consequences related to own conduct. 
 
After presenting the concept of acknowledgement and the related ideas of dissent and 
tolerance, following I shall try to explain our method of facing an ethics consultation. 
I think there are certain irreducible principles under which the ethics consultation seems 
to be jumbled, both in reference to what the word ethics recalls, and as the consultation 
must be directed supporting people in a difficult time, in which it is right to make a 
decision. This activity also involves a consistency with itself.  
 
Therefore, following I shall recall some principles that united with the concepts of 
acknowledgement, tolerance and dissent (presented above) can be of help in the work of 
the consultant: 
- If possible, leave time to those who will decide to consider all hypotheses; 
- Be available for all meetings needed and in different ways; 
- Recognize that there is not a precise time for counseling; 
- In difficult moments, the assignment of the consultant is to accompany, evaluating and 
helping everyone with due respect; 
- Recognize the objectivity of a history through the subjectivity of the storyteller 
- Recognize that each case present its own unique aspects. 
- Develop a significant research activity 
- Do not lie; 
- Do not let it favor the death of anyone. 
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Circle Method 
 
 
1: Who needs the consultancy? Why? 
 
 
4: How to offer solution? 
2: Who is involved? 
 
 
 
 
 
3: Why this problem? 
 
 
 
1: Who needs the consultancy? 
The first step concerns the way of reception of a request of consultancy. 
In this time a consultant should understand:  
Who is it that requires consultancy? Why? 
What is the issue? How urgent is it? Is there a doubt? 
Has this doubt been shared by others? 
According to the speaker, are there opposing views? If possible, which is patient’s 
position? 
 
2: Who is involved? 
The second step focuses on the protagonists of the specific clinical case (Personalism) 
Regarding the patient: medical indications and patient preferences.  
The consultant is called to listen to the patient’s history, his/her diagnosis and 
prognosis. 
Are there others involved in this case? What are their roles and ideas? 
Have they also expressed a similar doubt? If not, is there another issue? 
Patient	  
Family	  Member	  
Medical	  Team	  
Consultant	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3: Why this problem? 
The third step addresses the ethical issues related to the clinical and relational condition 
about the case (contextual features) 
What are the difficulties? 
What are the possible options? Are there other underlying factors? 
What are the principles to balance? Why? (Principlism) 
What can be found in the literature? Are there similar cases? (Casuistry) 
What are the positions of other people involved? 
How and by whom has the path been shared? 
 
4: How to offer a solution? 
The last step is focused on possible solution to ethical dilemma in that specific case. 
What are the possible solutions? The pros and cons of each? (Hermeneutical approach, 
without neutrality) 
Have all necessary meetings taken place? (to be always in relationship, allowing the 
case) 
Have all the options been understood by who will decide? If it is asked, it is possible to 
provide our justified idea).  
Look for the biggest share possible, always remembering the good for the patient related 
with his/her history. 
 
In order to better explain the proposed method, a pediatric clinical case is presented 
below, and is then analyzed following the Circle Method presented above. 
 
 Pediatric Clinical Case: No trach tube! 
 
 This case concerns a young family and its little daughter. 
The parents of the new-born child bring her to the Senior pediatrician for the first 
medical examination. 
The doctor observes a light hypotonia; there is suspicion of a slight reduction in 
muscle tone. This is confirmed during the second visit as well, after having sent the 
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child to a specialist for a hip ultrasound.  
In her third month she has a clear hypotonia, which is also observed by the child 
neuropsychiatrist. A reduction in body weight is also noted, even though she had 
eaten in a sufficient manner. 
Later, she was taken several times to the Emergency Room for respiratory problems. 
During one of these visits an evaluation at the Specialist Centre of  III Level was 
recommended for suspected spinal muscular atrophy type 1 (sma1). The diagnosis 
would be confirmed by the center a few days later, around the fourth month of the 
child's life. 
The Center decided to take in the child and her family. 
 
After carrying out various exams, the center proposed two options to the parents: an 
invasive therapy, i.e.  tracheostomy,  or a non-invasive therapy. 
The parents are young, recent residents in Italy. The pediatrician and ASL nurses 
participated in a series of meetings organized by the Centre aimed at understanding the 
disease, prognosis, therapy and prescribing home-care for the patient. 
All necessary medical devices for the home were provided (catheters, suction, pulse 
oximeter and all the tools necessary to promote the patency of the airway). 
Drug therapy according to protocols was prescribed. 
Starting from the first meetings at the specialized center, the parents were adamant 
about their refusal of any invasive treatment. It was their absolute intention to care for 
the child as much as possible at home. On this issue the parents never changed their 
minds, or had any doubts. 
The family was constantly supervised at home by the pediatrician, the ASL nurse, and 
the Center. 
For the pediatrician this was a new and very serious case. He was obliged to re-think the 
management of this patient. After understanding the wishes of parents, and having been 
instructed by the Centre, the pediatrician went along with the parents' wishes to keep the 
child at home. 
The pediatrician asked me the following question: from an ethical point of view, is it 
right what we're doing? It is right to keep the child at home when you have another 
option, i.e. the availability of the hospital? 
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I agreed with the choice that was made (the analysis of the ethical issues is in the next 
paragraph). The family had the opportunity to manage their child at home and at the 
same time to be followed by many specialists. The child died at 11 and a half months, in 
her own bed. 
 
 
Case Analysis: the notion of proportionality and the criteria of 
“terminal”. 
 
1: Who needs the consultancy? 
Who is it that requests consultancy? Why? 
The consultancy was requested by the pediatrician. He was in doubt about what he and 
the nurses and the Center were doing. The pediatrician asked me the following 
questions: from an ethical point of view, it is right what we're doing? It is right to keep 
the child at home when you have another option, i.e. the hospital? 
The consultancy was a validation/conflict resolution of the parents’ choice, which had 
been taken earlier after the training offered by the Center of III Level. 
 
What is the issue? How urgent is it?  
The problem concerns the withholding of an invasive treatment. 
No, it is not urgent. 
 
Is there a doubt? Has this doubt been shared by others? 
No, it is not, because the parents have always been very convinced about the refusal of 
any invasive treatment. 
 
2: Who is involved? 
 
Are there others involved in this case?  
Parents, pediatrician, nurses, specialists. 
 
What are their roles and ideas? 
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All of them shared the parents’ decision. 
 
3: Why this problem? 
 
What are the difficulties? 
The difficulties are in not intervening with invasive means so as not to bring the child to 
the Hospital, because the parents do not want the tracheostomy tube for their daughter. 
 
What are the possible options? 
The possible options are two: an invasive therapy – with tracheostomy- or a therapy 
without invasive treatment. 
 
What are the principles to balance? 
The principles are: autonomy of the family and beneficence (a balancing of the benefits 
and the risks of these two different types of treatments.) 
 
How and by whom was the path shared? 
The path was shared by all the persons of interes in the case. The parents were recent 
resident in Italy, the pediatrician and the ASL nurses participated in a series of meetings 
organized by the Centre aimed at understanding the disease, prognosis, therapy and 
management of the home-care therapy.  
The family was assiduously followed at home by the pediatrician, the ASL nurse, and 
the Center. 
 
4: How to offer solution? 
 
What are the possible solutions? 
The shared solution was to provide total care for the family for eleven months, offering 
all types of support to the child and her parents. 
 
Have all necessary meetings taken place?  
All meetings occurred. The medical team met every day with the family. 
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Have all the options been understood by who will decide? 
Yes, they have. The Center of III Lever offered them every means to understand their 
possible present and future situations. 
 
 
 
 In the literature the criterion of “terminal” is at the core of intensive research 
activity. Given that all that is extraordinary is not obligatory, it would seem that where 
there is terminal illness the ethical question, i.e. whether treatment should be continued 
or not, answers itself. 
The notion of “terminal” is one of the parameters which make it possible to choose the 
most appropriate therapy for a better quality of life during the end-of-life process.268 
The criteria of “terminal” renders ethically legitimate the possibility – but not 
necessarily the obligation - of withdrawing or withholding a clinically configured 
treatment as non-proportionate. The patient always has the last word regarding this 
choice, but, as we shall see later, not the only one. In the literature there is one 
substantial study on the historical development of the definition of terminally ill: it is a 
paper by D. Hui, it offers a synchronic elaboration of the different definitions of 
“terminal” from various sources from 1984 to 2012.269 
In this paper Mc Cusker’s definition in the matter of the terminal care period is cited. 
He writes: “The period during which there is evidence of progressive malignancy, and 
in which therapy cannot realistically be expected to prolong survival significantly. 
Patients enter this period either at time of diagnosis, or following a period of active 
treatment. The onset of the terminal care period should not be confused with the point at 
which life-expectation is estimated to be short. A patient might be expected to die 
within a few months, but have a treatable malignancy. This patient would still be in the 
active treatment period”270. In another paper by D. Hui, the life-span of the terminally ill 
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is so defined: “a life expectancy of six months or less”271. On the contrary in The 
Hastings Center Guidelines the term Terminally Ill means “having an incurable or 
irreversible condition that has a high probability of causing death within a relatively 
short time with or without treatment”272. 
The definition of the Hastings Center Guidelines underlines the time limit without a 
precise edge. The term “terminal” can’t be considered univocal in all fields of medicine. 
In oncology “terminal” is a clinical criterion used to make a prognosis.273 In neurology 
(in particular in Alzheimer disease), “terminal” corresponds to the most acute phase of 
the disease.274 In all of these definitions an important aspect is the clinical factor, which 
defines life expectancy. This element may be considered to be more important than the 
more ample criteria of “terminal”, because it seems to play a relevant role in the 
patient’s quality of life and in his/her possible future choices. 
In general when a patient is terminal each treatment can be evaluated as 
disproportionate. The criterion of “Terminal” acquires a predominant position in the 
definition of the principle of proportionality. J. Capasso et al. write: “The goal at this 
point [terminal phase] is mainly supportive: to ensure the most comfort for the patient 
and the people providing care. Other goals at this point include symptom management, 
emotional and spiritual support, help with personal care, transportation assistance, and 
improving communication with health care providers”275. The life expectancy of less 
than six months results as a sufficiently shared criterion for the approval of the 
suspension of treatments, including lifesaving ones, save hydration and nutrition. D. F. 
Kelly writes: “Treatments are morally extraordinary when their burdens outweigh their 
benefits”276.  
“Terminal” seems to be a diagnosis (in oncological diseases) that offers certain 
guarantees; it is often used to define a specific clinical condition (as shown previously 
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Journal of Pain and Symptom Manage, 2012; 43: 582-592. 
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Treatment and Care Near the End of Life, revisited and expanded 2nd ed., New York, Oxford University 
Press, 2013, 205. 
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by the definitions): it seems to offer more security regarding choices about withholding 
or withdrawing treatment. These choices should be shared as much as possible so as not 
to violate the patient’s right to autonomy. 
 
Where there are no treatments which can cure or block the progression of the disease, 
the cause of death is strongly (although not exclusively) connected to the disease itself 
and not to the discontinuation of treatment. According to the principle of double effect, 
D.F Kelly writes: “the direct killing of an innocent person is never morally right, but 
allowing a person to die is sometimes morally right” 277 . Noteworthy are the 
considerations regarding the role of the double effect in end of life decision making by 
T.E. Quill et al. because they emphasize the clinician’s intent. They write: “This 
principle is often cited to explain why certain forms of care at the end of life that result 
in death are morally permissible and others are not. […] The rule of double effect is a 
conceptually and psychologically complex doctrine that distinguishes between 
permissible and prohibited actions by relying heavily on the clinician’s intent”278. 
At this point a possible dichotomy arises: the clinical data and consequently the terminal 
prognosis seem to have a direct influence on the moral question, i.e. questions of 
conscience, inherent in the decision to withdraw or to withhold treatment; withholding 
treatment may help to provide a higher quality of life during the patient’s last moments, 
although it may accelerate the dying process. 
There are three ethically relevant aspects that may help to explain why terminal illness 
is a key criterion in end of life issues. They are: 
1. Is the criterion of terminal illness only clinical data?  
In a situation of terminal illness the principle of proportionality seems too biased 
towards the clinical data, but at the same time, the criterion of terminal represents a 
sufficient but not necessary clinical condition to determine whether to withdraw or to 
withhold treatment. There are therefore other factors, which can come into play, which 
influence decisions regarding good therapeutic choices. R.P. Hamel and J.J. Walter 
write about the intentions involved in ending treatment: “Life is something more than 
biological existence. Life is a conditional value which couples biological existence with 
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social, spiritual and human activities such as loving, praying, remembering, forgiving 
and experiencing. Life is all these things. Consequently, when these activities can no 
longer be realized, there is no moral obligation to continue medical treatment, unless to 
relieve suffering. The conclusion that treatment can stop does not mean that the person 
is worthless, but that the person has activated all human potential”279. 
2. Can the criterion of terminal illness influence the policies of rationalizing the use of 
economic resources in the health care field? J.W. Finn writes: “Patients with inadequate 
social support, and patients who are impoverished or poorly adherent to prescribed 
regimens, may have shorter life expectancies. Unresolved relationship issues or 
existential distress may prolong the dying process 280 . If true, this allows us to 
underscore both the ethical issues relating to the burdens of health care, and the inherent 
question of whether terminal patients should have the possibility of obtaining life-
sustaining care”281. 
3. Does the criterion of “terminal” respond to a specific moral issue? If so, which one?  
It defines the difference between directly causing death and letting someone die. This 
difference seems to be the most important feature in justifying the substantive meaning 
of “terminal”: the cause of death is related to the irreversibility of the terminal disease 
and not to the suspension of treatments. From a Catholic perspective, the difference 
between letting someone die and killing them also excludes the immediate and mediate 
material cooperation with evil, in reference to the patient’s death.282 
J.P. Bishop writes about the distinction between killing and allowing a patient to die: 
“In the traditional formulation, there is thus no distinction between acts of commission 
and acts of omission, but there is a morally important distinction that remains helpful 
for the care of the dying; that distinction is between directly and indirectly causing 
death. Today, directly causing death is often seen as parallel with acts of commission; 
indirectly causing death is commonly confused with acts of omission. But nothing could 
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be further from the case in the older formulation. Acts of commission and acts of 
omission are both forms of directly causing death for both entail the direct action of the 
will”283. 
Based on the above-mentioned critical analysis one can identify the key factors 
regarding what is really crucial regarding end-of life decisions in near death situations: 
a) the relationship between persons (patient, physician, family member), b) the dialectic 
between resistance to and surrender to a terminal disease. 
All three aspects have important ethical implications but the third aspect seems to be the 
most relevant moral criterion for those who must decide. This last feature turns out to be 
the most significant, irrespective of who will have the last word (patient, family member 
or legal guardian).  
The criterion of “terminal” maintains its specific ethical and clinical value, given the 
difference between directly causing death and letting someone die. 
But is all that has been said so far enough? Can the difference between killing and 
allowing someone to die only be understood through the criterion of terminal illness? 
The criterion of “terminal” provides guidelines to establish the difference between 
killing and allowing someone to die, but this difference may not be comprehensible only 
by using this criterion. 
Is this criterion really nullifying? Or do we take it for granted that just because it 
reassures, it eases the consciences of those who should decide? Perhaps it is useful to 
take time to think. From the ethical point of view, in the case of a patient with a non-
terminal incurable disease the suspension of treatments is in any case a choice: a choice 
always within a narrow range of possibilities: “there is a grey zone of physician 
complicity”284. On the other hand if the patient is terminal the suspension appears to be 
"always" more clear and morally licit. 
The decision to withdraw treatment is made considering the clinical data, but this may 
not be the only factor. In a quality care situation, the clinical reality which can best 
justify the idea of conditioned and shared surrendering to the disease is the 
irreversibility factor. 
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In the case of non-terminally ill patients with incurable diseases suspension of treatment 
is debatable from an ethical point of view, while it is “always” licit to withdraw 
treatment if the patient is a terminally ill. 
There are some valid reasons for discussion regarding the suspension of treatment in 
patients afflicted with incurable but non-terminal diseases. They are at least three: 1. If 
the criterion of proportionality originates from a dialectic relationship between clinical 
conditions and the existential status of a specific patient, terminal status leans strongly 
and inevitably towards the clinic condition; 2. Today “terminal” appears to be too 
restrictive a clinical criterion; technology prolongs difficult and painful clinical 
situations indefinitely, and often patients do not have the additional financial resources 
necessary to continue treatment; 3. It is essential to consider the complicated situations 
of the patients’ families or loved ones. They are often required to attend to their loved 
ones for prolonged periods of time. 
The criterion of irreversibility has not only a clinical but also an ethical value. Only in a 
good physician-patient relationship may the criterion of irreversibility help to decide 
about the suspension of the treatment. And this is true not only when the patient is 
terminally ill. The act of surrender seems justified when disease is irreversible. This 
clinical data must be related to both patient’s quality of life and the patient’s therapeutic 
history.  
Why does irreversibility better correspond to the difference between killing and 
allowing someone to die than the “terminal” factor? 
Both irreversible and “terminal” conditions oblige us to recognize what the ultimate 
limits are to which a sick person must surrender. But the irreversibility factor leaves 
room for the power of choice of the sick person or of the proxy. The criterion of 
irreversibility can be fully included in the notion of proportionality, through which it is 
possible to arrive at a morally “good” choice regarding suspension of treatment.285 
The elements that make it ethically acceptable to the situation are:  
1. if the disease which the subject is afflicted with is irreversible, the prognosis is poor, 
and their condition is worsening; i.e. there are no scientifically valid therapies and their 
condition is doomed to continuous deterioration over time; 2. if the subject  has 
manifested forms of resistance to the diseases. From this point of view, having had the 
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experience of the treatment that is to be suspended is a significant aspect (and indirect 
experience cannot be excluded from the equation, i.e. having witnessed a loved one 
suffering from the same disease). In some cases this is the only possibility – vegetative 
states come to mind, of which of course one cannot have direct experience); 3. if 
suspension is gradual: it is not about “pulling the plug”, but suspending things before 
more invasive treatments begin, then slowly progressing towards more traditional 
treatments (this allows time to contemplate mixed solutions); 4. if it acknowledges the 
value of the underlying symbolic gestures of care: this allows us to focus attention on 
the methods by which treatments are administered and meaning connected to said 
methods.286 
These reasons were explained briefly to the pediatrician during our meeting, and it gave 
him the possibility to understand another point of view (the ethics point of view), which 
had great influence on his convincing himself that the chosen path was at the same time 
the hardest but also the most correct for this child (especially since it had been shared 
with and promoted by the parents). 
 
 
 Clinical Ethics Record 
 
 The last point concerns the Clinical Ethics Record, a database used to analyze 
the data about Ethics Consultation. The ethics consultation is not only focused on single 
clinical cases, but is also oriented towards reporting and evaluating a posteriori the 
consultations carried out. Therefore, every case consultation should be accompanied by 
the filing of a clinical ethics record.287 The international literature confirms this practice, 
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but there are only few studies related to the assessment of how the ethics consultation is 
able to meet the specific needs in a hospital. 
The compiling of the clinical ethics record by the consultant should help: to report the 
data on the consultation; to verify and to improve the consultation service provided by 
the consultant or the clinical ethics committee; to understand who, when and why an 
ethics consultation is requested; and to develop guidelines.  
The majority of the clinical ethics services take note of ethics consultations to create a 
database. Compiling a clinical ethics record implies having both a history of the ethics 
consultations and the possibility of developing an ethics consultation service focused on 
the specific contexts in which the consultant works. In our experience the clinical ethics 
record is a valid tool for performing a consultation and in the development of empirical 
research. 
Following I present a clinical ethics record model, in which the consultant reports the 
information about the patient, the health care team, the ethical questions (identification, 
analysis, clarification) and the consultant’s recommendations about one or more 
possible solutions which were developed. 
 
 
An example of a Clinical Ethics Record 
 
 
n. …/… 
Date: …/…/… 
Time: …:… 
Name of the Consultant: ……………… 
 
Regarding the Consultation Requestor: 
 
Name of the Consultation Requestor: …………… 
 
Age: …… 
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Role: Department: Field of the Consultation: 
 
MD ☐ 
RN ☐ 
JD ☐ 
Family  member ☐ 
Clergy ☐ 
Doctor of 
psychology ☐ 
Genetic counselor ☐ 
Ethics Committee ☐ 
Management Team 
☐ 
Other: 
……………….. 
 
Neonatology☐ 
Pediatrics ☐ 
Cardiology ☐ 
Oncology ☐ 
Pediatric ICU ☐ 
ICU ☐ 
Gastroenterology ☐ 
Neurology ☐ 
Psychiatry  ☐ 
Nephrology ☐ 
Genetics ☐ 
Obs. and Gyn. ☐ 
Palliative Care Unit 
☐ 
Other: 
……………….. 
 
End-of-life issues ☐ 
Quality of life ☐ 
Parental decision-making ☐ 
Informed consent ☐ 
Professional obligation ☐ 
Disagreement among professionals ☐ 
Discharge planning ☐ 
Professional integrity ☐ 
Medical and surgical treatments ☐ 
Patient/family behavior ☐ 
Professional boundaries ☐ 
Resource utilization ☐ 
Decisional capacity ☐ 
Treatment genetics ☐ 
Resource allocation ☐ 
Refusal of non-life-threatening 
treatment ☐ 
Decision-making ☐ 
Genetics ☐ 
Miscommunication/misunderstanding 
☐ 
Pain control ☐ 
Quality of care ☐ 
Reproduction ☐ 
Non-compliance ☐ 
Truth-telling/disclosure ☐ 
Treatment innovation ☐ 
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Professional distress ☐ 
Other: ……………….. 
 
 
Location of the Consultation: …………… 
 
1- Level of urgency: 
☐ earliest 
☐ planned consultancy 
☐ within 1 day  
☐ within 3 days  
☐ within 5 days 
 
2- Reason for the Ethics Consultation: 
☐Advice 
☐Validation 
☐Problem-solving 
☐Information  
☐Conflict resolution  
 
About the Patient: 
Patient’s name: ………………… 
 
Age: ………… 
 
3- Patient’s decision making capacity: 
………………………………………………………… 
………………………………………………………… 
 
4- Information about the authorized proxy (if applicable): 
………………………………………………………… 
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………………………………………………………… 
 
5- Medical and Personal History: 
………………………………………………………… 
………………………………………………………… 
 
6- Patient’s preferences and interests  
(culture, religion, quality of life considerations): 
………………………………………………………… 
………………………………………………………… 
 
7- Prognosis: 
………………………………………………………… 
………………………………………………………… 
 
8- Ethical dilemma, question, issue, doubt: 
………………………………………………………… 
………………………………………………………… 
 
9- The ethical issue or dilemma has been shared: 
☐ with the medical team 
☐ with the medical and nursing teams 
☐ with the medical team and the patient 
☐ with the medical and nursing teams and the patient 
☐ with the medical team and the family members 
☐ with the medical and nursing teams and the family members 
☐ with the medical team, nursing team, the patient and the family members 
☐ other: ……………………………………………… 
 
About the decision: 
10- What kind of decision has been made? 
………………………………………………………… 
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………………………………………………………… 
………………………………………………………… 
 
11- Who took the final decision? 
☐ the medical team 
☐ the medical and nursing teams 
☐ the medical team and the patient 
☐ the medical and nursing teams and the patient 
☐ the medical team and the family members 
☐ the medical and nursing teams and the family members 
☐ the medical team, nursing team, the patient and the family members 
☐ other: ……………………………………………… 
 
12- What kind of motivation has been offered? 
………………………………………………………… 
………………………………………………………… 
 
13- Is there anybody who disagrees with the final decision? 
………………………………………………………… 
………………………………………………………… 
 
Comments: 
………………………………………………………… 
………………………………………………………… 
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Conclusions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Maybe I was not able to represent thoroughly the thirteen different ways of 
seeing a blackbirt.288 Many, perhaps too many things have been left unsaid. The work is 
not complete; perhaps, it is more the parts that are missing, the ones that have yet to be 
written. 
The Ethical theories and methods presented have been used to approach the different 
cases described during the Doctoral Course. These analyses require further reflection as 
to their exhaustiveness in approaching different clinical cases in a comprehensive 
manner. 
For this reason the analysis of the virtues and criticalities of these ethical theories and 
their methods gave me the opportunity to propose a new method, which I hope will 
bring about shared interest. 
Of course, it can be improved upon, but is this not the goal of clinical ethics? That is to 
create new constructive points of reflection in order to better track that thin red line 
between different positions, to make a definitive choice which provides the best 
possible solution? 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
288 Sulmasy D, Sugarman J (eds.), Methods in Medical Ethics, Washington DC, Georgetown University 
Press, 20102. 
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The mistake that I want to underscore is that the fact that everyone can create their own 
ethic, ignoring the validity of a concerted effort to share dilemmas, issues or doubts (just 
as the word “ethics” suggests) which are not resolvable a priori, or by simply applying 
general logic or common sense. 
The effort should begin with reasoning together. Each of us starts from nuances, 
experiences and different meanings, but the risk is that we live each day in a department 
as 'moral strangers', at the same time both near and far. Therefore, sharing seems to be 
an essential aspect. 
Sharing does not necessarily mean agreeing, but finding a moment in which to explain 
one’s own contrasting opinions, in a reasonable and tolerant manner, and to seek the 
possibility of achieving a synthesis in order to come to one final choice. 
Through general sharing we can begin to discuss specific cases, the difficulties involved 
for both the patient and the health care professional, and the reasons why a specific 
therapeutic strategy should be followed. 
The goal is to acknowledge clinical ethics as an integral part of everyday medical 
practice, recognizing that in all branches of medicine there are numerous ethical issues 
to take on and resolve. 
And it is precisely, given this common goal, that it is desirable that this field of 
research, between philosophy and medicine, develops and finds a recognized place in 
healthcare settings. 
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